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How IKEA Evolved Its Strategy While Keeping Its Culture Constant

If you’re leading your team through big changes, this episode is for you.

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The Swedish furniture maker IKEA found huge success producing quality furniture at affordable prices. But in 2017, the company was at a crossroads. Its beloved founder had died, and the exponential rise of online shopping posed a new challenge.

In this episode, Harvard Business School professors Juan Alcacer and Cynthia Montgomery break down how IKEA developed, selected, and embraced new strategic initiatives, while fortifying its internal culture. They studied how IKEA made big changes for the future and wrote a business case about it.

They explain how the company reworked its franchise agreements to ensure consistency among its global stores. They also discuss how IKEA balanced global growth with localization, developing all-new supply chains.

Key episode topics include: strategy, growth strategy, disruptive innovation, emerging markets, leadership transition, competitive strategy, company culture, succession.

HBR On Strategy curates the best case studies and conversations with the world’s top business and management experts, to help you unlock new ways of doing business. New episodes every week.

• Listen to the original HBR Cold Call episode: IKEA Navigates the Future While Staying True to Its Culture (2021)
• Find more episodes of Cold Call
• Discover 100 years of Harvard Business Review articles, case studies, podcasts, and more at HBR.org .

HANNAH BATES: Welcome to HBR On Strategy , case studies and conversations with the world’s top business and management experts, hand-selected to help you unlock new ways of doing business. The Swedish furniture maker IKEA found huge success producing quality furniture at affordable prices. But in 2017, they were at a crossroads. Their beloved founder had died, and the exponential rise of online shopping posed a new challenge. Today, we bring you a conversation about how to develop, select, and embrace a new strategic initiative – with Harvard Business School professors Juan Alcacer and Cynthia Montgomery. They studied how IKEA made big changes for the future while fortifying its internal culture and its external identity. In this episode, you’ll learn how the company reworked its franchise agreements to create a more managerial and modern culture, and ensure consistency among its global stores. You’ll also learn how they balanced global growth with localization – including new supply chains. This episode originally aired on Cold Call in June 2021. Here it is.

BRIAN KENNY: For some of the world’s most celebrated founders, the entrepreneurial drive kicks off at an early age. Mark Zuckerberg developed Facebook in his Harvard dorm room at the age of 18. Michael Dell made $200,000 upgrading computers in his first year of business, he was 19. Before Jack Dorsey founded Twitter, he created a dispatch routing platform for taxis in his hometown of St. Louis, while he was in middle school. But then there’s Ingvar Kamprad who began selling matches at the age of five to neighbors in his rural Swedish homestead. By the age of seven, he was buying matches in bulk in Stockholm and selling them at a profit back home. Ingvar learned early on that you can sell things at a low price and still make a good profit. A philosophy that fueled the success of his next business venture, IKEA. Today on Cold Call , we welcome professors, Juan Alcacer, and Cynthia Montgomery to discuss their case entitled, “What IKEA Do We Want?” I’m your host, Brian Kenny, and you’re listening to Cold Call on the HBR Presents network. Juan Alcacer’s research focuses on the international strategies of firms in the telecommunications industry and Cynthia Montgomery studies the unique roles leaders play in developing and implementing strategy. They are both members of the Strategy unit at Harvard Business School. And thank you both for joining me today. It’s great to have you on the show.

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: Thanks Brian.

JUAN ALCACER: Thank you for having us.

BRIAN KENNY: You’re both here for the first time, so we’ll try and make it painless so we can get you to come back on. I think people are going to love hearing about IKEA and getting an inside view. Most of us have had that experience of being like mice in a maze. When you go into an IKEA store, you are compelled to walk through the whole place. It’s really brilliant, so many of the touches and things that they’ve done. And this case helps to shine a light, I think, on some of those decisions and how they were made. I had no idea how old the company was. So just starting with its history, it’s going to be good to hear about that. Juan, I want you to start, if you could, by telling us what would your cold call be to start this case in the classroom?

JUAN ALCACER: I like to start the case, bringing in the emotions of the students and their relationship with IKEA. So most of our students have had some experience with IKEA. So I’d just start asking how many of you have been in IKEA, and then I’d start asking why? Why did you go to IKEA? And this time telling you all the things that you just mentioned, for instance, walking through the maze, going to eat the meatballs. So they started bringing all these small, decisions that were made through the years, that made IKEA, IKEA.

BRIAN KENNY: Who doesn’t love the meatballs? Cynthia, let me ask you, you’re both in the Strategy unit at Harvard Business School, there’s a lot of strategy underlying this whole case. I’m curious as to what made you decide to look at IKEA and sort of, how does it relate to your scholarship and the things that you think about; the questions you try to answer?

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: I’m really interested in the choices firms make about who they will be and why they will matter? The core questions at the identity of a company. In 1976 Kamprad laid out very, very carefully. What IKEA would do, who it would be. He identified its product range. The customers it would serve, the company’s pricing policy, all in a document called, The Testament of a Furniture Dealer. And he described it as, “the essence of our work.” And 45 years later, it was still required reading for all of the IKEA’s employees. It’s probably the most compelling statement of corporate purpose I’ve ever seen.

BRIAN KENNY: Remarkable in a company that’s based on furniture. It was a very, sort of powerful thing. There’s an exhibit in the case that shows the whole Testament. Maybe we can dig a little bit into the history here. I alluded to the fact that it’s been around for a long time. Cynthia, just tell us a little bit about how the company came to be and how it evolved over time.

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: IKEA started actually as a mail-order business in Sweden and in the late 1940s Kamprad noticed that despite a lot of demand for furniture, agreements between the furniture manufacturers and retailers were keeping furniture prices real high. He was interested in a different set of customers. And he decided that to attract farmers and working class customers, he needed to be able to offer quality furniture at lower prices.

BRIAN KENNY: What were some of the early challenges that they faced. I’m also curious a little bit about the Swedish culture and how that sort of factors in here. Because there was definitely undertones of that factoring into the way they set this up.

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: It’s a virtue to be frugal and to be very careful about how you spend your money. And that made a huge impression, particularly given his background, growing up on a farm for Kamprad, he decided he really wanted to lower the prices of furniture and began to do so. And it turned out that there was a very, very strong response from other furniture manufacturers who basically said that they were going to boycott him. They wouldn’t allow him into their furniture fairs, him personally, as well as his company. And so in turn, what happened was that they also pressured local suppliers not to sell to a IKEA anymore, basically trying to force him out of the market. And what happened was that that actually drove Kamprad to Poland as a source of supply because local firms wouldn’t supply him anymore. And in the process, he discovered that Polish manufacturers could actually make furniture at far, far lower costs than Swedish manufacturers. And that essentially gave IKEA a cost structure that was more like a difference in kind, than a difference in degree. And that proved enormously important to building almost insurmountable competitive advantage for IKEA.

BRIAN KENNY: He was also really keen with innovations early on that things like the restaurant area and the childcare space, what were some of the insights that drove him to make those kinds of decisions?

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: One of the things that he decided quite early on is that he wanted to have the stores located out of town. And the reason is because land there was much, much cheaper. So he built these ,as you described earlier, Brian, these gigantic stores on the outskirts of town and they had lots and lots of square footage and lots and lots of merchandise, but you know, it took time to get there. It took time to shop there and what he wanted to do was make it worth it for the customers to make the trip, worth it for them to spend a lot of time in the stores. So he decided to add restaurants and the now famous meatballs, which come in several flavors, actually around the world, and to add childcare centers that would care for young children while the parents shopped. On the low cost front, he was innovative in other ways, he actually borrowed the idea of flat pack from another innovator, but he’s the one that actually brought it to life in such a big way. Then he discovered that if you let the clients go in and pick off the furniture packs themselves, they could even save more money and lower the costs in the store.

BRIAN KENNY: So they have a pretty complicated org structure, when we start to dig into some of the nuance of the case. Juan, could you describe for us, how they’re set up from an org structure standpoint?

JUAN ALCACER: You have to realize that coming from Sweden, which is one of the countries with the highest taxation for corporations in the world. So early on, they decided to find some organization structure and legal structure that would allow them to lower taxes. And that created basically an ownership based on foundations, based in the Netherlands. And they decided, early on, to separate the company into pieces. One is the franchise store, which is basically running the brand and running the management image of the brand. And then the operational part of the company, which is a franchisee. And for many years, those two things were separated. The franchisee was also in charge of manufacturing and so forth. So it was a very strange structure, that was put in place in part by the charisma and the leadership style of Ingvar Kamprad. If I can go back to your question about the Swedish culture. One of the things that, at least for me, is very striking is that when you look at multinationals, there’s a thing called the liability of being a foreigner, which means that when you go to another country, you have some disadvantages. And you try to mitigate that liability of being a foreigner, by pretending to be of that particular country. IKEA went with a totally different approach, they’re totally Swedish. Names of their products are impossible to pronounce. The fact that they have meatballs, they have their Swedish flags all over the place. They embrace the Swedish spirit as a part of the brand. You don’t see many multinationals with that. That makes IKEA what it is today.

BRIAN KENNY: I definitely think that’s part of the appeal here in the US, for sure, is people being exposed to the Swedish culture in a way they never had before. What is the culture of the company like, what’s it like to work there?

JUAN ALCACER: We went to both the Netherlands and to Sweden and we had a great time. It’s a very egalitarian culture. All the VP’s, high-level managers, none of them have an assistant. Only the CEO has an assistant. They don’t have offices, so everybody shares an open space. The whole place is decorated with IKEA furniture, everybody talks to each other by their first name. It’s very collegial, very friendly.

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: I would add to that. I think IKEA was incredibly generous to us, in the sense that they shared all kinds of confidential, internal documents and were really willing to talk in a very open and forthright way, about both their strengths and their challenges, which was incredibly refreshing. And as Juan said, that it was very egalitarian, and not surprisingly IKEA was one of the first companies to embrace democratic design. And that spirit was everywhere in the company.

BRIAN KENNY: Cynthia, what would you say are some of the keys to their success over the years?

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: I’d say that IKEA basically picked a lane and stuck with it. They had clarified, as I said at the top of the show, very, very carefully about what they wanted to do, who they wanted to be. And what they said is, look, this is what we’re going to be about. We’re going to offer an extensive range of practical, well-designed furnishings at low prices. And we’re going to serve the many, not the few. And the many are those with limited financial resources. When you have such clarity about what you want to do, then you can set out and try to maximize how you approach that. Essentially IKEA built a system, to do exactly that, extremely well and their distinctiveness made them truly an iconic firm. And it’s great when you talk with students about, what’s the purpose of your business?, What are you doing? What’s interesting is that oftentimes they can describe much more carefully what IKEA is doing, than what their own businesses doing. The last thing I would add, is that as Juan one said, they’re really synonymous with Sweden and they put that right out there. It’s almost like the way that Coca-Cola is synonymous with the US. And that has been a big part of their advantage.

BRIAN KENNY: Okay. So we’ve painted a very rosy picture for IKEA, but it’s an HBS case. So there’s tension, inevitably. So let’s dig in a little bit to where the case brings us. I’m going to mispronounce his name. I hope I don’t, but Torbjörn Lööf is that close?

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: Yeah.

BRIAN KENNY: He is the protagonist in the case. And he is stepping into a leadership role here really after an iconic leader has stepped back and that’s a challenge. Any time that happens, and a leader has to step in. And as he starts to sort of peek underneath the hood a little bit, he starts to see some of the challenges that IKEA is facing in this now seventh decade, I guess, of their existence. So Juan, maybe you can set that up for us a little bit.

JUAN ALCACER: It’s not only that he is stepping in the shadow of a leader that created the company. It’s that the company is still controlled by the family. So this is not a public firm, this is a private firm. So, he had to basically walk a very, very thin line, trying to take IKEA towards the future, but still preserving the past. And he had basically two main tasks, one is short term, that organization restructure that we were talking about, that was very complicated was created products. As I said before, the franchisee, which is basically the one that was running all the operations, was also the manufacturer. But there were other franchises. So for instance, the operations in Middle East are run by another company. So they wanted to create a system of transparency, that all the franchises are run the same way. When you have a franchisee that has basically represented 80% of your sales, and the ones that are representing 2% or 3%, there is an imbalance of power. So they tried to create a structure that is more managerial, that is more modern, that will allow to create incentives for new franchisees to come into the system. So that transaction was basically transferring production and transferring the functions that were in the franchisee back to the franchisor. There were 25,000 people that have to move from one place to another.

BRIAN KENNY: Wow.

JUAN ALCACER: They didn’t move physically, but in terms of the legal status they shift around. And the second is to bring IKEA to the world. What they observed is that there were some changes in demographics, they were targeting the low-income, what they call the thin wallets of the world, but it turned out that people that would go to IKEA are not thin wallets anymore. These people have already moved towards the middle-class and they also have this whole, to increase the number of consumers to three billion, and that meant that they have to basically grow globally, at a rate that they have never done, before they had two or three markets, like China and India. They also have the issue of eCommerce, to pick up and every retailer in the world is dealing with that. So, it’s two steps. One, getting the house in order, and second one, creating a path for the future for IKEA to become an icon for the next 75 years.

BRIAN KENNY: Yeah. And I also think at some level it’s hard to sustain that original mission that they set out with, when you’re trying to expand so rapidly and bring in a much larger audience. Cynthia, I don’t know if you have other observations about these changes they were facing.

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: Absolutely. Because one thing is that you can look at the challenges that came from expanding into new geographies. But the other thing that they found in a large study that they did, is that there were challenges in their core business as well, that the countries they’d been in for a number of years, and what I’ll call the big blue box stores, mostly in developed countries. What they found is that increasingly many of their customers in those markets wanted new conveniences. They wanted stores that were located closer to city centers because a number of people say in their late twenties, early thirties are not driving and don’t have cars. And they found that there was an increasing demand for delivery and assembly services for shopping online. These trends are worrying to a huge number of retailers, but particularly a challenge to IKEA because low price, low, low price, so low that that people can recognize the difference. That being at the heart of their strategy. And customers’ willingness to spend time getting to the store, hauling furniture about, ultimately assembling it. Those are at the very, very heart of their low-cost strategy and their very distinctive value proposition. It was a big challenge within the developed markets as well.

BRIAN KENNY: And depending on where they went in the world, a different set of challenges pops up almost everywhere. Juan, you mentioned earlier that they pushed back against localization, but is that a sustainable strategy? When you’re trying to go into entirely new markets like China and India.

JUAN ALCACER: The beauty of IKEA is that they found a segment across different cultures that was very similar. College students the United States, that needed to have furniture for a few years only, it could be young couples that are opening a new house, in some places it’s immigrants that are moving from one country to another country that need to buy furniture, but they don’t have the money to do so. So there was this very common segment across the world that they were able to then define, that allows them to have basically 80% of their line, of their range, is common across countries. And they have around 10% to 20% that varies by country. Now, when they go to China, and they go to India, they find that the changes have to be of a higher scale for three reasons. One, the tastes are different, also the materials, when you are going to India and you are going to houses that are in a high humidity environment, the type of wood that you can use is different. Now you start, not only changing the look of the product but you also have to change how you made it. And the third big challenge is when you look at what is defined as thin wallet, in these markets, is really thin. It’s not thin wallet in Sweden, it’s not thin wallet in the United States. So, you have to go to prices that are really, really low. And that means that you are already a low cost producer but you have to go even lower. That means that you have to change your supplier, so it starts changing the fundamental parts of the business model that they created through the years.

BRIAN KENNY: And it could probably, pretty easily, get away from you. So this does call for a strategy. Cynthia, can you describe for us what the three roads forward are? This was sort of underpinned their strategy going forward and how they were going to deal with some of these challenges.

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: Basically, the three roads, the first was affordability, as Juan said, this isn’t affordability in the way that they, at the level at which they’ve traditionally thought about it. This is affordability for wallets that are either very thin or actually where the willingness to pay just isn’t as high, because they’re accustomed to having goods that are at very low prices. So they wanted to attack affordability for people who could not afford IKEA today. They cared a lot about accessibility. They’ve got to reach and interact with people where they are. And the last is sustainability, and they felt really, really strongly about this. And I think much in line with what you see with a number of other countries in Europe, that they cared a lot about the sustainability of the products and wanted to make a positive impact for people, society and the planet. And they’re taking on all three of these aspirations at once.

BRIAN KENNY: You have written many cases, I’m sure that parallel this, what are some other firms that have faced similar challenges and maybe figured out a way to deal with the same sets of challenges?

JUAN ALCACER: The challenge of going overseas, we didn’t write cases about multinationals for many years. They always have this tension between coordination in headquarters and adaptability in each one of the subsidiaries. So IKEA was very good at playing that game for many, many years. In a way they were going to countries that were somehow similar to Sweden. Now that they are venturing to countries that are farther away in many dimensions, not only physically, but also in terms of economic distribution, in terms of taste. They are seeing this tension to be amplified. We have seen that in many companies, Procter and Gamble has been doing that for years and years, Unilever has been doing that for years and years. IKEA has done it for 75 years. They went overseas very early on. But now the challenge is a little bit higher. The other challenge is that Cynthia also mentioned, which is basically adapting to new technologies and new demographics. Every retailer is facing that. Any supermarket, any chain that has been selling in brick and mortar is facing those challenges. So, what is interesting about IKEA is that they are facing these all at the same time and they’re facing this during the process of transition from the leader that created the company to a new set of managers that are more professional and are not part of the family.

BRIAN KENNY: You mentioned technology. I’m just curious, the role that the internet plays in this, because now everybody can see, you know, through YouTube and other things, what the experience is like from one place to the other, and how important is consistency across all those geographies, versus a little bit of localization to make it feel a little bit more like this is the China version of IKEA versus the European version of IKEA. Cynthia, do you have thoughts on that?

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: That’s the real challenge here in the sense that, how do you take this whole model that has been developed over so many years? And it’s very, very hard to imitate, which has given them a lot of strength over the years, but when the environment changes, instead of responding in a piecemeal way to all kinds of external stimuli, it’s how do you take this whole model and evolve it in some coherent way that stays true to the iconic sense of who IKEA is? I really see it fundamentally, as an existential question for IKEA.

BRIAN KENNY: Such a great point. Look, I want to thank both of you. This has been a really interesting discussion about a brand that we all know and have experienced many times firsthand. I have one more question for each of you before we part ways. And that would be if there’s one thing you want people to take away from this case, what would it be? Juan, let’s start with you.

JUAN ALCACER: What I would like listeners to take from this, is we have this mentality of growth, growth, growth, and expanding and doing different things, and when you look at IKEA, you have to wonder, is it better that IKEA stays doing what they do well, or do they have to keep growing and entering all these markets and adapt to overseas. We have this basic assumption that growth at any cost should be the goal. I would like the listeners, when they look at the case and think about the cases, to question that very basic assumption.

BRIAN KENNY: Cynthia?

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: One of the things about IKEA that I think it’s really, really important to know is that they really brought something different to the world and they did it in a very compelling way. So at the heart, to do something that’s distinctive, that adds value. It comes through really strong in the IKEA story. At the same time, when the environment changes, how do you evolve, is really challenging. And so the fact that they’re being so open in how they’re confronting this, I think there’s a lot to learn there. It’s a challenge. I think it’s really important to remember what’s at the heart of this company, is that they’re really bringing something that’s very unique and they need to continue to do that.

BRIAN KENNY: Juan Alcacer, Cynthia Montgomery, thank you so much for joining me. The case is called, “What IKEA do we want?” Thanks again.

JUAN ALCACER: Thank you.

HANNAH BATES: You just heard Harvard Business School professors Juan Alcacer and Cynthia Montgomery in conversation with Brian Kenny on Cold Call .  We’ll be back next Wednesday with another hand-picked conversation about business strategy from the Harvard Business Review. If you found this episode helpful, share it with your friends and colleagues, and follow our show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. While you’re there, be sure to leave us a review. We’re a production of the Harvard Business Review. If you want more podcasts, articles, case studies, books, and videos like this, find it all at HBR dot org. This episode was produced by Anne Saini, and me, Hannah Bates. Ian Fox is our editor. Special thanks to Maureen Hoch, Adi Ignatius, Karen Player, Ramsey Khabbaz, Nicole Smith, Anne Bartholomew, and you – our listener. See you next week.

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• Transformation

How IKEA is stepping up its digital transformation

Reading time: 6 min

As a symbol of big box retail, the Swedish furniture giant wants to harness e‑commerce to become more efficient and agile. Ikea has therefore been committed to a radical digital transformation incorporating cloud computing since 2018 – but the Covid-19 crisis incited them to step it up.

Ikea is pursuing a large-scale transformation. In May 2021, the Swedish furniture giant announced that it was building a vast warehouse spanning 72,000 m 2 on a 16 ha site located near the port of Limay-Porcheville in the Yvelines department in France for an investment of €120 million. This future distribution centre, set for commissioning in 2026, will mostly be dedicated to online sales.

This major initiative is part of a strategy adopted by the Group in 2018 that focuses on online commerce. “Digitisation is creating new possibilities for the retail sector. We wanted to harness those possibilities in order to bolster our relationship with our customers, while continuing to offer them the best experience possible,” explained Tolga Öncü, Retail Operations Manager for Ikea, in an interview with Le Monde when this strategy was announced.

That new strategy involved fundamentally transforming the Group using new technologies. “Using digital tools, we have access to all of Ikea in a smaller space – [all while providing] continuity between physical stores and the online offering in various formats, with the possibility of receiving personalised advice,” he added.

“Digitisation creates new possibilities for the retail sector. We wanted to harness those possibilities to bolster our relationship with our customers”

New tools, new channels

Ikea brought its famous catalogue to an end in 2021, symbolising its shift to digital. After 70 years, the brand’s paper brochures – up to 200 million copies of which were printed every year, in 32 languages for over 50 countries – were discontinued. The Covid-19 crisis stepped up the decision, which was initially planned for 2022 or 2023.

The money saved will be invested in other channels and tools, especially digital ones – like the 2020 acquisition of Geomagical Labs , a specialised provider of 3D imaging. The US-based start-up’s augmented reality solution can be used to create a 3D representation of a room, “delete” the existing furniture and virtually add new pieces. The tool will be integrated into the Ikea website and its various applications.

A wave of acquisitions have taken place with the rollout of Ikea’s new strategy, including that of Geomagical Labs. “Ikea has invested over $200 million in the acquisition of 23 companies, in order to both contribute to the sector and realise the company’s long-term vision. Ikea wants to step up this strategy in the future,” said Barbara Martin Coppola, Chief Digital Officer at Ikea, in a Tech Crunch article .

The accelerator effect of Covid

The health crisis spurred the furniture giant on. Like many other businesses, the Group had to close its shops during lockdown periods and was therefore more driven than ever to boost its online presence in order to reach consumers daily through digitised services. As a result, although the brand saw its revenue drop by 7% in 2020, the French subsidiary’s online sales jumped by 44%, four times greater than in 2017, reaching 15.4% of its total revenue.

It’s a radical change to the business model. “Imagine Black Friday levels of e‑commerce orders every day! We have more than doubled the volume of Ikea’s online sales in very little time,” said Barbara Martin Coppola at the EMEA Retail Summit , organised by Google Cloud in October 2020.

Centring the cloud

The cloud is a central tool in Ikea’s digital transformation. Ikea’s Chief Digital Officer said, “We transformed our current technological infrastructure, converted our closed shops into order processing centres and activated contactless click and collect services – all while boosting capacity to manage significant volumes of web traffic and online orders. Thanks to cloud technology, we have established data models to help our colleagues by creating more effective selection processes, which has enhanced our customer experience.”

But Ikea aims to go even further and even faster by developing a multi-channel strategy with its physical shops, including those located in city centres, to offer a more comprehensive phygital experience by way of a rise in click and collect services and home deliveries.

The brand is therefore working to deploy new digital tools, such as the “Shop and Go” payment service or a geolocation system for in-store products using augmented reality. “We are currently working on how to best fulfil our customers’ needs with recommendations made using AI, as well as chatbots for simpler customer service and 3D visualisation design tools to photograph furniture in the most realistic way possible,” said Barbara Martin Coppola.

Establishing a foothold in urban centres

The shakeup of Ikea’s model is also illustrated by its actions to get closer to customers. Although historically located in city outskirts, the Group has, in the last three years, embarked on a strategy to develop urban centres in order to adapt to consumers’ changing lifestyles. The Group has invested almost €6 billion towards this objective over the 2018-2021 period.

The opening of an Ikea shop in the Madeleine neighbourhood of Paris in 2019 symbolises this movement – and that location could benefit from the new logistics warehouse at Limay-Porcheville in the Yvelines department. This future site will not only speed up deliveries to customers in the Paris area, but also improve the restocking of the shops in and around the capital, with some goods transported by river for example; a way of combining the digital transformation with the environmental transition.

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Exploring digitalisation at IKEA

International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management

ISSN : 0959-0552

Article publication date: 15 March 2022

Issue publication date: 19 December 2022

The paper aims to clarify how an incumbent retail organisation explores digitalisation for its existing business.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper draws from an in-depth case study of home-furnishing retail giant, IKEA conducted with semi-structured interviews, participant observations and document analyses.

In the exploration phase of digitalisation, three major activities – interpreting, interrelating and integrating – illuminate how the exploration process can be organised in practice.

Originality/value

Although digitalisation ranks amongst the most significant ongoing transformations in retail businesses, research on how incumbent retail organisations have engaged in exploring digitalisation in practice has remained scarce. The paper contributes insights into digitalisation processes in retail businesses that may also apply to other trends affecting the retail industry.

• Digitalisation
• Exploration

Hagberg, J. and Jonsson, A. (2022), "Exploring digitalisation at IKEA", International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management , Vol. 50 No. 13, pp. 59-76. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJRDM-12-2020-0510

Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2022, Johan Hagberg and Anna Jonsson

Published by Emerald Publishing Limited. This article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence. Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create derivative works of this article (for both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full attribution to the original publication and authors. The full terms of this licence may be seen at http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode

1. Introduction

Digitalisation , defined as the “integration of digital technologies into everyday life by the digitization of everything that can be digitized” ( Hagberg et al. , 2016 , p. 696), ranks amongst the most significant ongoing transformations in business, one that has introduced new ways of doing business whilst challenging established ones ( Leeflang et al. , 2014 ). As such, digitalisation has been characterised as a disruptive change that tests industries, their accepted logics and even individual businesses (e.g. Verhoef et al. , 2015 ; Hänninen et al. , 2018 ).

In literature addressing retail, digitalisation has received increased attention from both consumers' and retailers' perspectives ( Frasquet et al. , 2021 ), including in terms of omni-channel strategies ( Verhoef et al. , 2015 ), business models ( Jocevski et al. , 2019 ), multi-sided platforms ( Hänninen et al. , 2019 ) and the reconfiguration of retail stores ( Hagberg et al. , 2017 ). Most recently, according to Hänninen et al. (2021) , such research has integrated far more discussion and theorising about digitalisation across the value chain. However, the organisational processes that catalyse the incorporation of digital technologies in retail businesses – in March's (1991) and Winter and Szulanski's (2001) terms, the exploration phase – have received less attention. Therefore, this paper focusses on that very phase – the early stage of digitalisation – to contribute insights into digitalisation in retail ( Hänninen et al. , 2021 ) whilst answering the call for research on “how firms adapt their business models in response to external threats and opportunities” ( Saebi et al. , 2017 , p. 567).

The paper aims to clarify how an incumbent retail organisation explores digitalisation for its existing business, even as potential disruptions, their meanings and their consequences remain uncertain. To that purpose, the paper builds upon an in-depth case study on IKEA, an established firm in today's dynamic retail sector, an environment in which digitalisation especially urges business actors to rethink their ways of doing business and attracting customers ( Hänninen et al. , 2018 ; Blom, 2019 ; Jocevski et al. , 2019 ). It draws upon first-hand experiences with, and insights into, how IKEA has explored digitalisation, even when the concept was relatively elusive and how it would affect IKEA's business. In describing IKEA's exploration phase and what digitalisation has meant for its business, the paper delineates three major activities of that exploratory process: (1) interpreting what digitalisation means, (2) interrelating digitalisation and the existing business and (3) integrating new ideas and solutions in light of digitalisation.

In what follows, we review literature on digitalisation in retail and research focussing on that process's exploration phase and development in businesses. Next, we describe the methodological considerations made for our case study on IKEA. After that, we present our findings in terms of three major activities that guide the exploration phase. We conclude the paper by discussing our findings in relation to the literature and addressing our research's limitations.

2. Literature review: exploring digitalisation in retail

Having significantly impacted retail in recent years, digitalisation has become an important topic in research on the industry ( Hänninen et al. , 2021 ), especially regarding specific applications of digital technology – for example, the use of smartphones in physical retail settings ( Fuentes et al. , 2017 ; Grewal et al. , 2018 ), augmented reality ( Scholz and Duffy, 2018 ; Caboni and Hagberg, 2019 ) and digital signage ( Dennis et al. , 2012 ; Jäger and Weber, 2020 ). Studies on specific technologies have been accompanied by broader frameworks for integrating various digital technologies into retail, not only by turns based upon their usage and retailers' objectives ( Wolpert and Roth, 2020 ), their social presence and consumers' convenience ( Grewal et al. , 2020 ) and their use in relation to shopping behaviour at various stages of the customer's journey ( Rosengren et al. , 2018 ; Blom, 2019 ; Roggeveen and Sethuraman, 2020 ), but also by general frameworks of what digitalisation implies for retail business overall ( Hagberg et al. , 2016 ). In such studies, digitalisation in retail has received sustained attention regarding several aspects of consumer behaviour ( Hure et al. , 2017 ; Pantano and Gandini, 2018 ), the retailer–consumer interface ( Hagberg et al. , 2016 ; Roggeveen and Sethuraman, 2020 ) and retailers' ways of doing business ( Verhoef et al. , 2015 ; Hänninen et al. , 2018 ). The processes in which incumbent retailers develop their businesses in light of digitalisation, however, have received far less attention.

Because digitalisation, understood as the integration of digital technologies, is arguably not a binary shift from one stage to another but an ongoing process without a clear beginning or end ( Hagberg et al. , 2016 ), its exploration in retail warrants a more processual perspective, particularly regarding its influence on how retail organisations alter their businesses (cf. Langley, 1999 ). Along with frameworks addressing how retail businesses can integrate digitalisation in various ways, the actual processes that may result in digital integration need to be explored and modelled. That need directs our attention to the exploratory processes through which retail businesses may approach digitalisation and, more specifically, to how digitalisation consequently influences established business models. Especially for the latter reason, we gave priority to incumbent retailers, whose business models and established ways of conducting business often confront such considerations.

Despite extensive research on what constitutes a business model, understandings differ about how to define, explore and leverage one. In fact, Teece (2018 , p. 41) has estimated that there are probably as many definitions of business model as there are models themselves. According to Ritter and Lettl (2018) , a business model, simply put, is a company's “way of doing business”. In this paper, considering how business models have been discussed in retail settings ( Sorescu et al. , 2011 , p. 4), we broadly understand a company's business model as representing “the firm's distinctive logic for value creation and appropriation”.

Although various external events may necessitate changes to ways of developing and operating businesses, digitalisation itself is not an event but an emergent, comprehensive and uncertain phenomenon. Indeed, digitalisation can span several external and internal aspects of businesses, as well as pose myriad implications for individual business models. To date, though scholars interested in digitalisation have examined different approaches to innovating business models, from making gradual, evolutionary adjustments to radically altering them ( Berends et al. , 2016 ; Inigo et al. , 2017 ; Snihur and Wiklund, 2019 ), how the exploration phase of digitalisation is understood and organised merits further investigation.

Following March's (1991 , p. 71) definition, exploration refers to searching for, innovating and experimenting with something novel. The concept as used by March (1991) is often considered in relation to exploitation, which refers to refinement, efficiency and implementation of “old” routines or certainties in an organisation. As noted by He and Wong (2004 , p. 481), researchers in strategic management, organisation theory and managerial economics have applied the two concepts in order to understand how innovations occur and how an organisation learn and develop dynamic capabilities to meet change. Previous studies either focus on the trade-off between exploration and exploitation or the balancing act between the two as discussed within literature focussing on ambidexterity and means for developing dynamic capabilities (e.g. Benner and Tushman, 2003 ; He and Wong, 2004 ; Vahlne and Jonsson, 2017 ). The two concepts have also been applied in processual research describing the evolution and development of an organisation. Winter and Szulanski (2001) use the two concepts when outlining their theory of replication as strategy and suggest a two-phase model where the organisation first enters the exploration phase “in which the business model is created or refined” (p. 731) and then move on to the exploitation phase. The argument that exploration and exploitation can be understood in terms of different phases of a process has been adopted also by researchers focussing on, for instance, retailers' internationalisation process ( Jonsson and Foss, 2011 ), the transition into retail omni-channel strategies ( Picot-Coupey et al. , 2016 ) and reverse knowledge flows within franchise organisations ( Friesl and Larty, 2018 ). Still, how the exploration phase is organised and how it can be understood remains to be further investigated. To the best of our knowledge, there is a dearth of research focussing specifically on the exploration phase and how it develops in practice. Whilst existing studies do explore the exploration phase, it is also discussed in relation to the exploitation phase with focus on the outcomes rather than the processual aspects of the phase as such. For this paper, we zoom in on and examine the exploration phase and how it can be understood in the context of retail digitalisation. In particular, when emergent trends such as digitalisation, a change process, challenge established business models, more comprehensively re-engaging the exploration phase can become essential.

3. Methodology

Investigating a complex phenomenon such as digitalisation, and given our aim, calls for a qualitative in-depth case study ( Eisenhardt, 1989 ). According to Dyer and Wilkins (1991 , pp. 615–617), case studies aim to “provide a rich description of the social scene”, “describe the context in which events occur” and thus offer opportunities for other researchers to see “phenomena in their own experience and research”. In that sense, rich, explorative case studies provide avenues for future research or, as more broadly conceived by Doz (2011 , p. 588), “offer the opportunity to help move the field forward and assist in providing its own theoretical grounding”.

Our in-depth case study focussed on IKEA, a global home-furnishing retail company, and its work with developing an understanding of digitalisation. IKEA is a particularly interesting case that has attracted practitioners seeking a benchmark in a hitherto successful business model (e.g. Jonsson and Elg, 2006 ; Edvardsson and Enquist, 2011 ; Burt et al. , 2016 ). IKEA has frequently been used as an empirical example in the business models literature (e.g. Hedman and Kalling, 2003 ; Sorescu et al. , 2011 ) and subject to in-depth case studies of the development of specific aspects related to the IKEA business model over time (see e.g. Salzer, 1994 ; Jonsson, 2007 ; Tarnovskaya et al. , 2008 ; Edvardsson and Enquist, 2011 ; Hellström and Nilsson, 2011 ; Burt et al. , 2016 , 2021 ). In addition, there are several studies of various aspects related to digitalisation, including store format development ( Hultman et al. , 2017 ) and comparison of IKEA's digital catalogue and website ( Garnier and Poncin, 2019 ). IKEA has also served as an in-depth case for studies of exploration in relation to exploitation and replication ( Jonsson and Foss, 2011 ; Vahlne and Jonsson, 2017 ). The present study adds to this literature through an in-depth case study of IKEA's digitalisation process in an early explorative phase.

In the ten months from September 2014 to June 2015, we observed IKEA's work on exploring digitalisation and the trend's potential impacts on various parts of the organisation's business model and participated in a project undertaken in support of such exploration. In that form of action research ( Patton, 1980 ), engaging in IKEA's internal exploratory work as researchers allowed us to understand digitalisation's implications by discussing them with representatives at IKEA, which, at the time, considered knowledge of those implications to be important because they, along with digitalisation itself, remained unknown. Using such methods enabled us to contrast findings from interviews with findings from observations and synthesise the results in light of theory ( Ghauri and Grönhaug, 2002 ). In particular, our case study revolved around two ongoing projects and the processes of working within them: IKEA's “E-Commerce Programme”, later named the “Multichannel Transformation Programme”, and a project designed as a pre-study addressing the future role of IKEA's physical stores and the challenges and opportunities that they face amid digitalisation.

We collected data with three overlapping methods: in-depth semi-structured interviews, participant observations and document analyses (for an overview, see Table 1 ). As for the first, we conducted 21 interviews with senior executives with different functions in different departments at IKEA as detailed in Table 1 . Using purposeful sampling, we interviewed IKEA managers and employees working with and/or preparing for the organisation's digitalisation about their experiences with and thoughts on the concept of digitalisation and its implications. The interviews combined retrospective questions about IKEA's business model with questions about current situations experienced by the interviewees and prospective enquiries about IKEA's future in relation to digitalisation. All interviews began with open-ended questions about digitalisation in general and digitalisation at IKEA in particular. As the interviews progressed, questions became more structured and delved into the future role of IKEA stores, the specific challenges that IKEA faces, whether they will affect the IKEA concept and if so, then how. All interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim and translated into English in those cases the interviews were made in Swedish.

Meanwhile, participant observations involved three meetings – before, during and after data collection, respectively – with the project manager of the pre-study to discuss the overall project. Those meetings lasted 11 h and 36 min in all. We also engaged in both in-store observations and meetings, lasting 10 h in total, whilst visiting an IKEA store in the Altona borough of Hamburg, Germany that operates as a test store for new concepts (e.g. urban proximity, technical solutions and delivery solutions). The local managers who accompanied us during our in-store observations also met with us twice: once with five other store managers and once with five employees from different departments. We conducted both meetings as group interviews guided by the same questionnaire used in the individual interviews. During all observations, we took field notes for data about the employees' perspectives and what digitalisation meant in practice. That information was valuable when conducting interviews with IKEA managers responsible for strategic decision-making and for translating digitalisation into IKEA's business model. Last, we also collected documents and visual communication, both public and internal, for analysis. The internal documents contained information about the pre-study, the “E-Commerce Programme”, the “Multichannel Transformation Programme” and the movie “ Shop with Laura ” (see Table 1 ) and public documents included information about the IKEA history, vision and business idea statements. Documents were collected on the basis of their mentioning during the interviews or participant observation sessions. These constituted sources of detailed information preserved from the time in which they were written and less dependent on the informants' memories. Throughout data collection, we facilitated informants' validation of the data on several occasions (cf. Silverman, 2006 ), which afforded us the opportunity to discuss our observations and findings with the participants. Apart from our participant observations, we also hosted two internal workshops with the project manager of the pre-study to discuss our findings.

To analyse the data, we used systematic combining ( Dubois and Gadde, 2002 ) – i.e. alternated focus between our empirical material and theory – whilst developing our case study and the emerging framework. For integrity's sake, we triangulated the three major sources of data – participant observations, interviews and document analysis ( Silverman, 2006 ) – during all four steps of data analysis. First, we coded the transcripts with reference to keywords and phrases related to digitalisation and its consequences for the retail industry in general and IKEA in particular. In that step, we adopted an emic perspective that prioritised the perceptions and understandings of the informants ( McCracken, 1988 ). Second, following Langley's (1999) suggestion, we took a narrative approach to comprehending the process-related data, namely by drafting a general description of the process with illustrative quotations from material collected in the field ( Berends et al. , 2016 ). Third, whilst working abductively between the empirical material and our emerging analytical framework, we used theoretical coding ( Charmaz, 2014 ) to sort, integrate and organise the material to represent a three-phase process. In so doing, we gradually shifted to an etic perspective – i.e. from the informants' perspective to our own perspectives as observers of the empirical material. Fourth and finally, we reorganised the material and wrote a case narrative structured according to the three abovementioned activities as presented next.

4. Exploring digitalising: the IKEA way

In the past 70 years, IKEA has grown from a small, family owned company in Sweden into the world's largest retailer of home furnishings. Arguably, IKEA's rapid international expansion resulted from the three-phase development of a formula that has been replicated in all markets where IKEA has entered an expanded, where the first phase commenced by exploring IKEA's business idea and opening test stores in markets outside Sweden ( Jonsson and Foss, 2011 ).

IKEA's business idea builds upon two concepts – the idea concept and the concept in practice – that together define what, in theoretical terms, could be understood as IKEA's business model. Whereas the idea concept refers to IKEA's vision “to create a better everyday life for the many people”, its philosophy of co-creation (i.e. “We do our part, and you do yours”) and the central role of IKEA stores, the concept in practice refers to IKEA's practices of examining specific sets of variables whilst adjusting to local markets ( Jonsson and Foss, 2011 , p. 1,090). The two concepts are mutually dependent; if the concept in practice does not change, then the practices of the idea concept will eventually become irrelevant and not reach “the many people”.

In 2014, drawing from insights during its internationalisation, IKEA realised that digitalisation could be both a challenge and an opportunity amid its recently declining expansion. For decades, IKEA had experienced outstanding success in replicating its business model: an average yearly increase in sales of approximately 8–10%, the constant meeting of new sales targets and a steady rate of expansion, with 12–14 store openings per year. In 2013, however, IKEA's steady growth declined in some markets, as the rapid worldwide growth of e-commerce in retailing continued to challenge physical stores and change the competition. In response, the company decided to decelerate its international expansion in favour of exploring what digitalisation could mean for their established business model. At IKEA, it was, therefore, considered increasingly important to return to a state of exploration in which key variables describing the idea concept and the established concept in practice would be re-evaluated. Moreover, as increasingly more young employees at IKEA sought new, 21st-century ways of reaching “the many people” – i.e. current and potential customers – both IKEA's employees and customers began looking for digital solutions and new ways of working.

In the following sections, we recount how IKEA engaged in exploring digitalisation in the IKEA way and how it (re)imagined reaching “the many people” in the shifting retail landscape. The story begins when the intersection of digitalisation and IKEA's business model was becoming increasingly apparent but not yet regarded as a phenomenon that would require radical changes, and it ends six months later, when the exploration phase resulted in an understanding and approach that we term the re(in)innovation of IKEA's business idea. In particular, we discuss how IKEA interpreted, interrelated and integrated digitalisation with its established ways of doing business. Although we have structured our discussion in three subsections, each addressing one of those three activities, the activities should not be considered as occurring along a linear path but instead as three aspects of the exploration phase.

For an overview of the activities and related steps, please see Table 2 .

4.1 Interpreting digitalisation

In 2014, aware that IKEA retailers in the USA were witnessing a cannibalising effect on their physical stores because of e-commerce, IKEA took its first steps towards exploring digitalisation. IKEA realised that its E-Commerce Programme launched only a year prior, could not simply be rolled out as initially planned but needed to be informed by a discussion about what e-commerce and digitalisation would mean for sales in IKEA's physical stores. Although digitalisation was becoming a widely discussed concept in retail at the time, it had remained undefined, and it was unclear how, or even whether, it was distinct from e-commerce. Recognising that possibility, IKEA's global expansion manager initiated several internal projects to explore what digitalisation meant and how it might relate to IKEA's business idea.

E-commerce is how we do business electronically, so it's about selling: selling online. But digitalisation is much bigger than that […] It's about the whole company, because it involves, for example, online learning. I think that e-commerce is not just about selling; it's about fulfilment, the buying process. (Development Manager, E-Commerce Programme)

Digitalisation is broader than e-commerce. It's also more about how we approach customers: how we communicate and how we ensure that all of our customers have the same knowledge, whether they're buying things in the store or online. Digitalisation is something that happens in the store. It's how we provide all of the information to our customers: where the products come from, what they do and how you can use them. (Supply Manager, IKEA Supply AG, Logistics)

As that quotation suggests, despite references to what digitalisation might mean and what it truly is, its signification remained vague. Even so, it appears that digitalisation might have generally been understood as offering digital information to customers. Making sense of digitalisation thus involved distinguishing digitalisation from e-commerce to not only explain how the concepts differed but also make digitalisation manageable for and relevant to customers.

So, all of a sudden, the amount of information that we have about people and how they live, move, interact etc. is phenomenal. And it's in combination. It's not urbanisation only; it's urbanisation plus digitalisation that gives us the opportunities. It's an example of how combined trends can become very powerful. (Digital Business Manager, Inter IKEA Systems B.V.)

It is exponential because every new invention in the digital space is built on previous ones. So, it's a combined effect that creates exponential speed. So, ignoring it, as Kodak or Nokia did, will be very dangerous. On the contrary, it can be very powerful, like for Apple, Google, Facebook, etc.

For me, digitalisation is a moving target. Its content is changing all of the time. To some extent, we use a lot of digital technology already—it's just that it’s outdated, right—so we're changing how we digitalise instead of digitalising something that is not digital. (Global Retail Logistics Manager, Retail Logistics IKEA of Sweden)

Gradually, it became clear that digitalisation not only needed to be understood in the sense of selling goods online but would have broader implications for the company. As a case in point, when observing customers who had already developed new shopping behaviours – using mobile phones to search for products from both outside and inside stores, for example – IKEA realised that new mobile solutions had to be integrated with traditional retail logic. As a result, IKEA unveiled the “Future Role of the IKEA Store in a Multichannel Environment” project to emphasise the need to understand and combine related trends. The project was initiated to jumpstart a shift towards what IKEA called a “seamless customer journey”. Consisting of five sub-projects, the project prompted the redefinition of the E-Commerce Programme and later evolved into the Multichannel Transformation Programme.

Digitalisation means nothing, I would say. Because what we want is to secure a solution for when you, the customer, move between the store and the web. It might be a digital solution, but it can also be a physical solution, or something else. The only thing that's important is to solve some sort of need and to learn more about those needs. (Group Retail Manager, Global Retail Services IKEA Group)

The expansion manager also emphasised that instead of simply focussing on defining digitalisation, routines and skills need to be developed for facilitating “disruptive developments” and finding new solutions and ways of testing new ideas. Understanding how various activities were organised and integrated was also considered to be pivotal. The idea addressed in many interviews – namely, that digitalisation both enables and requires the integration of knowledge – was explained as enhancing the focus on customers and their experiences. That perspective marked a shift into the phase in which IKEA began actively exploring what digitalisation meant to its ways of doing business by revisiting the idea concept and the concept in practice.

Altogether, the first activity of the exploration phase, interpreting, refers to ways of understanding and making sense of digitalisation and the changes that it was considered to imply. The process can be described as encompassing three steps: differentiating (i.e. distinguishing and delimiting digitalisation from other concepts), combining (i.e. making connections between digitalisation and other trends and concepts) and concretising (i.e. defining digitalisation and making it actionable). Building upon lessons from that work, IKEA transitioned into the second activity of exploration where it began relating digitalisation more explicitly to IKEA way of doing business.

4.2 Interrelating digitalisation with established business ideas

Whilst interpreting digitalisation, informants increasingly reflected on what it would mean for IKEA's established business ideas. After all, the replication formula was being challenged by not only digitalisation but also urbanisation. Mounting criticism about globalisation and calls for de-growth were also seen as challenging the existing understanding of doing business – i.e. by selling furniture “to the many people” – and concerns for sustainability were identified as needing to be incorporated into understandings of digitalisation.

To ensure that all IKEA employees shared the same interpretation of digitalisation and how it relates to IKEA's established business model, it was considered to be necessary to visualise the future. To convince internal sceptics, it was considered to be especially important to also visualise how digitalisation could generate opportunities for sales and attract a broader customer base and thereby more fully reach “the many people”. It additionally required ideas about urbanisation, sustainability and ways of offering not only furniture but also services, both in terms of continuity and making it easier to shop. Some proposals even conceived collaborating with second-hand retailers or establishing an organisation that would create opportunities to sell recycled and/or used furniture.

We wanted to have a completely different kind of interaction with our customers: a completely different type of conversation, a completely different type of engagement. So, I made a video that I think is very entertaining. […] She [Laura, the protagonist] wants to decorate her children's room, and the videos show her journey until she's satisfied. (Web and Digital Manager, Web and Digital Retail Services)

To develop a “seamless” experience for customers, it was considered to be crucial to introduce multiple perspectives, which seemed to require visualising the journey of customers in order to ensure focus on their experiences. To that end, it was expressed that all perspectives in IKEA's value chain had to be considered, and a consensus was emerging that different perspectives needed to be integrated in order to realise digitalisation. It was also clear that integrating knowledge from various functions in order to avoid a silo mentality would require more effort.

Our model has been built on direct deliveries to our stores, where you [the customer] do your part, we do our part, and then we save money. We need to think about a completely different kind of integration in how we develop and how we lead the overall development. To make that happen, we're now investing billions in new infrastructure—large investments in IT—but that's not what will take us into the future . (Group Retail Manager, Global Retail Services IKEA Group)

It was necessary to look inwards and to involve different views and perspectives, both across different parts of the company and from the outside. The same informant underscored the importance of accessing different perspectives to also “integrate the outside perspective into our structure, so that we do not get too isolated and, in that way, also cultivate our own skills”. The involvement of different functions and external partners prompted discussions about what digitalisation meant in relation to the established retail logic of “You do your part, we do our part (and together we save money)”. As it became clear that digitalisation would inevitably affect IKEA's business model, the question of how that process would unfold increasingly became the topic of discussion.

In sum, the second activity of the exploration phase, interrelating, refers to assessing digitalisation in relation to established ways of doing business in three steps: visualising (i.e. what the future might look like), mapping (i.e. what functions, areas and parts of the business model will be involved) and evaluating (i.e. how digitalisation will affect the business model and current ways of doing business). Based upon insights from that work, IKEA advanced to putting lessons learnt into practice and began the third activity: integrating new knowledge with existing knowledge.

4.3 Integrating digitalisation into a business model

From the internal projects related to efforts of interpreting digitalisation and interrelating it to other trends, IKEA's managers concluded that its established business model needed an update and that the antidote, digitalisation, also offered an opportunity to fully realise the business idea of offering products and services to “the many people”. To that end, testing new ideas, learning from them and making any necessary adjustments were considered to be important tasks. Thus, to be able to integrate digitalisation with the business model, it was necessary to experiment with numerous ideas and solutions as was done at numerous IKEA locations. For example, at IKEA in Altona, new ideas and concepts were tested to see whether they could satisfy a more digital, urban segment of customers. The Altona store was not only constructed differently from the standard global store format, in terms of size and layout, but also to accommodate for trends in urbanisation. It had also been adapted to test new concepts in practice, including new logistics and distribution solutions, and the normal pathway through the IKEA store had been partly removed to attract customers passing by outside. In the United Kingdom, by comparison, as a result of exploring digitalisation and testing new digital solutions, IKEA had launched its first app.

Experiences from testing new ideas and solutions were transferred back to the IKEA Group and Inter IKEA Systems. Thus, an important step was reviewing and learning from those experiences followed by transferring them internally within the organisation. In relation to the Altona store, both IKEA's management team in Germany and the IKEA Group's management team followed the experiences closely. Beyond that, many employees from IKEA worldwide visited the UK and/or Altona stores simply out of curiosity.

That's the essence of IKEA. If you remove everything, then the core is what's left, and that's IKEA… [We] need to develop our concept, take it further and say, “This is how I see IKEA today”. We have to be on track and dare to test and create other formats… So, IKEA has to change; otherwise, it's the beginning of the end. (Group Retail Manager, Global Retail Services IKEA Group)

The concept manager also reflected on how those changes would affect the idea concept and the concept in practice, as well as the latter should not come at the former's expense: “I mean the concept, if we go back to it, and the vision… part of the recipe for success has been just doing things together, engaging people” (IKEA Concept Manager, Inter IKEA Systems B.V.). Thus, integrating digitalisation into IKEA's business also implied reconnecting with IKEA's roots and reflecting on the idea concept as “the core of the core”. After all, although IKEA was changing at the time and continues to change, it remains the same IKEA. In that sense, revising the business model appeared to be quite natural, for though it had always changed in one sense, in another sense it had also always remained intact. The conclusion was that to be able to sustain the idea concept, “the core of the core”, the concept in practice needed to change, which would imply searching for new formats and new solutions to further leverage IKEA's business. IKEA's managers realised that although the basic needs were the same, people had changed and were continuing to change, and the experiences of customers demanded far more focus. For those reasons, a new position, global customer experience manager, was created. The shift implied a return to the core of IKEA's concept and vision – “to provide products and services that are both cost-efficient and innovative” – and that digitalisation had forced IKEA to rethink its processes of achieving those ends. As another informant argued, the entire process of re-evaluating the way of doing business – i.e. the IKEA way – had alerted managers and employees not only to IKEA's strong vision and business model, but also its need to seize the opportunity to fully realise that vision and reach “the many people” both online and offline.

All of the work to prepare IKEA for the digital shift had prompted a return to the company's roots and the questioning of proven solutions, which is indeed one of IKEA's ten values, perhaps best be described as shifting from interpreting digitalisation and interrelating with IKEA's business model into integrating and turning it into practice. That integrative phase also precipitated how IKEA re(in)novated its business model. IKEA's approach of digitalisation could thus be understood as returning to the company's original idea; the understanding of the idea concept will never change, but the concept in practice has to be rethought and new ideas and practices tested and evaluated in order to continue to reach “the many people”. To that end, practising and testing new solutions were crucial strategies for IKEA, not to mention integral to the IKEA concept and its organisational culture.

In all, the third activity of the exploration phase, integrating, refers to the actual digitalisation of the business idea by steps of practising (i.e. developing and trying different solutions to test and learn from them), reviewing (i.e. sharing knowledge within the organisation to learn from practice) and revising (i.e. connecting and evaluating changes to the established business model in order to provide continuity).

5. Conclusion

This paper has sought to illuminate how an incumbent retail organisation approached digitalisation for its existing business at an early, exploratory phase when possible disruptions, their meanings and their consequences remained uncertain. To that aim, we have provided an account based upon our in-depth case study of IKEA and how the company explored digitalisation at an early stage. We have delineated the exploration phase as consisting of three chief activities – interpreting, interrelating and integrating – each of which we have detailed by identifying certain steps therein. Together, and with reference to IKEA's case, those aspects allow an understanding of the exploration phase.

Compared with previous studies on exploration and exploitation (e.g. March 1991 ; Winter and Szulanski, 2001 ) and specifically in the context of retailing ( Jonsson and Foss, 2011 ; Picot-Coupey et al. , 2016 ; Friesl and Larty, 2018 ), our paper contributes with insights on how the exploration phase is understood and organised in practice. The study further contributes to previous literature of IKEA's business model ( Hedman and Kalling, 2003 ; Sorescu et al. , 2011 ) and specific aspects of the IKEA business model (see e.g. Edvardsson and Enquist, 2011 ; Burt et al. , 2016 , 2021 ) by outlining the exploration phase in further detail. Although the activities of the exploration phase – interpreting, interrelating and integrating – stem from a specific case, we believe, following the potential of qualitative in-depth case studies ( Dyer and Wilkins, 1991 ; Doz, 2011 ), that they may provide value for analysing what digitalisation or any other current or future trend means to retail businesses apart from IKEA.

Because our study was performed at a relatively early phase of adapting the business model at IKEA, some of the outcomes of that process were beyond our study's time frame. However, conducting the study during the process afforded the advantage of revealing ambiguities, scepticism and reservations amongst employees and managers, all of which are important for understanding how retail businesses can be transformed in practice due to digitalisation. In hindsight, some of those uncertainties may be expected to fade or fall into oblivion once changes appear as a continuation of their antecedents and become institutionalised in the ordinary course of business, whether such a development occurs and, if so, then how it remains to be investigated. In any case, a key contribution of our study is the understanding of how an organisation such as IKEA, a global retail giant, organises its efforts to explore digitalisation in relation to its existing business. Still, as this study was conducted in a relatively early phase of the digital transformation, we believe that the findings may differ from later implementations when digitalisation has increasingly become a norm rather than an exception and retailers having increased abilities to learn from their and other's previous experiences. An important opportunity for further research would be to study more recent cases of exploration phases in relation to digitalisation as well as comparing incumbents and entrants as well as larger and smaller organisations.

Using a case study to develop an understanding of digitalisation in retail has advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it affords a more profound understanding of how retail businesses are transformed due to digitalisation in practice, as well as detailed insights into the practical work within the company (cf. Saebi et al. , 2017 ). On the other, however, it can be difficult to apply the results of case studies in forming a basis for scientific generalisation ( Yin, 2003 ). Although an analysis based upon a particular case can indeed provide an understanding of the practical process, that process is liable to differ between companies and between industries. In IKEA's case, as an organisation that many companies use as a benchmark due to its long-term success, no precedent construct existed for understanding how digitalisation in retail would look – for example, by relying on normative models – but instead surfaced as an emerging process. A better understanding of how a specific retailer has approached digitalisation complements current understandings of retail's digitalisation in general ( Hagberg et al. , 2016 ; Hänninen et al. , 2021 ). By extension, we believe that the suggested conceptual framework for understanding and organising the exploration phase could be a useful tool for retail managers to explore not only digitalisation, but also any other transformation and the consequences for their businesses.

Types of data sources

Exploring digitalization in relation to an established business model

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Acknowledgements

The authors contributed equally to this work. The paper is part of a research project with financial support from The Swedish Retail and Wholesale Development Council. The authors would like to thank Niklas Egels-Zandén for comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and also colleagues Catrin Lammgård and Malin Sundström who were also part of the research project. In addition, the authors would like to thank the people at IKEA who have contributed with their time and reflections, and in particular, the authors would like to appreciate Martin Hansson and Carole Bates for showing interest in this research and for inviting the authors to participate in the internal work of trying to interpret what retail digitalization means to IKEA.

Corresponding author

About the authors.

Johan Hagberg is professor of business administration specialising in marketing at the School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg. His research revolves around the digitalization of retailing, consumption and markets.

Anna Jonsson is associate professor at Lund University, School of Economics and Management. Her research interests include learning and knowledge sharing in organizations and society. She has conducted research about various industries and organizations, including the retail industry.

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By: Juan Alcacer, Cynthia A. Montgomery, Emilie Billaud, Vincent Dessain

In 2018, Swedish furniture maker IKEA was undergoing a significant transformation. Challenged by the rise of online shopping and changing consumer behavior, and mourning the death of its founder, the…

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In 2018, Swedish furniture maker IKEA was undergoing a significant transformation. Challenged by the rise of online shopping and changing consumer behavior, and mourning the death of its founder, the Company's top executives knew they had to step out of their comfort zones and embrace new strategic initiatives to stay relevant. But which initiatives, executed where, when and how, would enable IKEA to achieve its goals in a way that was profitable while creating an IKEA they would want to pass on to the next generation of co-workers and customers?

Learning Objectives

Strategy Identification and Evaluation: Learn to identify the key elements of a firm's strategy, and why it is effective or ineffective. Students are asked to identify IKEA's historic strategy, its key supporting elements, and what made it successful for so long. Added-Value: Learn to de-compose a firm's added-value. Did IKEA increase customers' willingness to pay, reduce the total cost of supply, or both? How did it do it? Environment and Competitive Analysis: Understand the key factors in the external landscape that impact a firm's success and the ways those factors can change over time. What is notable about the macro environment, the furniture industry, and consumer behavior and preferences at the time IKEA's initial strategy was developed? Globally, what has changed? What are the implications for IKEA? Change at an Iconic Firm: Iconic firms are set apart by their distinctiveness. Often, their strategies are developed over years and reflected in a host of unique, interconnected elements, a system of advantage. This case gives students an opportunity to consider when, as a leader, you might want to change a strategy, or key elements of a strategy; the possible risks and benefits of doing so; and how one might want to proceed.

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IKEA’s business and operating models: a match made in heaven

“For us, good design is the right combination of form, function, quality, sustainability and a low price. We call it ‘democratic design’, because we believe good home furnishing is for everyone. It’s why we’re constantly exploring smarter, thriftier ways to do things.” – IKEA Website

With revenue of over 29 billion euros in 2014, 315 stores in 27 countries, 9,500 product types, and 147,000 employees, IKEA Group is one of Sweden’s best-known companies. IKEA designs, manufactures, and supplies quality furniture at low prices to make it accessible to the majority of people. IKEA’s furniture products are designed to be sleek and minimalist, and manufactured to be easy to assemble and maintain.

IKEA is a great example of a company that effectively aligns it business model and operating model. In order to deliver on its customer promise of providing quality furniture at affordable prices, IKEA relies on its value chain to optimize its production and overhead costs, as exemplified below:

Product design process: In order to reach the shop floor, a product must meet four criteria: affordability, sustainability, good design, and functionality. Interestingly, the design-planning of any product starts by first setting a price at which a product will be sold. As part of that, designers have to select which design elements, raw materials, and production techniques to use in order to reduce production costs. Furthermore, the designers often work on the factory floor, directly interacting with the manufacturing team in order to understand the capabilities and constraints of the manufacturing department, thereby streamlining the design process and minimizing the cost of the prototyping phase.

In addition to that, IKEA standardizes the production processes by using a limited selection of raw materials across the product ranges and it uses the same base design for different products (example: the chairs from the PELLO series have the same base design as chairs from the POÄNG chairs). This level of standardization results in lower rates of defect and scrap, therefore less waste and cost.

Pathways to Just Digital Future

Production & Distribution: IKEA has over 50,000 SKUs; in order to relieve the challenge of product variability, IKEA relies on extensive forecasting, and usually planning production five years in advance. Similar to Toyota’s Heijunka practice, IKEA relies on long-term planning to evenly balance production volumes across its network of more than 1,000 third-party manufacturers. As we learned in the TOM course, spreading out production demand allows for suppliers to have a uniform cycle time which ultimately leads to lower production costs per unit. Furthermore, with the help of an Advanced Planning and Scheduling software, IKEA allocates production to suppliers based on each supplier’s production capacity and raw material availabilities.

After productions, the products are transported to a network of 47 IKEA-owned, highly-automated distribution centers located in 17 countries. In order to optimize on warehousing and transportation requirements, the finished products are tightly packed into flat packages. This type of packages makes the finished goods easy to transport (leading to decreased transportation costs) and easy to store (leading to decreased warehousing costs).

Retail: After customers browse the shop floor and select the items to purchase, they head to the store’s warehouse to retrieve the packages themselves. Because the customers are responsible for picking up their packages, IKEA does not have to hire labor that would otherwise assume such a responsibility. This helps drive down IKEA’s labor cost.

Consumers play another role in IKEA’s low-cost strategy. Because the customers are responsible for transporting the furniture out of the store and assembling it, IKEA further saves on labor, shipping and overhead costs associated with furniture assembly and delivery.

Overall, I think IKEA effectively manages several key elements of its value chain from design-process to its retail stores, and it has access to customer’s demand patterns. With this information flow and control from one end of the supply to the other, IKEA is able to smoothen the bullwhip effect that other firms typically experience. This in turn helps IKEA drive operational efficiencies throughout the supply chain, resulting in reduced costs and lead times. Given IKEA’s strong financial performance with profit margins of over 11%, I believe that that IKEA’s business and operating models are strongly aligned with one another.

• IKEA Group Website ( ikea.com )
• IKEA Group FY2014 Yearly Summary ( http://www.ikea.com/ms/en_US/pdf/yearly_summary/ikea-group-yearly-summary-fy14.pdf )
• “Anatomy of an IKEA product” ( http://www.cnet.com/news/anatomy-of-an-ikea-product/ )
• “IKEA’s Inventory Management Strategy: Why It Works” ( http://www.supplytimes.com/inventory-management/ikeas-inventory-management-strategy-why-it-works )
• “How is IKEA so inexpensive?” ( https://www.quora.com/How-is-IKEA-so-inexpensive )
• “IKEA as an Innovator: The Right Combination of Execution and Ecosystem Innovation” ( http://faculty.tuck.dartmouth.edu/images/uploads/faculty/ron-adner/17EIS_Main_Project_-_IKEA_-_Final.pdf )
• Lean Management of Global Supply Chain (Japanese Management and International Studies), a book by Yasuhiro Monden and Yoshiteru Minagawa, which can be find through Google Scholar ( https://books-google-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/books?hl=en&lr=&id=qtqiCgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA65&dq=ikea+fabless&ots=YKAwVPF5JG&sig=flyn7qcY9IYSid6gzEi6S_ZnoJs#v=onepage&q=ikea%20fabless&f=false )

Student comments on IKEA’s business and operating models: a match made in heaven

IKEA has a unique value proposition that it delivers to its customers and it seems it has been able to be successful because of the distinct brand image it has developed together with reduced costs to effective supply chain management and scalability.

I found it extremely interesting it the way IKEA develops products. It seems intuitive that the designers work together with the production team on the factory shop floor to develop products that are functional, aesthetic and yet provide good value for money. In most companies the design and production team are separate even though there are obvious synergies between the two.

What I also found interesting is that, IKEA plans its production 5 years in advance. While this helps to smooth out demand forecasts, I was wondering what this would mean for changing trends in design? It seems that design trends change season to season, so how is IKEA able to keep up with design trends, if they plan 5 years in advance?

This is a great post Amine! I think IKEA is a great example of a company creatively disrupting what used to be a standard – and clunky, and expensive – event in a person’s life. IKEA set out to democratize design. Their mission is to “create a better everyday life for the many people” and so much of that comes back to the elements you discussed ( http://www.ikea.com/ms/en_SG/about_ikea/our_business_idea/index.html ). I would like to add a couple of notes expanding on your product design process idea.

First, IKEA does its research. When IKEA first came to the US, it dropped off truckloads of products all measured in centimeters and Americans rejected them. IKEA has learned, and now sends anthropologists into countries to learn how people interact with their homes and what their lives are like. They publish a quarterly “Life at Home” report with qualitative and data-intensive quantitative findings. For example, here is a sample showing differences in peoples’ habits in the kitchen around the world: http://lifeathome.ikea.com/food/en/ . Based on this research, IKEA might develop products, but more often they learn how their existing products can fit into the lifestyles of people around the world. IKEA stores’ showrooms and catalogs tell people how to integrate products into their lives, and with this anthropological understanding, IKEA can adapt its products to fit the world and increase volumes, creating further economies of scale ( http://fortune.com/ikea-world-domination/ ).

Second, IKEA is conscious that when you supply the world with tables and chairs, you are also taking a lot from the world. IKEA uses an incredible 1% of the world’s wood supply, which is roughly 17.8 million yards of wood ( http://gizmodo.com/heres-why-ikea-is-discontinuing-everyones-favorite-sh-1527126312 ). In 2012 IKEA published an intensive report detailing their sustainability strategy in which they begin by stating they would “economise with resources” ( http://www.ikea.com/ms/en_US/pdf/reports-downloads/sustainability-strategy-people-and-planet-positive.pdf ). Holding true to that mission, a little over a year later they replaced the beloved EXPEDIT bookcase (a bestseller), with the KALLAX; the only difference between the two was shaving down the width of the outside wooden pieces. It is a small change, but at the volumes this bookcase is sold it has a meaningful impact on IKEAs raw material usage. This demonstrates IKEAs iterative product development expertise, helps them lower costs, and more importantly supports their philosophy of creating a better life for many people – if they can reduce their wood usage, they can bring their product to more people without further environmental impact. Bring on the Poang.

Dear Amine,

Great note and highlight on Ikea’s operating & business models! That is very telling. My question was about subproduction. It seems IKEA outsources part of its manufacturing to Chinese and Indian manufacturers for cost logics. How do you think Ikea can keep an edge, as it is being copied by some of its Chinese sub contractors?

Another question I have is about IKEA’s terrible customer service. Do you think that a wrong customer service may hamper Ikea’s s sales on the long run? Isn’t it part of the business model?

Thanks again for you note, really interesting!

Great post Amine. I really liked the way how you brought to life the operating model of IKEA – an innovative industry leader. IKEA is certainly a good example of a company which has effectively employed lean supply chain management practices. I had a few questions regarding this strategy. 1. Can you elaborate on IKEA’s third party manufacturer suppliers? Are they based in Sweden or in low cost locations in developing countries? I am assuming that at this price point, they will need to be sourcing cheap. 2. Since the design and production functions have to work together to ensure standardization, how is this managed with manufacturing being outsourced? Does IKEA have its design teams working with the third party manufacturers? 3. What is IKEA’s raw material procurement strategy? 4. I find it quite incredible that IKEA has a 5 year demand forecast. Given that it has 50,000 SKUs, does IKEA only forecast demand for the base models or for all 50,000 SKUs?

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• International Marketing
• Localization

IKEA’s Localization Strategy: A Masterclass in Global Expansion

• January 12, 2024

Table of Contents

The ikea localization strategy, ikea’s localization strategy: a delicate balance of standardization and adaptation, ikea’s localization strategy in china: adapting to local preferences, ikea’s localization strategy in india: embracing local customs and tastes, ikea’s localization strategy in japan: the importance of understanding local preferences, key takeaways from ikea’s localization strategy, accelingo: your partners in localization success.

In a world where companies are increasingly competing globally, the ability to tailor products and services to local markets is crucial for success . Thanks to their localization strategy, IKEA, the Swedish furniture giant, has mastered this art, becoming a household name in over 50 countries and amassing a staggering $42 billion in annual revenue.

IKEA’s international expansion success can be attributed to its unique localization strategy, which strikes a delicate balance between standardization and adaptation. The company maintains a core set of principles and values that resonate across cultures , but it also makes strategic adjustments to cater to local preferences and market conditions.

This localization approach has allowed IKEA to successfully navigate the diverse and ever-changing landscape of international business. From adapting its product designs to fit smaller Asian homes to partnering with local assembly services in China, IKEA has consistently demonstrated its ability to connect with consumers on a global scale .

In the realm of international business, localization is the art of adapting products, services, and marketing strategies to suit the specific needs and preferences of a target market. This involves a delicate balance between standardization, which ensures consistency and brand recognition, and adaptation, which enables a deeper connection with local consumers . IKEA, the Swedish furniture giant, has masterfully navigated this balance, becoming a global success story with over 450 stores in 52 countries, according to Statista .

Standardization versus Adaptation: Striking the Right Chord

Standardization, often associated with economies of scale, involves creating a consistent product or service offering across all markets. This approach can streamline operations, reduce costs, and enhance brand recognition. However, a purely standardized approach can fail to resonate with local preferences and cultural nuances , leading to missed opportunities and potential brand alienation.

Adaptation, on the other hand, involves tailoring products, services, and marketing messages to specific market contexts. This approach can foster deeper connections with local consumers, address cultural sensitivities, and enhance brand relevance. However, over-adaptation can lead to brand dilution , fragmentation of the global brand identity , and increased costs from localized production and marketing efforts.

IKEA’s Middle Ground: A Strategic Approach to Localization

IKEA has successfully navigated this standardization-adaptation dichotomy, adopting a hybrid approach that strikes a delicate balance between the two strategies. The company maintains a core set of design principles and values that underpin its global identity, such as its commitment to affordable, stylish furniture that can be assembled by consumers . However, IKEA also makes strategic adaptations to cater to local preferences and market conditions.

Examples of IKEA’s Localized Approach

IKEA’s localization efforts are evident in its product designs, store locations, and marketing strategies across different markets. In China, where many consumers prefer to have furniture assembled professionally, IKEA partnered with local assembly services to enhance customer convenience. In India, IKEA adapted its product range to include items more suited to local tastes and dietary habits , such as smaller furniture pieces and vegetarian dishes in the company’s restaurants. And in Japan, where smaller living spaces are common, IKEA introduced smaller-sized furniture designs that better fit the constraints of Japanese homes.

The Importance of Cultural Understanding

IKEA’s success in localization is deeply rooted in its commitment to understanding local cultures and customs. The company conducts extensive market research and cultural sensitivity training for its employees to ensure that its products, services, and marketing efforts align with local expectations. This deep cultural understanding has enabled IKEA to forge meaningful connections with consumers across the globe.

The Value of Localization for Businesses

IKEA’s localization strategy serves as a valuable case study for businesses seeking to expand internationally . By striking an effective balance between standardization and adaptation, companies can enhance their brand relevance, increase customer satisfaction, and gain a competitive edge in global markets .

IKEA’s entry into the Chinese market in 1998 marked a significant milestone in the company’s global expansion journey. However, the company’s initial attempts to replicate its successful Swedish model in China met with challenges due to cultural differences and consumer preferences .

Cultural Barriers to Overcome

One of the primary challenges IKEA faced in China was the cultural norm of having furniture professionally assembled. In Swedish culture, self-assembly is seen as a badge of honor, symbolizing resourcefulness and DIY capabilities. However, in China, furniture assembly is considered a time-consuming and undesirable task , often assigned to hired professionals.

This cultural difference posed a significant obstacle to IKEA’s core business model, which relies on customers assembling their own furniture. IKEA’s initial efforts to introduce self-assembly instructions in Chinese were met with resistance, as many consumers were hesitant to tackle the task themselves .

Partnering with Local Expertise

To address this cultural barrier and enhance customer convenience, IKEA made a strategic decision to partner with local furniture assembly services in China . This move proved to be a game-changer, allowing IKEA to tap into the existing expertise of local professionals while still maintaining its commitment to affordable furniture.

The partnership with local assembly services not only addressed customer preferences but also created new employment opportunities and strengthened IKEA’s ties with the Chinese community. As a result of this adaptation, IKEA’s sales in China skyrocketed, reaching $1.6 billion in 2019 .

Other Localized Adaptations in China

IKEA’s localization efforts in China extended beyond furniture assembly. The company carefully tailored its store locations to suit Chinese shopping habits , opting for central locations near public transportation hubs to cater to busy urbanites.

IKEA also adapted its product range to meet the specific needs of Chinese consumers. The company introduced smaller-sized furniture designs to fit the limited living spaces of many Chinese households, and it also expanded its selection of home appliances to include items more suited to local cooking and dining preferences .

The Success of IKEA’s Localization Strategy in China

IKEA’s success in China is a testament to the power of localization in global business . By understanding and adapting to local preferences, the company has successfully established itself as a leading furniture retailer in China, with over 36 stores and a strong online presence, as per IKEA .

IKEA’s experience in China highlights the importance of cultural sensitivity and adaptation in international business. By making strategic changes to its products, services, and marketing strategies, IKEA has successfully connected with Chinese consumers , demonstrating that localization is not just a matter of complying with local regulations but also about forging meaningful connections with local communities.

IKEA’s expansion into India in 2018 marked a significant milestone in the company’s global journey, opening doors to one of the world’s most populous and rapidly growing markets . However, the Indian market presented its unique set of challenges, including cultural nuances, regulatory hurdles, and a diverse consumer base.

Navigating Cultural Nuances and Regulatory Hurdles

India’s complex cultural landscape presented IKEA with a unique set of challenges. The country is home to a diverse range of religions, customs, and traditions , which IKEA needed to carefully consider in its product offerings and marketing strategies.

Additionally, the Indian market was characterized by complex regulatory frameworks and logistical challenges, requiring IKEA to adapt its operations to comply with local standards and ensure efficient supply chains.

Adapting to Indian Consumer Preferences

To succeed in India, IKEA recognized the importance of tailoring its products, marketing, and customer experience to resonate with local sensibilities. The company conducted extensive market research to understand Indian consumer preferences, cultural norms, and dietary habits.

Tailoring Products and Menus to Local Tastes

One of the most notable adaptations IKEA made in India was the expansion of its product range to cater to local tastes and preferences. The company introduced smaller-sized furniture pieces to suit the compact living spaces of many Indian homes , and it also incorporated elements of Indian design and craftsmanship into its products.

In addition to product adaptations, IKEA also made significant changes to its food offerings in India. The company’s restaurants in India feature a menu that includes a wide variety of vegetarian and vegan options , reflecting the dietary preferences of a large portion of the Indian population.

Pricing Strategy for Affordable Furniture

IKEA’s commitment to affordability, a core tenet of its business model, was particularly important in India, where price sensitivity is a prevalent consumer trait . The company carefully considered pricing strategies to ensure its products remained accessible to a broad range of Indian consumers.

Localization Efforts in Marketing and Customer Experience

IKEA’s localization efforts extended beyond product design and menus; the company also adapted its marketing strategies and customer service approach to Indian sensibilities . The company employed local marketing campaigns that resonated with Indian cultural references and values, and it also trained its employees to provide culturally sensitive customer service.

The Success of IKEA’s Localization Strategy in India

IKEA’s efforts to embrace local customs and tastes have been met with remarkable success in India. The company’s stores have been warmly welcomed by Indian consumers , and its sales have grown steadily since its entry into the market. In 2020, IKEA opened its second store in India, and plans for further expansion are underway according to INGKA .

IKEA’s experience in India serves as a compelling example of the power of localization in international business. The company’s ability to adapt its products, services, and marketing strategies to align with local preferences has been instrumental in its success in this challenging yet promising market.

IKEA’s journey into the Japanese market in 1974 marked a pivotal moment in the company’s global expansion strategy. However, the company’s initial foray into Japan was met with challenges , highlighting the importance of understanding and adapting to local preferences in international business.

Initial Setback and the Over-Reliance on Standardization

IKEA’s initial attempt to replicate its successful Swedish model in Japan failed to resonate with local consumers. The company’s standardized product designs, often characterized by larger sizes, were incompatible with the compact living spaces of many Japanese homes . Additionally, IKEA’s marketing campaigns, which emphasized self-assembly, conflicted with Japanese cultural norms of craftsmanship and professional convenience.

As a result of these missteps, IKEA’s sales in Japan were initially sluggish , and the company was forced to withdraw from the market in 1986 .

Learning from Failures and Embracing Local Preferences

After withdrawing from Japan, IKEA took a step back to reassess its approach and make necessary adjustments. The company conducted extensive market research to understand Japanese consumer preferences , cultural nuances, and design sensibilities.

Strategic Comeback with Localized Adaptations

In 2006, IKEA made a strategic comeback to Japan, this time with a localized approach that emphasized adaptation to local preferences. The company introduced smaller-sized furniture designs, tailored to the limited living spaces of Japanese households . Additionally, IKEA partnered with local assembly services to offer convenient and professional furniture assembly services, aligning with Japanese preferences.

Localized Marketing Campaigns and Cultural Sensitivity

IKEA’s marketing campaigns in Japan also underwent a transformation, incorporating local cultural references and values. The company used traditional Japanese art and design elements in its store décor and marketing materials , creating a more immersive and culturally appropriate experience for Japanese consumers.

Continuous Research and Adaptation

IKEA’s experience in Japan highlights the importance of continuous research and adaptation in the face of cultural and market shifts. The company recognized that globalization does not mean homogenization ; rather, it requires a deep understanding of local preferences and a willingness to adapt to the specific needs of each market.

The Success of Adaptation: IKEA’s Thriving Presence in Japan

IKEA’s localized approach has been instrumental in its success in Japan. The company has established a strong presence in the market, with over 10 stores and a growing customer base . IKEA’s sales in Japan have consistently increased since its comeback , demonstrating the power of localization in connecting with local consumers.

IKEA’s experience in Japan serves as a valuable lesson for businesses seeking to expand internationally. By understanding and adapting to local preferences, companies can successfully navigate the complexities of global markets and build strong relationships with consumers across borders.

IKEA’s remarkable success in expanding its global footprint can be attributed to its unwavering commitment to localization , a process of adapting products, services, and marketing strategies to suit the specific needs and preferences of a target market.

Accelingo is a leading translation and localization agency with a proven track record of helping businesses thrive in the global marketplace. With over a decade of experience and a team of highly skilled linguists and cultural experts, Accelingo provides comprehensive localization services that enable companies to seamlessly adapt their products, services, and marketing strategies to local markets.

Accelingo’s Localization Expertise

On top of our language translation services , at Accelingo we offer a wide range of localization services , including:

• Expert translation: Accelingo’s team of native speakers delivers accurate and culturally sensitive translations across a diverse range of industries and languages.
• Cultural adaptation: Accelingo goes beyond mere translation to ensure that content resonates with local audiences, considering cultural nuances, sensitivities, and market trends.
• Localization strategy development: Accelingo helps businesses develop comprehensive localization strategies that align with their overall business goals and marketing objectives.

As you embark on your global expansion journey, let IKEA’s localization playbook serve as your guide. By embracing a deep understanding of local cultures, continuous adaptation, and a balanced approach to standardization and localization, you can unlock the key to success in the ever-evolving global marketplace . At Accelingo, we’re ready to partner with you every step of the way, from market research and strategy development to expert translation and cultural adaptation . Contact us today for a free consultation and let’s transform your global ambitions into reality.

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Case Study: Operations management at IKEA

Low prices have been the key to IKEA’s success, but price alone cannot create an international long-term marketing success story. Products are updated consistently to match consumers’ expectations and lifestyles. In-store service and staff training are integral to the IKEA shopping experience. Store sites are chosen to maximize catchment areas, to make access easy for shoppers and to bring the brand name to the attention of the whole community … Promotion emphasizes the ‘style without expense’ philosophy and the IKEA name … IKEA has a forceful, well-directed marketing strategy actioned through primarily one tightly developed marketing mix for the core superstore operation. The result is a successful, expanding company, satisfied target customers, highly motivated personnel and unhappy competitors.

In contrast, the operations management perspective is well-represented by Slack et al. (2011, p. 3), who state:

Operations management is a vital part of IKEA’s success. IKEA shows how important operations management is for its own success and the success of any type of organization. Of course, IKEA understands its market and its customers.

Just as important, it knows that the way in which it manages the network of operations that design, produce and deliver its products and services must be right for the market.

Consider just some of the activities that IKEA’s operations managers are involved in:

• Arranging the store’s layout to give smooth and effective flow of customers (called process design).
• Designing stylish products that can be flat-packed efficiently (called product design).
• Making sure that all staff can contribute to the company’s success (called job design).
• Locating stores of an appropriate size in the most effective place (called supply network design).
• Arranging for delivery of products to stores (called supply chain management).
• Coping with fluctuations in demand (called capacity management).
• Maintaining cleanliness and safety of storage area (called failure prevention).
• Avoiding running out of products for sale (called inventory management).
• Monitoring and enhancing quality of service to customers (called quality management).
• Continually examining and improving operations practice (called operations improvement).

Question 1: Aligning competitive, operations and marketing strategy ( 35 marks, 300 words )

Discuss IKEA’s competitive strategy , operations strategy and marketing strategy .

Is the operations strategy aligned with the competitive strategy? Discuss in terms of the four key areas of operations strategy.

Is the marketing strategy aligned with the competitive strategy? Discuss in terms of IKEA’s target market.

Question 2: The five performance objectives ( 30 marks, 300 words )

The 4Vs of operations influence the operations design . Discuss the 4Vs of operation at IKEA and then discuss the impact that these dimensions have on the cost of operations .

Question 3: IKEA’s supply chain ( 35 marks, 300 words )

A. Discuss the meaning of supply chain management. (5 marks)

B. As completely as possible, discuss the supply chain for IKEA from raw materials to consumer purchase. (30 marks)

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Why IKEA’s Operations Model Is So Successful

Sep 16, 2021 9:32:00 PM / by Taylor Faircloth

Operations management is an essential part of the Swedish furniture company  IKEA ’s success. Its management systems have enabled the company to offer more than 9,500 products at competitive prices as it has grown over nearly eight decades. 

IKEA’s reputation has rested on its efficient and effective management of: 

• Product and process design
• Quality assurance
• Supply chain networks
• Back-end operations

These management systems have made the company the highest-valued retail furniture brand that has been exemplary in management and business textbooks worldwide. As an innovative leader of successful management practices, IKEA represents what effective operations management can do for a business or organization.

What Is Operations Management?

Put simply, operations management is the managing of resources, production, and delivery of a business’s products or services. Among other things, this includes managing:

• Process design to arrange a building’s layout
• Functional, cost-effective product design
• Supply chain deliveries and networks
• Inventory for products
• Capacity, or fluctuations in a product or services demand
• Product and service quality

Effective and efficient operations management strategies are the foundation of any successful organization. They ensure quality products and services to customers and efficient organizational practices to deliver cost-effective goods and enhance brand recognition.

IKEA's Business Model

Founded in 1943, IKEA had a vision to provide well designed, functional home furnishings at the lowest possible price point to ensure affordability. The company’s focus on achieving high standards of quality, design, and function at competitive prices drives its innovation. The inception of the flat packing method of retail furniture in 1956 is a product of this successful business model and distinguishes the brand.

To maintain its low prices, IKEA requires efficient operational management on all levels of the organization from product design, sourcing materials, and flat packing to distribution and dealing with fluctuations in demand. Sustaining low manufacturing or service costs through efficient operations management is what sets a successful business apart from the rest. The proven success of IKEA’s internal operations can give keen insights into effective management solutions for any business.

Product Design and Production

When it comes to designing a product, IKEA has strict requirements on quality, function, and cost. Designers at IKEA excel at creating high-quality products while maintaining low manufacturing costs to ensure affordability. The ready-to-assemble design of each item in its inventory also drastically reduces the price of production and distribution.

IKEA starts each design phase by first setting a price point for a particular product. To reduce waste and overall cost, the company’s standardized production process uses a limited selection of raw materials. From this selection, designers at IKEA create a product that upholds the company standards of affordability, sustainability, quality design, and functionality.

To stay ahead in such a competitive marketplace, IKEA has an extensive forecasting system to predict trends and begin production plans years in advance. The strategic allocation of production based on supplier resources and capacity allows IKEA to balance production volumes across its network of third-party manufacturers. These two factors significantly reduce the cost of production for each unit in its extensive inventory.

Packaging and Distribution

After production, IKEA packages the disassembled furniture into flat boxes that optimize storage space and transportation costs. As we previously mentioned, the flat packing method IKEA uses to ship and store its products is a crucial part of its operational model that reduces consumer and manufacturing costs.

IKEA attributes much of its success to its efficient operations management system and conscious product design. After production, IKEA operational management oversees the transportation of the final products to a network of 47 automated distribution centers around the globe. The well-designed system ensures cost-effective distribution to the 445 IKEA stores worldwide.

Inventory Management

IKEA utilizes a unique and innovative environment for its retail locations. Each building functions as both a store and a warehouse. The first and second floors consist of stunning showrooms displaying the assembled products, while the pallet floor serves as a storage facility for products in stock. By merging retail locations with warehouse facilities and a self-service model, IKEA is able to reduce distribution and product storage costs to maintain a competitive edge.

IKEA’s operations management controls in-store logistics to manage these integrated facilities and support an efficient flow of goods. Each retail facility has an in-store logistics manager and a store goods manager who are responsible for the ordering and material handling processes, respectively. Together, they work to balance customer demand and inventory management while maximizing profits.

IKEA's Supply Chain

With over 1,800 suppliers around the globe and 43 localized trading offices to maintain relationships with manufacturers, IKEA understands the importance of building strong business relationships through effective communication. To ensure that its inventory will be in stock, IKEA works side-by-side with material suppliers, manufacturers, and factory workers across their supply chain network.

IKEA believes that long-term business relationships with suppliers ultimately reduce the cost of goods sold. As a high-volume global retailer, IKEA recognizes that suppliers are meaningful collaborators that add to the business’s value chain. Rather than fostering competition among suppliers, IKEA works directly with suppliers to innovate efficient, low-cost ways to bring its designs to life.

IKEA's Operational Model

Since its inception in Sweden in 1943, IKEA has offered affordable, high-quality furniture to the masses. Today, IKEA is the largest and most valuable furniture retail chain globally, with over 400 locations operating in 52 countries. From the comfortable showrooms navigating customers through a labyrinth of product displays to the innovative thinking that created flat packing and ready-to-assemble furniture, IKEA’s success relies on efficient and effective operational management solutions.

Through tight control over operational efficiencies in the design, production, supply chain, and distribution processes, IKEA has been able to keep consumer and manufacturing costs low while growing the company on a world stage. IKEA perfectly demonstrates the power and significance of operational management systems to elevate a business and optimize its workflows.

Operational Management Tools for Your Business

If you are looking to optimize your business, increase efficiency, and empower your employees, Chekhub has an   all-in-one operational management platform   for you. You can manage checklists, assets, team members, and schedules anywhere and at any time with just one application.

Visit our website, or email us at [email protected] for more information or to schedule a product demo for your company.

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IKEA Case Study: IKEA’s Genius Business Strategy

This article is an excerpt from the Shortform summary of "Understanding Michael Porter" by Joan Magretta. Shortform has the world's best summaries of books you should be reading.

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Are you looking for an IKEA case study according to Michael Porter’s Five Forces?

Porter’s IKEA case study shows one company’s success in fitting together business activities, business strategy, and operations. His analysis shows how the activities connect to create a uniquely competitive business.

IKEA’s Fit Between Activities

Good strategies depend on the connection among many things. Fit means the value or cost of one activity is affected by the way other activities are performed – in other words, “synergy.” If the activities fit together, they each meaningfully contribute to the company’s increased value or lower cost, and they work strongly together. The IKEA case analysis below is one example of fit between different activities.

This is a clear departure from the (mistaken) idea of the one core competence. If strategy truly is based on one core competence, then it becomes relatively easy to replicate. More often, industries compete fiercely to control the one key “resource” – distribution channels, product portfolios – thus driving up cost. In reality, strong strategies are built on many unique activities that fit together to deliver the unique value proposition. Later, you’ll see how fit works well in the IKEA case study, despite certain trade-offs.

Fit arises in 3 ways . Keep this in mind when you read the IKEA case analysis:

• Example: many of Southwest’s activities are directionally pointed toward lowering cost and increasing convenience.
• When activities are inconsistent, they cancel each other out.
• Netflix’s large catalogue gives more chances to collect data points to make better recommendations.
• IKEA’s room displays substitute for sales associates, thus lowering cost.
• Dell will preload software onto PCs, substituting for the customer’s IT department.

Fit discourages rivals in a few ways:

• With a large range of activities, it becomes unclear which of the company’s activities are most valuable to replicate.
• As a simplistic example, say there are 5 activities that give a company a competitive advantage. If the chance of replicating one activity is 90%, then the chance of replicating all of them is 0.9^5, or 62%.
• An activity that fits one value chain can punish a different value chain, if it lacks synergies with the other activities or contradicts them.
• Activities with fit make it easier to see where the weak link in the chain is (think about this in the IKEA case analysis later).

The IKEA Case Study

Let’s examine a masterpiece of strategy in IKEA using the IKEA case study analysis. Their mission is to deliver stylish furniture at low prices. Their activities show clear trade-offs and strong fit:

• Assembling furniture yourself also seems to increase your enjoyment of it, maybe because of endowment effect. 
• Compact boxes reduce freight shipping costs from the manufacturer.
• This means time from buying to having furniture in your house is much faster than shipped furniture.
• IKEA stores are huge warehouses in large suburban locations with highway access. With large parking lots and loading zones, they allow customers to self-service and deliver their own furniture.
• IKEA showrooms have minimal staff, with the entire inventory laid out for buyers to peruse.
• IKEA cafeterias are self-service and customers are encouraged to bus their own trays.
• IKEA designs its own products, allowing trade-offs in styling and cost.
• Furniture has few customization options, allowing production in bulk and bargaining at scale.
• A narrower catalogue also allows IKEA to keep its warehouses fully stocked, instead of requiring shipping.

Many of these activities fit together and reinforce each other to provide low-priced furniture. The furniture’s self-assembled design reduces manufacturing costs, storage costs, shipping costs from manufacturer, and shipping costs to customers. In turn, IKEA’s locations make the furniture’s self-assembled design even more effective. 

Note how each activity is distinctly a trade-off : you either have furniture disassembled or not. You either have salespeople on the showroom floor or not. This is one of the aspects covered in the IKEA case study analysis.

Many traditional furniture retailers practice the inverse of IKEA’s value chain. If they tried to adopt one of IKEA’s activities, they’d find it less compatible with their own value chain, and so they’d gain very little of IKEA’s competitive advantage.

Note too that, in making these tradeoffs, IKEA is deliberately alienating customer groups – those who want furniture ordered seamlessly to their homes, who want nice salespeople to guide them through options, who want unique and fancifully designed furniture. The IKEA case study analysis shows how trade-offs can sometimes have big strategic payoffs.

Activity System Map

To visualize the strength of fit between activities, place the activities on a map.

• Start by placing the key components of the value proposition.
• Make a list of the activities most responsible for competitive advantage
• Add each activity to the map. Draw lines wherever there is fit: when the activity contributes to value proposition, or when two activities affect each other

Here’s an example for IKEA:

A densely interconnected activity map is a good sign. A sparsely connected map shows weak strategy.

The activity map isn’t useful just for description of your current strategy. It can also be used for ideation for new strategies:

• Can you improve fit between activities? 
• Can you find ways for an activity to substitute for another?
• Can you find new activities or enhancements to what you already do?
• Are there new products or features you can offer because of your activity map, that rivals will find difficult to emulate?

Porter’s IKEA case study is an example of a competitive business in a particular area of an industry. Porter’s IKEA case study shows business activities and strategy intersecting successfully.

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Carrie Cabral

Carrie has been reading and writing for as long as she can remember, and has always been open to reading anything put in front of her. She wrote her first short story at the age of six, about a lost dog who meets animal friends on his journey home. Surprisingly, it was never picked up by any major publishers, but did spark her passion for books. Carrie worked in book publishing for several years before getting an MFA in Creative Writing. She especially loves literary fiction, historical fiction, and social, cultural, and historical nonfiction that gets into the weeds of daily life.

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Operations and Project Management: A Case Study of IKEA

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Streamlining processes and standing up HR operations with PwC’s Total Workforce Management solution

From acquisition to autonomy: how a tech company transformed its workforce

• May 29, 2024

A regional tech company faced the challenge of establishing a new company after an acquisition, while also scaling its workforce. To avoid costly transition services agreements (TSAs) and preserve deal value, it needed a rapid HR system separation. The company worked with PwC to swiftly move its enterprise-wide HR operations to SAP and stand up its own system. The solution provides unprecedented visibility across the organization and empowers leadership to make data-driven decisions that improve employee experience.

Regional Tech Company

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HR TSAs required post-divestiture, despite accounting for HR and tax nuances in 35 states and 25+ employee unions, which helped preserve deal value

A human-led, tech-powered workforce transformation enables transparency and helps build trust with stakeholders

PwC shares the path to operational efficiency

What was the challenge.

The challenge was managing rapid change amid a complex acquisition . The client needed to physically separate the HR, payroll and operations systems of its newly acquired company to avoid relying on the former owner’s tech infrastructure via costly TSAs.

Speed was key. The goal was to stand up the new systems as quickly as possible without a significant impact on either company’s daily operations, which span 35 states. Simultaneously, the team also had to onboard thousands of employees overnight, causing a rapid scaling of the HR organization.

Describe the solution delivered by the PwC community of solvers

PwC’s Total Workforce Management solution powered by SAP was chosen to streamline HR processes and manage all related operations. This comprehensive, cloud-based HR suite integrates modules like S/4HANA, SuccessFactors and Fieldglass to efficiently handle talent management, learning, recruitment, timekeeping, finance (including financial planning and analysis) and contractor management. The automation tools and data cleansing enabled a smooth transition under a tight deadline, along with accurate financial data posting and streamlined payment processing for both contractors and over 25 employee unions across the business.

Transitions of this magnitude typically take at least 12 to 15 months, but PwC did it in 9 months. The client now has great operational efficiency and workforce management capabilities.

How does the solution blend the strengths of technology and people?

Despite the time constraints, PwC quickly implemented Total Workforce Management and the Experience Suite framework . This is a digital SuccessFactors-driven solution that provides tools to enhance employee upskilling, labor sourcing and localized people management. The solution simplified governance, improved visibility and empowered smarter decisions as the organization grew. Within the Experience Suite, you could see exactly what the system build would look like via a test environment, incorporating standardized practices to meet the deadline as an independent company.

Where or how did innovation and unexpected ways of thinking come into play?

PwC’s Experience Suite framework provided a practical and efficient approach to setting up a new system. This included leading practices and pre-built models based on PwC’s extensive experience with SAP SuccessFactors and Fieldglass implementations. It streamlined project management, reduced decision-making time and minimized complexities. PwC’s fit-to-standard approach also helped provide a standard system setup and HR enhancements to simplify the implementation process. The team’s innovative solutions truly made a difference in the workforce transformation journey.

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The state of AI in early 2024: Gen AI adoption spikes and starts to generate value

If 2023 was the year the world discovered generative AI (gen AI) , 2024 is the year organizations truly began using—and deriving business value from—this new technology. In the latest McKinsey Global Survey  on AI, 65 percent of respondents report that their organizations are regularly using gen AI, nearly double the percentage from our previous survey just ten months ago. Respondents’ expectations for gen AI’s impact remain as high as they were last year , with three-quarters predicting that gen AI will lead to significant or disruptive change in their industries in the years ahead.

About the authors

This article is a collaborative effort by Alex Singla , Alexander Sukharevsky , Lareina Yee , and Michael Chui , with Bryce Hall , representing views from QuantumBlack, AI by McKinsey, and McKinsey Digital.

Organizations are already seeing material benefits from gen AI use, reporting both cost decreases and revenue jumps in the business units deploying the technology. The survey also provides insights into the kinds of risks presented by gen AI—most notably, inaccuracy—as well as the emerging practices of top performers to mitigate those challenges and capture value.

AI adoption surges

Interest in generative AI has also brightened the spotlight on a broader set of AI capabilities. For the past six years, AI adoption by respondents’ organizations has hovered at about 50 percent. This year, the survey finds that adoption has jumped to 72 percent (Exhibit 1). And the interest is truly global in scope. Our 2023 survey found that AI adoption did not reach 66 percent in any region; however, this year more than two-thirds of respondents in nearly every region say their organizations are using AI. 1 Organizations based in Central and South America are the exception, with 58 percent of respondents working for organizations based in Central and South America reporting AI adoption. Looking by industry, the biggest increase in adoption can be found in professional services. 2 Includes respondents working for organizations focused on human resources, legal services, management consulting, market research, R&D, tax preparation, and training.

Also, responses suggest that companies are now using AI in more parts of the business. Half of respondents say their organizations have adopted AI in two or more business functions, up from less than a third of respondents in 2023 (Exhibit 2).

Gen AI adoption is most common in the functions where it can create the most value

Most respondents now report that their organizations—and they as individuals—are using gen AI. Sixty-five percent of respondents say their organizations are regularly using gen AI in at least one business function, up from one-third last year. The average organization using gen AI is doing so in two functions, most often in marketing and sales and in product and service development—two functions in which previous research  determined that gen AI adoption could generate the most value 3 “ The economic potential of generative AI: The next productivity frontier ,” McKinsey, June 14, 2023. —as well as in IT (Exhibit 3). The biggest increase from 2023 is found in marketing and sales, where reported adoption has more than doubled. Yet across functions, only two use cases, both within marketing and sales, are reported by 15 percent or more of respondents.

Gen AI also is weaving its way into respondents’ personal lives. Compared with 2023, respondents are much more likely to be using gen AI at work and even more likely to be using gen AI both at work and in their personal lives (Exhibit 4). The survey finds upticks in gen AI use across all regions, with the largest increases in Asia–Pacific and Greater China. Respondents at the highest seniority levels, meanwhile, show larger jumps in the use of gen Al tools for work and outside of work compared with their midlevel-management peers. Looking at specific industries, respondents working in energy and materials and in professional services report the largest increase in gen AI use.

Investments in gen AI and analytical AI are beginning to create value

The latest survey also shows how different industries are budgeting for gen AI. Responses suggest that, in many industries, organizations are about equally as likely to be investing more than 5 percent of their digital budgets in gen AI as they are in nongenerative, analytical-AI solutions (Exhibit 5). Yet in most industries, larger shares of respondents report that their organizations spend more than 20 percent on analytical AI than on gen AI. Looking ahead, most respondents—67 percent—expect their organizations to invest more in AI over the next three years.

Where are those investments paying off? For the first time, our latest survey explored the value created by gen AI use by business function. The function in which the largest share of respondents report seeing cost decreases is human resources. Respondents most commonly report meaningful revenue increases (of more than 5 percent) in supply chain and inventory management (Exhibit 6). For analytical AI, respondents most often report seeing cost benefits in service operations—in line with what we found last year —as well as meaningful revenue increases from AI use in marketing and sales.

Inaccuracy: The most recognized and experienced risk of gen AI use

As businesses begin to see the benefits of gen AI, they’re also recognizing the diverse risks associated with the technology. These can range from data management risks such as data privacy, bias, or intellectual property (IP) infringement to model management risks, which tend to focus on inaccurate output or lack of explainability. A third big risk category is security and incorrect use.

Respondents to the latest survey are more likely than they were last year to say their organizations consider inaccuracy and IP infringement to be relevant to their use of gen AI, and about half continue to view cybersecurity as a risk (Exhibit 7).

Conversely, respondents are less likely than they were last year to say their organizations consider workforce and labor displacement to be relevant risks and are not increasing efforts to mitigate them.

In fact, inaccuracy— which can affect use cases across the gen AI value chain , ranging from customer journeys and summarization to coding and creative content—is the only risk that respondents are significantly more likely than last year to say their organizations are actively working to mitigate.

Some organizations have already experienced negative consequences from the use of gen AI, with 44 percent of respondents saying their organizations have experienced at least one consequence (Exhibit 8). Respondents most often report inaccuracy as a risk that has affected their organizations, followed by cybersecurity and explainability.

Our previous research has found that there are several elements of governance that can help in scaling gen AI use responsibly, yet few respondents report having these risk-related practices in place. 4 “ Implementing generative AI with speed and safety ,” McKinsey Quarterly , March 13, 2024. For example, just 18 percent say their organizations have an enterprise-wide council or board with the authority to make decisions involving responsible AI governance, and only one-third say gen AI risk awareness and risk mitigation controls are required skill sets for technical talent.

Bringing gen AI capabilities to bear

The latest survey also sought to understand how, and how quickly, organizations are deploying these new gen AI tools. We have found three archetypes for implementing gen AI solutions : takers use off-the-shelf, publicly available solutions; shapers customize those tools with proprietary data and systems; and makers develop their own foundation models from scratch. 5 “ Technology’s generational moment with generative AI: A CIO and CTO guide ,” McKinsey, July 11, 2023. Across most industries, the survey results suggest that organizations are finding off-the-shelf offerings applicable to their business needs—though many are pursuing opportunities to customize models or even develop their own (Exhibit 9). About half of reported gen AI uses within respondents’ business functions are utilizing off-the-shelf, publicly available models or tools, with little or no customization. Respondents in energy and materials, technology, and media and telecommunications are more likely to report significant customization or tuning of publicly available models or developing their own proprietary models to address specific business needs.

Respondents most often report that their organizations required one to four months from the start of a project to put gen AI into production, though the time it takes varies by business function (Exhibit 10). It also depends upon the approach for acquiring those capabilities. Not surprisingly, reported uses of highly customized or proprietary models are 1.5 times more likely than off-the-shelf, publicly available models to take five months or more to implement.

Gen AI high performers are excelling despite facing challenges

Gen AI is a new technology, and organizations are still early in the journey of pursuing its opportunities and scaling it across functions. So it’s little surprise that only a small subset of respondents (46 out of 876) report that a meaningful share of their organizations’ EBIT can be attributed to their deployment of gen AI. Still, these gen AI leaders are worth examining closely. These, after all, are the early movers, who already attribute more than 10 percent of their organizations’ EBIT to their use of gen AI. Forty-two percent of these high performers say more than 20 percent of their EBIT is attributable to their use of nongenerative, analytical AI, and they span industries and regions—though most are at organizations with less than $1 billion in annual revenue. The AI-related practices at these organizations can offer guidance to those looking to create value from gen AI adoption at their own organizations.

To start, gen AI high performers are using gen AI in more business functions—an average of three functions, while others average two. They, like other organizations, are most likely to use gen AI in marketing and sales and product or service development, but they’re much more likely than others to use gen AI solutions in risk, legal, and compliance; in strategy and corporate finance; and in supply chain and inventory management. They’re more than three times as likely as others to be using gen AI in activities ranging from processing of accounting documents and risk assessment to R&D testing and pricing and promotions. While, overall, about half of reported gen AI applications within business functions are utilizing publicly available models or tools, gen AI high performers are less likely to use those off-the-shelf options than to either implement significantly customized versions of those tools or to develop their own proprietary foundation models.

What else are these high performers doing differently? For one thing, they are paying more attention to gen-AI-related risks. Perhaps because they are further along on their journeys, they are more likely than others to say their organizations have experienced every negative consequence from gen AI we asked about, from cybersecurity and personal privacy to explainability and IP infringement. Given that, they are more likely than others to report that their organizations consider those risks, as well as regulatory compliance, environmental impacts, and political stability, to be relevant to their gen AI use, and they say they take steps to mitigate more risks than others do.

Gen AI high performers are also much more likely to say their organizations follow a set of risk-related best practices (Exhibit 11). For example, they are nearly twice as likely as others to involve the legal function and embed risk reviews early on in the development of gen AI solutions—that is, to “ shift left .” They’re also much more likely than others to employ a wide range of other best practices, from strategy-related practices to those related to scaling.

In addition to experiencing the risks of gen AI adoption, high performers have encountered other challenges that can serve as warnings to others (Exhibit 12). Seventy percent say they have experienced difficulties with data, including defining processes for data governance, developing the ability to quickly integrate data into AI models, and an insufficient amount of training data, highlighting the essential role that data play in capturing value. High performers are also more likely than others to report experiencing challenges with their operating models, such as implementing agile ways of working and effective sprint performance management.

About the research

The online survey was in the field from February 22 to March 5, 2024, and garnered responses from 1,363 participants representing the full range of regions, industries, company sizes, functional specialties, and tenures. Of those respondents, 981 said their organizations had adopted AI in at least one business function, and 878 said their organizations were regularly using gen AI in at least one function. To adjust for differences in response rates, the data are weighted by the contribution of each respondent’s nation to global GDP.

Alex Singla and Alexander Sukharevsky  are global coleaders of QuantumBlack, AI by McKinsey, and senior partners in McKinsey’s Chicago and London offices, respectively; Lareina Yee  is a senior partner in the Bay Area office, where Michael Chui , a McKinsey Global Institute partner, is a partner; and Bryce Hall  is an associate partner in the Washington, DC, office.

They wish to thank Kaitlin Noe, Larry Kanter, Mallika Jhamb, and Shinjini Srivastava for their contributions to this work.

This article was edited by Heather Hanselman, a senior editor in McKinsey’s Atlanta office.

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