failed projects case studies in south africa

Our research reveals two almost diametrically opposite descriptions of performance in project delivery in South Africa. The first is a description of failure and its characteristics. The second is a number of accounts of success in current project delivery. It appears that there has been much improvement on their earlier failures. For completeness, descriptions of the two performances are discussed starting with an article entitled: “South Africa: Why Have All the Rural Tech Projects Failed?” by Kathryn Cave, Editor at IDG Connect dated 21 June 2013 [1]. We shall discuss the reported reasons for the failure and also other failed projects. According to her, poor planning and implementation, as described below, was the main reason.

The author reported scepticism in the planning and implementation of major projects. Quoting Schofield, she wrote:

Nearly every government plan talks about what will be achieved at the end of 10, 20, 40 years - none of them is held to account for steps along the way. [South Africa is] small on delivery, poor at executing the plans, lousy at monitoring progress and ironing out the problems that arise along the way.

This summarised the views of the then Vice Chairman of Africa ICT Alliance (Africa Information & Communication Technologies Alliance). His comments were made on the National ICT Plan and the Universal Service and Access Agency (USAASA). The aim of the plan was described as follows: "This state-owned entity of government aims to ensure that every man, woman and child whether living in the remote areas of the Kalahari or in urban areas of Gauteng will be able to connect, speak, explore and study using ICT” He commented that the organisation was “sitting on billions of Rands that it does not know how to spend ... and what has been spent has achieved little.”

They include the following:

Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality (NMBMM) -South Africa

Metro bus purchase

Integrated Public Transport System (IPTS)

February 2015

R2 billion ZAR (approximately $130 million)

Sixty buses purchased at a cost of R100 million (ZAR) in 2009 have turned to a failed project. They were purchased as part of a programme to refresh municipal bus service in Port Elizabeth, South Africa. They were used during the 2010 Soccer World Cup but up to 2018 they were still parked.

The bus purchase was part of a larger R2 billion ($130 million) project to implement a Bus Rapid Transit system in Port Elizabeth, which started in 2008. Sadly, they are yet to be used in operation.

The problems identified are as follows:

■ The specification was wrong, and this resulted in the purchase of buses that are too large for the driving lanes.

■ There was a failure to identify the need to drop passengers off on “central islands,” which resulted in the doors ending up on the wrong side of the bus.

It was reported that from 2008 to 2013 the project had been through five different engineering companies and four project managers. Whilst this was worrying, it was better that efforts were being made to resolve the issues than the project being abandoned as it could happen in some other African countries.

Contributing factors to project failure included:

■ Poor requirements management

■ Lack of attention to detail (resulting in faulty requirements)

■ Dysfunctional decision making

■ Failure to engage stakeholders

■ High staff turnover levels

Sentech was the first company in South Africa to launch a wireless broadband service, introducing services in the 3-5GHz band under the brand MyWireless in 2002. However, due to poor financial operations there was only a limited rollout to parts of Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria and Nelspruit. It was eventually abandoned.

Causes of failure of the Sentech’s MyWireless in South Africa:

In October 2010, Sentech could not collect more than 60% of the money that it was owed. Its former leadership went aground amidst accusations of mismanagement, and the auditor-general was concerned they could not pay their bills to creditors.

The MyWireless product was terminated in 2009 after the company proved it was unable to compete with better-resourced private-sector operators in the retail consumer market. To worsen the situation, Sentech could not organise itself to make a presentation to parliament’s portfolio committee on communications.

It is relevant to observe that in spite of the failures they experienced, Sentech Limited had been reorganised to a successful State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) operating in the broadcasting signal distribution and telecommunications sectors and reporting to the Minister of Telecommunication and Postal Services. Probably, one of the positive lessons that could be taken away from the story of Sentech is that in spite of a temporary failure, an African company, like a company in developed countries, could be turned around if it was reorganised with changes in its management and if it was properly funded from the start before being left to operate independently.

On 9 March 1997, Bill Gates reportedly launched the “Digital Villages” concept in the black township of Soweto, which had made headline news by its mass uprising in 1977. This township suffered and probably still suffers from extreme poverty. It was reported in the a daily newspaper in Spokane, Washington, USA, that when Gates visited in 1997, “a computer could cost as much as a house” and few people would think of going online.

The centre launched was South Africa’s first free access “Digital Village,” funded by Microsoft, local computer companies and US development organisation, Africare. The concept was that the $100,000 computer package, housed in the Chiawelo Community Centre, should give the township’s poor residents a link to the information age. As part of the opening, Gates observed a class from the local Elsie Ngidi primary school using computers for the first time, before reportedly telling a crowd of 200: “Soweto is a milestone. There are major decisions ahead about whether technology will leave the developing world behind. This is to close the gap.”

It was reported that even by 2013, there was hardly any evidence of the “Digital Villages” across South Africa. “[They] worked well for a while but collapsed as soon as the sponsors stopped funding the activities - the community had failed to make the use of technology self-sustaining.” A one-time Vice Chairman of Africa ICT Alliance, Adrian Schofield, explained: “What should have been a model for others to follow became a failure. This is a common outcome, where there is no long-term follow through” [4].

However, the report of the complete collapse of the concept in all of South Africa appears not well founded. It was likely that the computer package, housed in the Chiawelo Community Centre, might have failed but there were other Digital Villages, based on the concept, in other areas of South Africa. Some of these are discussed in the next paragraphs.

Microsoft, Comparex Africa, Anglo Platinum, Telkom Foundation and the Digital Partnership joined forces through the Kopano Joint Venture to equip three Rustenburg schools with technology. The computer centres were officially opened and handed over to the school communities by Andile Ngcaba, the Director-General, Department of Communications during a ceremony at Sedibelo Middle School in Moruleng, Rustenburg, on 23 May 2003.

Microsoft presented the following business plan and guideline for how the company implemented the establishment of “Digital Villages” in South Africa. This has been adapted and modified for this publication.

When a suitable centre has been identified, the community will be engaged in negotiations and discussions on the project. The following actions should be taken:

■ A committee comprising the partners and the community is established.

■ The community members are trained and prepared for the takeover once they are ready and the business partners have completed their term as per agreement.

■ An agreement is drafted to specify the roles and responsibilities of the business partners and the community members. This is done to define the relationship to prevent any misunderstanding.

■ Funding of the Digital Village, in both the present and future, is discussed and planned.

■ Microsoft approaches its business partners to donate hardware. Joint venture programmes are encouraged to ensure that hardware is available for the project.

Other joint venture initiatives cover administrative costs, training and the future planning for the centre.

To ensure sustainability of the project, the following actions are embarked upon:

■ Training: As already stated, the established committee members are trained and assisted to prepare for the self-maintenance and operation of the centre.

■ The students are encouraged to form computer clubs and contribute towards the usage of the centre.

■ Adults are expected to contribute a minimal sum of money to be registered as members of the centre.

■ The committee is assisted to open a bank account where these contributions will be deposited.

■ A Trust Fund will be established to allow the committee to raise funds on behalf of the centre.

■ The viability of a particular centre will be evaluated on an agreed and regular basis and will be subject to the continued interest of all parties.

They are as follows:

■ Annual evaluation is conducted, and recommendations are made for further improvement of the centres. Relevant stakeholders will be identified, and participation is invited where applicable.

■ The project is considered successful in communities where evidence of commitment, achievement, organisation and structure is present.

■ The support of the community is assessed through the number of paid-up memberships, the number of regular attendees and the trainees per courses offered at the centre.

The Microsoft-operated Digital Villages concept is a classic illustration of planning a project, properly resourcing it and providing resources for its follow-up when it goes into operation. This is followed by regular monitoring of its performance to ensure that the project deliverables do not fail. It could be a model to be adapted according to local requirements in providing foreign aided services to the developing world. The concept espoused in the Digital Villages programme exemplifies the suggestions being made in this book on how to achieve success and sustainability of projects and project deliverables.

TechCentral, 28 March 2011.

In this section, project failures in some industries are examined. These are representative of failures in most industries in Africa. The causes of failures and lessons that could be learnt to prevent reoccurrence should be some of the takeaway points from this section.

Name omitted deliberately.

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Examples of Failed Projects in South Africa

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This chapter examines two almost diametrically opposite descriptions of performance in project delivery in South Africa. The first is a description of failure and its characteristics. The second is a number of accounts of success in current project delivery. The chapter discusses the reported reasons for the failure and also other failed projects. According to her, poor planning and implementation, as described below, was the main reason. The centre launched was South Africa’s first free access “Digital Village,” funded by Microsoft, local computer companies and US development organisation, Africare. Microsoft, Comparex Africa, Anglo Platinum, Telkom Foundation and the Digital Partnership joined forces through the Kopano Joint Venture to equip three Rustenburg schools with technology. Microsoft presented the following business plan and guideline for how the company implemented the establishment of “Digital Villages” in South Africa.

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Examples of Failed Projects in South Africa

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10 failed projects and the lessons learned

By ilx team | 19 august 2019.

Every project teaches lessons with its successes and failures. Best practice courses highlight the importance of developing a mind-set of continuous learning from the outset of the project. In this blog we’ll look at 10 major public project failures and the lessons learnt from these mistakes.

Why should we analyse projects that failed?

Failed projects provide valuable lessons. Analysing failures can help to pinpoint weaknesses in project planning, execution, or team dynamics. By dissecting what went wrong, project teams can gain insights into the mistakes that were made and avoid repeating the same errors in the future.

Embracing failure as a learning opportunity fosters a culture of continuous improvement, which leads project teams to become more resilient, adaptable, and innovative.

10 projects that failed:

1. apple lisa.

In the early days of Apple, Lisa was the first GUI computer marketed at personal business users. It was supposed to be the first desktop computer that incorporated the now famous mouse, and a 5 MHz, 1MB RAM processor – the fastest of its kind back in 1983.

However, the project was a big failure. Only 10,000 computers were sold. It was such as failure that Steve Jobs was taken off the project and allocated to another project, the Macintosh. Apple Lisa overpromised and under-delivered, with a price-performance ratio that was significantly worse than had been expected.

Lesson learned:

The importance of stakeholder collaboration and transparency.

2. Crystal Pepsi

The early 1990s saw the trend for ‘light’ drinks emerge. In 1992, Pepsi launched Crystal Pepsi , a soft drink that tasted similar to regular Pepsi but was clear-coloured. Initially sales were good, mainly due to the curiosity factor, but soon dropped away to the point where Crystal Pepsi was withdrawn from the market just 2 years later.

The mistake of David Novak, creator of Cystal Pepsi — and Pepsi itself — was making too many assumptions about the product and market demand. Novak was even told by the bottlers that the drink needed to taste more like Pepsi. Unfortunately, he didn’t listen.

Don’t make assumptions about your audience. Leverage everyone’s expertise and verify statements before considering them fact.

3. Ford Edsel

It’s not often that Ford gets it wrong, but in the case of the Edsel , they failed on a big scale. Ford wanted to close the gap with General Motors and Chrysler. Having spent $250 million and 10 years developing the Edsel, by the time it came to the market the trend was for more compact cars.

Launched in 1957, the Edsel was considered overpriced, over-hyped, too big, and unattractive. By 1959, production was ceased.

Update a project’s business case and schedule during its lifecycle.

4. Computerised DMV

In the 1990s, the DMV tried to computerise their department to track drivers’ licences and vehicle registrations.

But after 6 years and $44 million, as well as ‘putting all their eggs into one basket’ with Tandem Computers, they discovered their computers were actually slower than the ones they replaced. On top of that, a state audit found that the DMV was violating contracting laws and regulations.

Processes should be followed, and any legal or regulatory constraints must be included in the project plan.

5. J.C. Penney’s 2011 rebrand

To wean customers away from their reliance on coupons, J.C. Penney introduced simpler price points and colour-coded price tags, and ran a marketing campaign to promote this strategy.

Customers found the new pricing structure confusing, and many items advertised never went on sale. Revenues dropped significantly and J.C. Penney had to admit failure.

The impact a lack of stakeholder and market research can have on a project.

6. Airbus A380

When the Airbus A380 was launched in 2007, much was expected of the airplane, but just 10 years later, they were being sold for no more than spare parts. The expected game-changer led to Airbus struggling to secure deals with airlines.

The A380 was expensive to produce, and Airbus’s production teams didn’t communicate and used different CAD programs. That mistake alone cost $6.1 billion . Furthermore, the second-hand market was non-existent because the planes were simply too big for any airline to make back their invested money.

The impact of poor internal communication and a business case that was built on initial sales, taking the second-hand market for granted.

7. Montreal’s Highway 15 overpass

In 2016, Montreal city officials found that an overpass for Highway 15 didn’t align with the design for the new Champlain Bridge nearby, which was also undergoing redevelopment.

So just a year after being built, the $11 million overpass was torn down . While changing design criteria can have expensive knock-on effects, there was an apparent lack of communication between projects here.

A lack of programme management meant the bridge and the overpass for the same highway were being constructed without the other being considered. The long-term planning and internal communication suffered as a result.

8. Knight Capital

The company’s stock market algorithm released in 2012 with code from an earlier build. It took just 30 minutes for a software glitch to see the company lose a massive $440 million and be forced into a merger a year later.

Although their CEO, Thomas Joyce, implied that the software bug could have happened to anyone, it is very likely that poor software development and inadequate testing models are more to blame for the defect in their trading algorithm.

Project targets and deadlines must be realistic to be achievable. Rushing a product can cause mistakes to be made.

9. Target’s failed entry into Canada

When Target said they were expanding into Canada, 81% of Canadian shoppers expressed interest in visiting them. It should have been a resounding success, but it wasn’t. Less than 2 years later, Target’s Chairman and CEO announced they were pulling out of Canada , closing all 133 stores.

Target misjudged the Canadian customer. Their stores did not feature the same low prices as the US stores, there were serious supply and distribution problems, and they opened too many stores too quickly.

The need for better resource and supply planning, as well as the impact of ineffectively managing stakeholder expectations.

10. Afghan forest camo pattern

Afghanistan’s landscape features around 2% woodland, yet this didn’t stop the US government from spending $28 million of taxpayers’ money on ‘forest’ pattern uniforms for the Afghan National Army. It was only chosen because the Afghan Defence Minister liked the design.

Ultimately, these were never used, so the money and uniforms were completely wasted. That particular forest pattern required a paid licence, while many patterns already owned by the army were more suitable for Afghanistan’s landscape.

Poor management led to a serious oversight, which stakeholder engagement and quality control would have prevented.

Common warning signs of a failing project

Throughout the 10 failed projects we’ve highlighted above, there are a number of common themes. Identifying and being mindful of these warning signs can help you avoid making the same mistakes.

Lack of interest

One warning sign may be stakeholder not attending meetings or providing feedback, as well as allocated tasks not being completed on time. It’s the project managers role to track assignments and ensure a high level of communication at all times. If you believe stakeholders are losing interest, call a meeting to reiterate the value of the project.

Learn more about how support (or lack of) from internal and external stakeholders can make or break a project.

Poor communication

It’s easy for members of the project team to become ‘lost’ and out of the loop with project progress, decisions, and reviews. Project managers should have a communication plan and automate as much as they can. This ensures everyone involved in the project is kept up-to-date constantly.

Discover how effective communication is essential to the success of projects, programmes and portfolios.

Lack of transparency

The more you try to cover up a problem or issue, the less transparency you have and the greater the problem becomes. Be honest. Issues do arise and the best way forward is to identify them as early as possible, notify stakeholders, including sponsors and customers, and work closely with them to resolve the issue.

Scope and budget creep

Don’t start the project until all the stakeholders are on the same page. Always ensure everyone has the scope statement to work from.

Find out how you can ensure your project budgets are based on reliable projections to avoid scope and budget creep .

Poor management oversight

Ensure everyone’s roles and responsibilities are well-defined. The project manager is accountable to other stakeholders.

How ILX can help train project managers

There will always be project failures. The key is to identify them as early as possible and work to resolve them before it’s too late, allowing you to minimise the damage.

It is a project manager’s responsibility to lead by example, and learn from other people’s mistakes. Training in one of our project management courses such as PRINCE2® , AgilePM® or APM PMQ , is a great way to help you develop these skills and improve your leadership qualities.

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Megaprojects—mega failures? The politics of aspiration and the transformation of rural Kenya

Special Issue Article
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Published: 13 April 2021
Volume 33 , pages 1069–1090, ( 2021 )

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failed projects case studies in south africa

Detlef Müller-Mahn ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-5266-195X 1 ,
Kennedy Mkutu 2 &
Eric Kioko 3

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Megaprojects are returning to play a key role in the transformation of rural Africa, despite controversies over their outcome. While some view them as promising tools for a ‘big push’ of modernization, others criticize their multiple adverse effects and risk of failure. Against this backdrop, the paper revisits earlier concepts that have explained megaproject failures by referring to problems of managerial complexity and the logics of state-led development. Taking recent examples from Kenya, the paper argues for a more differentiated approach, considering the symbolic role infrastructure megaprojects play in future-oriented development politics as objects of imagination, vision, and hope. We propose to explain the outcomes of megaprojects by focusing on the ‘politics of aspiration’, which unfold at the intersection between different actors and scales. The paper gives an overview of large infrastructure projects in Kenya and places them in the context of the country´s national development agenda ‘Vision 2030′. It identifies the relevant actors and investigates how controversial aspirations, interests and foreign influences play out on the ground. The paper concludes by describing megaproject development as future making, driven by the mobilizing power of the ‘politics of aspiration’. The analysis of megaprojects should consider not only material outcomes but also their symbolic dimension for desirable futures.

Les mégaprojets jouent à nouveau un rôle clé dans la transformation de l'Afrique rurale, en dépit de leurs résultats controversés. Si certains les considèrent comme des outils prometteurs permettant un «grand pas » vers la modernisation, d’autres critiquent leurs multiples effets néfastes et leur risque d’échec. Dans ce contexte, l'article revisite des concepts antérieurs qui ont expliqué les échecs des mégaprojets en faisant référence aux problèmes de complexité managériale et à la logique du développement dirigé par l'État. L’article s’inspire d’exemples récents au Kenya et fait un plaidoyer pour une approche différenciée, en prenant en compte le rôle symbolique que jouent les mégaprojets d'infrastructure dans les politiques de développement orientées vers l'avenir en tant qu'objets d'imagination, de vision et d'espoir. Nous proposons d’expliquer les résultats des mégaprojets en nous concentrant sur la «politique de l’aspiration», qui se trouvent au croisement entre les différents acteurs et les différentes envergures. L’article donne un aperçu des grands projets d’infrastructure au Kenya et les positionne dans le contexte du programme de développement national du pays, «Vision 2030». Il identifie les acteurs concernés et examine la manière dont les aspirations, intérêts et influences étrangères controversés s’articulent sur le terrain. L’article conclut en décrivant le développement des mégaprojets comme étant créateur d’avenir, sous l’impulsion du pouvoir fédérateur de la «politique de l’aspiration». L'analyse des mégaprojets doit tenir compte non seulement des résultats matériels, mais également de leur dimension symbolique qui forge un avenir attrayant.

Are Mega Projects Inherently Undemocratic? Field Narratives from Mega Projects Sites in Bangladesh

The Challenge of Megacities in India

Scientific and institutional capacity for complex development of the russian arctic zone in the medium and long term perspectives

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Introduction

Africa is currently witnessing an unprecedented boom of investments in large infrastructure projects, commonly referred to as megaprojects. New roads, railways, airports, deepwater harbours, power lines, dams and irrigation schemes are mushrooming all over the continent. Megaproject development, as it seems, is implemented with the force of bulldozers, cutting corridors of economic growth into rural hinterlands and pushing the frontiers of modernization towards the margins. This present phase of spatial development began shortly after the year 2000, accompanied by large-scale land acquisitions and a ‘new scramble for Africa’ (Carmody 2011 ), and gained momentum when China announced its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 (Chen 2016 ). A growing body of literature provides interpretations of the historical legacies of the ‘infrastructure scramble’ (Enns and Bersaglio 2019 ), highlighting the return of state-led development visions (Mosley and Watson 2016 ), modernist logics (Dye 2019 ), green economy (Bergius et al. 2020 ) and other forms of land investments (Lind et al. 2020 ), the emergence of a state-building frontier (Stepputat and Hagmann 2019 ) and the underlying fascination for ‘dreamscapes of modernity’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2015 ; Müller-Mahn 2020 ). Yet the resurrection of megaprojects is hard to understand in so far as large-scale projects have long been criticized for notorious under-performance and cost overrides, a phenomenon described as the ‘megaprojects paradox’ (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003 ). Against this backdrop, the question arises as to how we can explain the renewed fascination for ‘thinking big’ in spatial development, and the often rather meagre outcomes of megaprojects.

This paper takes cases from Kenya to investigate the political rationality and performance of megaprojects in the context of national development. Kenya is a particularly telling example, since it is the country with the highest concentration of large infrastructure projects in East Africa (Enns 2017 ). In line with a neoliberal, investor-friendly tradition, successive Kenyan governments have attempted to attract foreign and domestic capital, and to channel funds into showpieces of progress. Development corridors play an important role in this context, while national planning envisions transformation into a middle-income country. Recent studies have highlighted various aspects of corridor development in East Africa, such as territorial restructuring (Greiner 2016 ), societal exclusion and inclusion (Chome 2020 ), complex rural responses (Enns 2017 , 2019 ), diverse forms of knowledge production and resistance by rural land users (Enns and Bersaglio 2020 ), the use of discursive tactics and spatial imagination (Aalders 2020 ), and the importance of corridors as instruments for the expansion of global value chains (Dannenberg et al. 2018 ).

The paper contributes to the debate on megaproject development by highlighting an aspect, which has attracted relatively little attention. We propose to view megaprojects as huge constructions that explicitly affect the future, or more specifically, as tools of ‘future-making’ in the sense proposed by Appadurai ( 2013 ). Appadurai distinguishes anticipation, imagination and aspiration as cultural practices that make the future an issue in the present. While anticipation refers to probabilities, and imagination to designs and collectively held beliefs, aspiration aims at desirable futures, possibilities and hope. Thus, we assume that aspiration is important for understanding how megaprojects are conceived and performed as promises of future improvements, as pathways to modernity, and—to use a metaphor—as ‘beacons of hope’. We propose to consider megaproject development as part of the ‘politics of aspiration’, in which hope is produced and performed in public debates, political negotiations, and planning processes.

The history of large-scale projects in Africa saw a first boom after independence, when national development followed visions of modernity and state-driven development and was aimed at rapid societal transformation (Scott 1998 ). The character of large infrastructure projects changed substantially after the neoliberal turn in the 1980s. With the roll-back of the state, ‘the envisioning of megaprojects was limited to those that could at least be partially funded by the private sector’ (Schindler et al. 2019 : 2). Today, megaprojects are back on the political agenda, but embedded in complex institutional settings. They involve governmental and non-governmental actors, the private sector and international funding agencies, resulting in a more decentralized and partially fuzzy governance structure (Mosley and Watson 2016 ).

We will first explain our conceptual framework in respect of the so-called ‘megaproject paradox’ and the significance of aspiration. Then we will present three cases of megaprojects in Kenya: the standard gauge railway from Mombasa to Nairobi, the LAPSSET corridor with the construction of an international airport and an abattoir at Isiolo, and the Galana-Kulalu Food Security Project. In the discussion, we will come back to the question formulated in the title of this paper by looking at the relationship between the politics of aspiration and the outcome of such megaprojects.

Conceptual explanations for the success or failure of megaprojects

The history of problematic megaprojects may be traced back to the Tower of Babel, which became a metaphor for over-ambitious construction schemes ending up in chaos. Until today, megaproject developments arouse ambivalent feelings, fluctuating between enthusiasm and scepticism. James Scott ( 1998 ), in his seminal work entitled Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed , presents a number of cases exemplifying the ‘fiasco’ and even ‘full-fledged disaster’ of large state-led projects. Yet there are no absolute criteria for characterizing a project as ‘mega’ or as a failure, since these are both relative terms. Megaprojects may be viewed as huge development schemes which are particularly ambitious, expensive, and difficult to manage, with a tendency to fail to meet the initial objectives (Schindler et al. 2019 ). On the basis of a literature review, we distinguish four conceptual approaches to explaining the outcome of megaprojects.

The first of these four approaches focuses on the complexity of large-scale engineering projects, which are generally difficult to manage and control (Salet et al. 2013 ). Flyvbjerg et al. ( 2003 ) present a number of spectacular multi-billion dollar infrastructure projects, such as the Channel Tunnel, Denver International Airport, and other examples in the Global North, which started with high-flying expectations and ended up with extreme cost-overruns. The examples highlight the gap between promises and achievements, a phenomenon the authors call the ‘megaprojects paradox’. They argue that the disappointing performance of megaprojects is not accidental, but part of the project logic. Exaggerated promises, weak governance structures, lack of control, and insufficient accountability serve to generate exceedingly high profits. In sub-Saharan Africa, this combination of problems is all too common (Sobják 2018 ).

A second line of explanation links the outcome of megaprojects to political regimes and the state. Scott ( 1998 ) relates the failure of large-scale development schemes to a combination of several elements culminating in ‘high modernism’, i.e. a system of beliefs that relies on science and technology, the transformation of nature, and the power of authoritarian states. On the basis of case studies of large schemes from various parts of the world, including an example from Tanzania, Scott argues that ‘it is the systematic, cyclopean shortsightedness of high-modernist agriculture that courts certain forms of failure’ (Scott 1998 : 264). State-led, top-down projects do not work, because they do not fit into local conditions. This argument is supported by recent studies on high-modernist megaprojects on the African continent. Van der Westhuizen ( 2007 ), for example, points to the importance of political symbolism to explain the costly construction of Gautrain, a metropolitan high-speed train network in South Africa, which was aimed not only at improving public transport but also at presenting South Africa as a modern state on the occasion of the 2010 Football World Cup. Ballard ( 2017 ) interprets housing schemes in South Africa as attempts to strengthen the legitimacy of the state, especially in the context of upcoming elections. This explains why housing megaprojects serve other interests beyond their material dimension. Ballard and Rubin ( 2017 ) attribute the shift from small to big housing schemes to the ‘megaprojects policy turn’ in South Africa in the years 2014–2015. In a similar vein, Hannan and Sutherland ( 2014 ) explore controversies around urban megaprojects in Durban, South Africa, which they attribute to conflicts between short- and long-term goals, and between pro-poor and pro-growth orientations. Projects are criticized for high economic risk, frequent delays, lack of transparency and accountability, and as ‘elite playing fields’ (Hannan & Sutherland 2014 : 2).

A third argument points to the vulnerability of megaprojects in the context of social and economic change. Ansar et al. ( 2017 ) give an overview of ‘theories of big’, which they interpret as a tendency to undertake ever bigger projects under conditions of economies of scale. They argue that, contrary to their ambitious goals, big projects are characterized by a particularly high degree of ‘fragility’ due to their exposure to uncertainties. The authors conclude that ‘to automatically assume that “bigger is better”, which is common in megaproject management, is a recipe for failure’ (Ansar et al. 2017 : 3).

Finally, a fourth approach highlights the symbolic dimension of large-scale infrastructure projects, especially regarding their role as symbols of progress and focal points of aspiration. Megaprojects capture the imagination, they are ‘imagined before they come to exist’ (Schindler et al. ( 2019 : 2), and in doing so, they create ‘imagined futures’ (Beckert 2016 ) which serve as pacemakers of development. Imagined futures may become effective drivers of change, if the imagination is shared by a sufficiently large number of actors, based on the promises of transformation, and the ‘enchantments of infrastructure’ (Harvey and Knox 2012 ). The power of megaprojects comes not only from their physical impact but also from the power they exert over the minds of the people affected by rural transformation. Thus, they may be considered as aspirational projects aiming at ‘dreamscapes of modernity’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2015 ; Müller-Mahn 2020 ). Such aspirations promote speculation and jostling for position, which can easily lead to conflicts (Elliot 2016 ). Further, interference with land rights, ecology and social conditions may lead to project delays if these injustices are protested. Lastly, the projects may be impractical, since they are largely driven by elite imaginations with little attention to participatory processes involving the local communities. This suggests that local input is not only morally desirable but also practically necessary (Stetson 2012 ; Mkutu et al. 2019 ).

Development planning in Kenya

The first megaproject in Kenya was the nearly 600-mile-long railway from Mombasa to Lake Victoria, constructed in 1896–1901, which aimed to consolidate British control in the region and succeeded in opening up the southern part of Kenya (Jedwab et al. 2015 ). In the postcolonial period, there was an intermittent focus on infrastructural development as a driver of economic growth. After independence, Kenya’s economic policy was formulated as African socialism Footnote 1 —although it was in fact a mixed economic policy, focusing chiefly on high potential areas (Zelezer 1991 ). Later policies briefly favoured redistributive ideals, and then donor-driven structural adjustment policies took over in the 1980s in which the private sector and civil society were seen as key drivers of growth. Policies produced during this period were aimed at employment opportunities in industry and agriculture, while roads, power and water supply were prioritized. Industrialization continued to be emphasized in the 1990s and again in the 2000s.

The year 2008 saw the creation of Kenya’s Vision 2030 whose aim was the pursuit of global competitiveness and prosperity in order to offer Kenyans a high quality of life by 2030. Key features of the plan include investment in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL), focusing on infrastructural development to connect different parts of the country through roads, railways, ports, airports, waterways and telecommunications, which would then stimulate private sector investments. The first medium-term plan (MTP) of Vision 2030 (2008–2013) outlined the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor project. According to claims by the LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority, the corridor will ‘inject between 2 and 3% of GDP into the [Kenyan] economy’. Officials further estimate that LAPSSET might even yield higher growth rates ‘of between 8 and 10% of GDP when generated and attracted investments finally come on board’. Footnote 2 These claims lie behind the project slogan: ‘Building Africa’s Transformative and Game Changer Infrastructure to Deliver a Just and Prosperous Kenya’. As Browne ( 2015 :7) rightly points out, LAPSSET ‘echoes the modernist developmental approach of African governments in the 1960s but differs from the infrastructural visions of the past in both its magnitude and rationale’. It is part of a continent-wide ambitious development vision, which copies models of transboundary integration and modernization from Europe and North America (Chome et al. 2020 ).

In 2012, in line with Vision 2030, the government produced Sessional Paper No. 8 of 2012 ‘National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands’, which deliberately focused on reversal of the previous policy of concentrating development efforts on high potential areas. The paper articulated the need to close the gap between these areas and the rest of the country, while at the same time protecting and promoting the mobility and institutional arrangements which are so essential to productive pastoralism amidst the threat of climate change and the need for food security. The paper acknowledged the potentials of ASAL regarding cross-border trade, livestock, tourism, natural minerals and renewable energy, with special mention of the LAPSSET project.

The second MTP (2013–2017) continued to emphasize infrastructure development, amongst others, while the third MTP (2018–2022) prioritizes a so-called Big Four Agenda: food security (which includes irrigation and development of the blue economy), affordable housing, affordable healthcare for all and manufacturing (which includes creation of special economic and industrial parks and increasing agro-processing). Additionally, it proposes oil and minerals development, and the expansion and modernizing of infrastructure. These plans are considered inclusive by virtue of the devolved structure now in place following Kenya´s 2010 constitution.

One problem with this timeline of Kenya’s visions is that implementation is characteristically poor (Zelezer 1991 ). Referring specifically to the LAPSSET project, Browne ( 2015 ) comments that there have been delays in implementation, confused and sometimes contradictory announcements, and many concerns over land grabbing and compensation issues, as well as social and environmental impacts, raised by a very active civil society. Below, we present a number of case studies as examples of megaproject development in Kenya.

The case of the Standard Gauge Railway

The 485 km long Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) from Nairobi to Mombasa was completed in 2017 as Kenya’s largest infrastructure project since independence. Footnote 3 It was funded and built by the Chinese at a cost of $3.2 billion US dollars loaned from China Exim Bank and is also operated by the Chinese. Footnote 4 As of June 2019, Kenya owes $6.5 billion to China following the further extension of the railway to Naivasha, Footnote 5 but China declined further loans to take the railway to Kisumu as originally planned. Footnote 6 The project has been mired in controversy due to the non-competitive manner in which the Chinese company was awarded the tender. Footnote 7

The final terminus of the SGR is to be a dry port in Maai Mahiu near Naivasha town, partially occupying land which was privately grabbed by high ranking politicians. Footnote 8 Around 40 km away in Suswa town, Narok County, 405 ha of land is being set aside for an industrial park. Footnote 9 The SGR was intended to recoup its costs through cargo transportation, although so far it is mainly a passenger service. In September 2019, the Cabinet Secretary for Infrastructure issued a directive that all cargo be transported by rail on the new railway from Mombasa to Nairobi and on to Naivasha, thus, bypassing Mombasa town. This met with strong protests over the loss of thousands of jobs in clearing and forwarding agencies, and in the fuel and transport sectors, and a shrinkage of Mombasa’s economy by over 16%. Footnote 10 The directive was subsequently officially suspended in October 2019, Footnote 11 likely due to pressure from elites who own trucking companies operating between Kenya and the Great Lakes countries. Footnote 12

A World Bank report highlights numerous negative impacts of the SGR project in Narok, such as increasing crime and prostitution, pollution and deforestation, with particularly severe consequences for local pastoralists. Footnote 13 An estimated 10,000 families are expected to be displaced by the inland container depot and associated developments. A Maasai community went to court to oppose the developments, saying that the 1619 ha they were offered to replace their land is insufficient. Footnote 14 The shaky provisions for compensation of community-land owners have been described, but the enactment of the Land Value Index Act (2018) has made it even more difficult to get timely and adequate compensation. The Act is meant to prevent delays over compensation disputes by allowing the government to go ahead with the project as cases are resolved, but there are concerns that this could also allow community rights to be overridden more easily. Further, the Act only recognizes the market value of the land, and it only acknowledges permanent occupiers, which is insensitive to pastoralist realities and the value of the land for pastoralist livelihoods. Currently, compensation is marred by corruption, including the taking of bribes by Maasai elites. Footnote 15 Furthermore, some influential persons, including members of parliament, have bought land cheaply from locals and sold it at exorbitant prices to the Chinese company constructing the SGR. In Suswa, one man’s farm was bought for KES 40,000 (USD 400) and sold on for millions. It is expected that land sales will continue to increase in the area in which former Maasai group ranches have been extensively subdivided. Footnote 16 When interviewed, a Maasai elder explained his fears concerning the loss of pasture and water in the Kedong valley in which Suswa town is located:

Changes are coming, the previous life we were living seems to be gone… We might have to start zero grazing (bringing cattle feed), when Kedong is gone… Now we are being pushed out. What will happen? People will suffer...our living will be like Kibera (slum in Nairobi). Footnote 17

This case illustrates how weak land laws allow elites to benefit from infrastructure developments at the expense of marginalized citizens. Poor planning of such a huge project, which is at the same time dominated by elite visions, caused the project to become a financial failure and transferred the debt burden to future generations of Kenyan taxpayers.

LAPSSET projects: Isiolo International Airport and Abattoir

Like the SGR, projects in the LAPSSET corridor such as the upgrading of the small airfield of Isiolo to an international airport have raised temperatures over land rights, with irregularities in respect of land acquisition, resettlement and compensation. Covering an area of 260 ha, the airport terminal lies in Isiolo County, while the runway extends into Meru County. The total cost for the Kenyan government amounts to 27 million US dollars. At its opening, the airport was heralded as a ‘game changer’ for the economy of the northern counties. However, the airport, which had been built for over 6000 passengers per week, currently operates far below its capacity, handling only one small weekly flight (Atieno 2019 ). Moreover, the airport is still not equipped to handle commercial or cargo flights because it lacks a control tower, landing lights and a sufficiently long runway. Footnote 18 One of the immediate challenges has been the downturn in the global demand for the soft drug miraa (also known as khat ), which was banned in Europe in 2017. The plant is grown widely in Meru, and it was anticipated that the trade in miraa would benefit greatly from the facility. Another challenge has been delay in the completion of the Isiolo abattoir, to be discussed below (Atieno 2019 ). Thus, the current failure of the airport is related to its complex interdependency with other segments of the LAPSSET megaproject.

The airport was built on trust land—an old designation referring to land owned on a communal basis, often by pastoralist groups, and held in trust by local authorities. Such land was compulsorily acquired by the government or grabbed by elites, sometimes in league with local councils, as rights holders were rarely aware of their rights to consultation, appeal and compensation or relocation, and had little capacity to fight for them. The Land Act of 2012 and the Community Land Act of 2016 re-designated trust land as community land and strengthened the legal framework for its users, providing for registration by communities. This will protect them against land grabbing and allow direct compensation in the event of compulsory government acquisition. However, the process of implementation of this law is slow, even as the pace of change in northern Kenya is rapid.

In 2004, a team of councillors and elders was appointed to look at the number of people who would be affected by the airport project. Footnote 19 A ballot process for which people paid KES 1000 (USD 10) was used to allocate replacement plots to displaced residents. However, initial estimates of those displaced swelled, and the situation became increasingly complicated. Outsiders also benefited from allocations. Footnote 20 In a World Bank report, a former county council administrator described the confusion:

The initial 700 were to be relocated to Mwangaza, but the number increased over time to 1,500. As a result, some of the people were relocated to Kiwanjani location (Wabera Ward) but there were only 450 plots, and 50 squatters were already occupying the area, so approximately 400 in number were to move to Chechelesi, which had 1,900 plots. However, although the ballot was done, no land has yet been given out. Tension resulting from political interference and the change of leadership meant that even the Mwangaza area has not yet been occupied by the allocated people …. It’s now more than politics and has turned into a blame game. Footnote 21

The process was marred by delays and also by double allocation of new plots, which is the result of both corruption and confusion. The situation was further complicated by devolution. Several plots were acquired by elites following the passing of the mantle from the former Isiolo County Council to the County Government in 2013. A bishop estimated that there were around 100 internally displaced households as a result of the flawed relocations, and he believed that the new county government had behaved irregularly. Chiefs and ward administrators concurred that the county government had grabbed and consolidated 10 to 20 plots that were balloted, and later prepared a new fake map to facilitate the sale or gift of the plots to their cronies, especially in the Chechelesi area. Illegally produced and invalid documents were given out. In the words of a local chief, ‘the problem is corruption within the land office’.

Several respondents warned of the potential for ethnopolitical conflict as a result of the airport expansion. The runway extends into Nyambene in Meru County, where people who lost their land for construction purposes have been compensated, while those affected in Isiolo have not, because here the land was trust land. This plays into an existing volatile boundary dispute between Isiolo and Meru counties which has already been exacerbated as a result of LAPSSET, since the boundary determines which county benefits from compensation and economic development in the disputed area.

Interestingly, a top official from the Vision 2030 directorate denied in an interview that genuine people had not been compensated and reiterated that LAPSSET is a game changer with positive effects for the local population. Footnote 22 This viewpoint fails to acknowledge that not everyone is a winner from this project, and that shared prosperity may remain a dream due to institutional weaknesses, corruption, elite capture and pre-existing ethnopolitical competition.

Another example to illustrate the complexity of activities tied into the LAPSSET corridor is the construction of an abattoir at Isiolo town. Isiolo Holding Ground (also known as Livestock Marketing Division or LMD) is a 124,200 ha site, occupying parts of Burat and Oldonyiro wards, and bordering Laikipia, Samburu and Meru counties (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock Development and Marketing, 2006). It was established by the colonial government as a disease control buffer zone for protecting settlers’ cattle from pastoralist cattle migrating southwards during times of drought, and for quarantining and livestock marketing purposes. The ground continues to be used for quarantining and disease screening, as well as fattening and watering, but for some years it has not been operating as effectively as intended, due to poor management, land claims and overgrazing. It is occupied by a number of users including different armed pastoral groups belonging to Dorobo ( iltorrobo , hunter gatherers turned Maasai), Samburu, Turkana, Meru and settled Somali communities.

In line with other planned developments in northern Kenya, the new abattoir is expected to boost the economy of the north through meat export and to allow farmers to receive direct payment for their livestock without being exploited by middlemen. It has the capacity to slaughter 1000 sheep and goats, 200 cows and 100 camels daily. Realization of the vision was delayed due to lack of funds provided by the previous county government and poor workmanship, but there are hopes that private investment and World Bank funds may help to make up the shortfall. Footnote 23 In an interview, an official from the LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority was very positive about the potential for international export of animal products, saying that ‘this abattoir will be one of the major economic achievements that can facilitate growth along this corridor especially within the pastoralist counties’.

In contrast to the airport, there was a general sense of optimism and hope amongst many community members regarding the abattoir. It may be that this aspect of Vision 2030 is truly appropriate to local needs and more likely to bring shared prosperity, once the problems have been overcome. Further, its potential success does not rely on other infrastructural developments, although it does harmonize with the airport plans. Some concerns remain, however, such as a potential rise in conflict due to the large number of people from different ethnic groups settled in the LMD, so that the improved market for livestock could potentially exacerbate cattle raiding for cash. Footnote 24 Lastly, Isiolo abattoir was initially envisioned to serve the neighbouring counties, but the governments of three other counties have decided to build their own.

Galana-Kulalu: a failed ‘million-acre’ food security project

Large-scale agricultural development schemes are not new in Kenya. From the mid-1950s, the colonial government sets up the Perkerra, Hola and Mwea-Tebere irrigation schemes on ‘native reserves’. After independence, the Ministry of Agriculture took over the management of these projects, and in 1966, the National Irrigation Board (NIB) Footnote 25 was established with the mandate to develop, improve and manage national irrigation schemes in Kenya (Ngigi 2002 ). NIB spearheaded the development of Ahero, Bunyala, West Kano and Bura irrigation schemes between the mid-1970s and early 1980s.

Closely related to these projects is the million-acre idea, which is traceable to the early 1960s when focus shifted to the re-Africanization project dubbed the ‘million-acre settlement scheme’. It targeted lands that the colony had previously set aside for European settlement (Bradshaw 1990 ; Chambers 1969 ; Kanyinga 2009 ; Leo 1981 ). The million-acre scheme aimed at land redistribution and conferment of tenure rights on indigenous communities for settlement and agricultural development, while the large irrigation schemes were a response to food security challenges and the management of risks associated with unpredictable rainfall patterns. Irrigation and settlement schemes are driven by the politics of aspiration, because their purpose goes beyond addressing the underlying challenges. Essentially, they are central to the realization of the independence dream and are, thus, designed to win the support of the masses and to draw potential international development aid. The big promises justified external financing of such projects. For example, between 1977 and 1986, the World Bank financed the Bura Irrigation Project to the tune of USD 40 million.

To what extent have these centralized projects lived up to expectations? About six decades on, most public irrigation schemes in Kenya perform way below average (Muema et al. 2018 ). Ngigi ( 2002 ) notes that ‘the intended benefit of improving the living standards, to say the least, has not been realised’ and that some, like Bura, are no longer functional. Moreover, some irrigation schemes and large-scale agricultural investments are linked to human rights abuses especially through land dispossession (Otieno 2016 ). However, central to the failure of these schemes is the complexity of management and control as exemplified by Flyvbjerg et al. ( 2003 ). Bradshaw ( 1990 ) blames this on challenges around ownership, management, uneven resource distribution, water allocation and scarcity, which contribute to underdevelopment.

In 2010, as part of Vision 2030 and in line with UN goals, Footnote 26 Kenya embarked on a renewed push for the return of mega irrigation projects. Arguably, these visions and imaginations of the future are essentially anchored in global discourses and existential threats, which helps to give them currency and a strong bargaining position in the state decision-making apparatus. Despite the proven failure of the schemes already discussed, the idea of megaprojects was presented afresh, with renewed fascination and new aspirations that captured the imagination of the masses, as well as that of development partners, capitalizing on their link to the country’s development blueprints within the internationally favoured devolved governance structures.

Nine large-scale schemes were identified, three of which became flagship irrigation projects: the Galana-Kulalu Food Security Project (GKFSP), Mwea Irrigation Development Project and Bura Irrigation Rehabilitation Project. The GKFSP is more recent than the others, having been launched in 2014 with completion planned for 2017. The project was one of the key campaign promises that the Jubilee administration made in its manifesto. The idea was to make Kenya a food-secure nation through the one-million-acre land irrigation initiative (Leshore and Minja 2019 ). Below, we will describe the nature of the project and the conditions under which this massive agricultural investment collapsed.

The project was planned to be implemented in three phases: a Model Farm of 10,000 acres, to be developed into a Pilot Farm covering 100,000 acres, and finally the larger GKFSP with 1.75 million acres (NIB 2015 ). As located in one of Kenya’s poorest, semi-arid counties, the proposed million-acre irrigation scheme promised to secure the country against hunger, increase agricultural exports and transform a previously ‘underutilized’ landscape through large-scale production of maize, sugarcane, vegetables and fruits, and through market-oriented livestock production for both local and international markets. Water from the Galana River was meant to irrigate hundreds of thousands of acres of farmland located primarily within the controversial Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) Footnote 27 land at Kulalu ranch. Such a massive project required big financing and technical expertise that exceeded the country’s capacity. Through NIB, the Kenyan government engaged Israel’s leading agricultural consulting firm, Agri-Green Consulting Ltd, for technical and operational support. The selection of this firm went along with financial assistance from Israel for implementation of the project and to cement Israel-Kenya relations. In September 2014, the government awarded Agri-Green Ltd the contract at KES 14.5 billion (USD 145 million), which was later revised down to KES 7.2 billion (USD 72 million). Popular opinion has it that the contract may have been deliberately overpriced for personal gain.

The launch of the project elicited much excitement and expectations that a previously ‘forgotten’ space could become the engine for national food security. However, this anticipation would soon turn into heated criticism and resistance, particularly from coastal Kenya, where the project is located. Expectations of job opportunities for young people were disappointed, leading to feelings of betrayal and deception, as elite-owned consulting firms controlled even the lowest jobs, like bush clearing. From the onset of the project, there was strong centralized management, which meant lack of ownership and support at the local level. Such grievances quickly led to crime and insecurity, as armed groups in the region expressed their displeasure over the agricultural investment. The location of the project next to the Tsavo East National Park also meant that a new frontier for human-wildlife conflict was created, coupled with increasing cases of poaching. This begs the question whether the state and other stakeholders bothered to consider the possible consequences of such a massive investment. It would appear that fascination with the scheme blinded its founders to the realities on the ground: ongoing conflicts between Orma pastoralists and the management of Galana-Kulalu ADC ranches over grazing land; human-wildlife conflicts; challenges of service delivery; poverty and poor education (NIB 2015 ).

Other contextual and politico-economic factors that are blamed for the slow pace of the project and its eventual collapse include poor road networks, mismanagement of funds, and lack of basic amenities like electricity, potable water and health facilities. Footnote 28 Indeed, this marginalized area had deep-seated problems and social inequalities that needed serious state intervention before setting up such a huge project. However, it seemed as though there was a rush to push the financing through to demonstrate that the political regime was working towards its development goals. The ease with which billions of shillings were disbursed within a very short period of time in contrast to the quality of work done became the greatest point of public concern. For example, the Senate Agricultural Committee probing the stalled Galana-Kulalu model farm learnt that the government paid KES 580 million for bush clearing on only 10,000 acres of land, a job that was apparently done to a poor standard. Footnote 29 According to NIB, at least KES 6.1 billion was paid to the contractor out of which KES 2.55 billion was paid by the government of Kenya. Footnote 30 The lack of tangible results for the money spent raised public suspicion, as noted in a national newspaper:

The project was a good idea but now it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that it ended up being a cash cow for a few individuals… the expected production from the project turned out to be about a quarter of what had been expected. This, after more than Sh5 billion has been spent on the project. How could a project to be carried out on 1.75 million acres and having the engagement of a firm from Israel – which is renowned for its success in dryland agriculture and advanced irrigation techniques – have failed? Footnote 31

Some critics have interpreted this feeling of deception among the inhabitants of the region as a deliberate strategy by the state to undermine development in coastal Kenya and thus weaken its political relevance. The NIB links the failure of the project to the lack of capacity on the side of the contractor, Agri-Green Consulting Ltd, yet the firm had a strong record of delivering similar projects in worse ecological conditions and it was the responsibility of NIB to vet the firm’s capacity before awarding the contract. Israel’s envoy to Kenya, Noah Gendler, resigned after barely two years in the job, noting that he had ‘failed to add value to the country’. He linked the failure to political and economic sabotage, particularly by farmers and their politicians in Kenya’s maize growing areas, and pitiless cartels involved in maize importation, both of whom thrive on shortages that allow them to reap billions. The scheme, according to him, was the first ever in the history of Israel’s government-to-government development projects to fail. Footnote 32 Despite the failure, neither the government nor the contractor has accounted for the billions of shillings lost.

Notwithstanding the big promises made by the state and the high expectations of the local communities, Galana-Kulalu adds to the list of failed large-scale irrigation projects in Kenya. A similar story comes from the Napuu II irrigation scheme in Turkana County, which seems to have even intensified hunger. Footnote 33 Likewise, the Tana Delta Irrigation Project, which was funded through the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), failed to achieve its intended promise, though the Tana and Athi Rivers Development Authority (TARDA) invested KES 70 million (US$ 700,000) to rehabilitate the collapsed scheme. Footnote 34 The Perkerra irrigation scheme is also reportedly on the brink of collapse due to insufficient water supply. Nevertheless, NIB continues to line up dozens of large irrigation projects for funding, whilst facing a political tussle revolving around the governance and management of projects in specific devolved units.

The example of Galana-Kulalu illustrates how the state originally envisioned massive agricultural investment as promising quick economic and social transformation, which then became overcomplicated and suffered from a lack of accountability and other institutional deficiencies. As a response, the state and some politicians sold part of the scheme to private investors, convinced an international partner to participate in providing technical solutions, and attracted foreign donor assistance. The over-ambitious imaginations around the project blinded its makers to unintended consequences, accountability or possible failures. Similarly, in their review of three large dams in West Africa, Bazin et al. ( 2017 ) note that decisions to invest in large dams and irrigation schemes are not always based on realistic hypotheses. Instead, they argue, initial design studies often rely on overestimated assessments of irrigable potential or economic performance of irrigation projects, or under-estimate their cost and the time needed to realize them, in order to make the economic case for a project. For Kenya, such has been the game, where rushed projects end up failing due to contextual and political economy factors.

Discussion: megaproject ambiguities

What do the Kenyan examples tell us about megaprojects and failed developments? The following aspects are key to explaining the often rather ambiguous outcome of megaprojects, the role of aspiration and the meaning of failure.

First, we would argue that the older conceptual approaches mentioned at the beginning of this paper need to be critically revisited in the light of recent developments and scientific debates. Management problems do of course play a role, as observed by Flyvbjerg et al. ( 2003 ), but this does not sufficiently explain why projects go wrong. Likewise, Scott’s ( 1998 ) analysis of the state as an authoritarian modernizer does not capture the complexity of governance systems, as Li ( 2005 ) has pointed out, and it has little to do with Kenya (Mosley and Watson 2016 ). Instead, we believe that it would be more appropriate to describe the role of the Kenyan state as moderating the interplay between multiple actors in cross-scalar connections, and seeking to create an investor-friendly climate.

Second, our analysis highlights the symbolic dimension of megaprojects as showcases and ‘dreamscapes’ of modernity (Jasanoff and Kim 2015 ; Müller-Mahn 2020 ). They serve as strategic tools to foster optimistic outlooks and ‘fictional expectations’ (Beckert 2016 ), thus, taking centre stage in the politics of aspiration. A telling example is the Galana-Kulalu scheme, which Kenyan public media presented as the ‘new food basket’ of the country. Footnote 35 It is important to note that megaprojects contribute to future making, regardless of whether they achieve their declared goals or not.

Third, using the politics of aspiration does not mean that planners and politicians are blind to risk, but it explains why they often do not tell the whole story, or prefer to talk about ‘chance’ instead of ‘risk’. Decision makers tend to take an attitude of ‘wishful thinking’ by presenting and performing ‘desirable futures’ as if they were real, because it helps to convince investors, donors and local populations. The ‘enchantment’ of large infrastructures (Harvey and Knox 2012 ) is used to justify risky investments, while fuzzy time frames make it almost impossible to measure project delivery. As long as the promised future has not (yet) arrived, one cannot say that a megaproject has definitely failed.

Fourth, megaprojects hardly ever end with complete success or failure, but somewhere in between. To do justice to the complex setting, the performance of megaprojects should be assessed relative to the promised benefits. In the same vein, projects should be evaluated relative to time, i.e. accepting that there may be good reasons if they fail to deliver on the promises and within the expected timeline. Failure may have many causes which are not necessarily part of the project itself, but may be due to its complex environment and the conflicting visions of the multiple actors involved. In the case of the SGR, for example, the section from Naivasha to Malaba cannot be completed because of debt, Tullow Oil’s uncertain stake in Turkana, and several changes of the LAPSSET route and resort city sites. When building the international airport at Isiolo, planners could not foresee that the export of khat , one of its purposes, was going to be banned. In the building of the Isiolo abattoir, it was not foreseen that other counties would want to build their own, using their devolved funds, with the result that the abattoir may never function to capacity. In some cases, projects are deliberately delayed to serve other political purposes. For example, previous presidents have used slogans like ‘ Kazi iendelee ’ (work should continue) during their re-election campaigns, to indicate that their regime needs another term in power in order to realize their promises—which either never happens or provides the impetus for more promises.

Fifth, megaprojects are characterized by lack of accountability, which can best be seen in the case of the Galana-Kulalu scheme. For LAPSSET as a whole, the promises and economic returns were deliberately overestimated. So far, only the SGR, one berth of Lamu port, and a road from Isiolo to Moyale have been completed and have resulted in large debts and unpaid compensation claims. This is far less than originally planned, but the promises served their purpose.

People imagine megaprojects as if they are already complete—without factoring in the complexity, local conditions, and the hidden risks and agendas. Indeed, such imaginations contribute enormously to shaping and changing both space and people’s lives. In the cases discussed here, expectations concerning infrastructure such as valorization of land and other previously peripheral resources became the basis for communal land subdivision, commodification and privatization. This change of social arrangements follows the popular narrative that people are ‘leaving the rural behind’ and jumping into modernity. The meanings and aspirations that people at the local level associated with these megaprojects as systems to enable the circulation of goods, knowledge, meaning, people and power (Graham and Marvin 2001 ), have been reduced to mere hopes.

However, as one might argue, if all potential challenges were foreseen, nothing would ever get off the ground. If planners in early colonial times had listened to criticisms of the Kenya-Uganda railway, the ‘train from nowhere to nowhere’ would never have led to the development of the interior, albeit with violence and injustice. Thus, while big unrealistic visions may be useful for mobilizing action, they simultaneously offer opportunities for everyone to aspire to effective participation and address the structural injustices upon which these projects are often superimposed. Despite the challenges, setbacks and perceived failures, these very visions of development, prosperity and independence ironically shape contemporary economic and sociol-political discourses, as well as development partnerships. Big promises and megaprojects continue to be powerful tools that legitimize massive external borrowing, the burgeoning foreign debts notwithstanding.

In conclusion, we have shown that certain megaprojects in Kenya started with over-ambitious goals, which they failed to meet during implementation. Even so, a critical assessment of megaprojects should focus not only on material outcomes, but also on their symbolic dimension. The fuzziness of ‘mega’ and ‘failure’ is part of the answer: ‘mega’ refers to the big promises that underpin large-scale projects, pointing to the politics of aspiration as a driver of investment and change. ‘Failure’ must be understood not in absolute terms, as a total collapse, but rather as a relative category in which achievements are compared to the originally declared goals. Megaprojects are always ambiguous: they often do not deliver as planned, they may be misused for various purposes, but at the same time, they serve as tools of future making, as iconic landmarks of transformation, and as ‘beacons of hope’ (Fig. 1 ).

Map of megaprojects in Kenya

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The authors would like to express their gratitude to the anonymous reviewers of this article, and to DFG for funding the collaborative research center “Future Rural Africa”.

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Müller-Mahn, D., Mkutu, K. & Kioko, E. Megaprojects—mega failures? The politics of aspiration and the transformation of rural Kenya. Eur J Dev Res 33 , 1069–1090 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41287-021-00397-x

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DOI : https://doi.org/10.1057/s41287-021-00397-x

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WHAT A FAILED JOHANNESBURG PROJECT TELLS US ABOUT MEGA CITIES IN AFRICA

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The value of learning from failure in products and services : a case study of a South African bank

Journal title, journal issn, volume title, description, collections.

Examples of failed aid-funded projects in Africa

The World Bank's private arm, the International Finance Corporation, has found that only half of its Africa projects succeed.

Many other donors have not done much better.

Here are a few of the development projects in Africa that went wrong:

Project : Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline to the Atlantic Ocean Donor : World Bank Cost : $4.2 billion Where it went wrong : The pipeline was the biggest development project in Africa when it was completed in 2003. It was funded on condition that the money be spent with international supervision to develop Chad. However, President Idris Deby's government announced in 2005 that oil money would go toward the general budget and the purchase of weapons, or else oil companies would be expelled. Now Deby spends the oil money on regime survival and rigged elections.

Project : Lake Turkana fish processing plant, Kenya Donor : Norwegian government Cost : $22 million Where it went wrong : The project was designed in 1971 to provide jobs to the Turkana people through fishing and fish processing for export. However, the Turkana are nomads with no history of fishing or eating fish. The plant was completed and operated for a few days, but was quickly shut down. The cost to operate the freezers and the demand for clean water in the desert were too high. It remains a "white elephant" in Kenya's arid northwest.

Project : Lesotho Highlands water project Donor : World Bank, European Investment Bank, African Development Bank Cost : $3.5 billion Where is went wrong : The project to divert fresh water from the mountains for sale to South Africa and for electricity began in 1986. But the electricity proved too expensive for most people, and the diversion of so much water caused environmental and economic havoc downstream. The development fund raised from selling the water was shut down in 2003. The courts convicted three of the world's largest construction firms on corruption charges and the project's chief executive was jailed. Tens of thousands of people whose lives were ruined by the diversion are still waiting for compensation.

Project : Office du Niger, Mali Donor : France Cost : More than $300 million over 50 years Where is went wrong : The goal in 1932 was to irrigate 2.47 million acres to grow cotton and rice and develop hydropower in the Mali desert. More than 30,000 people were forced to move to the desert to work on the largest aid project attempted by French colonial authorities. The African workers largely ignored French attempts to change traditional agricultural practices. By 1982, only 6 percent of the region was developed and the infrastructure was falling apart. The World Bank took over the project in 1985 and has shown limited success with rice farming.

Project : Roll Back Malaria, across Africa Donor : Multiple agencies Cost : About $500 million Where is went wrong : Roll Back Malaria, established in 1998, aimed to halve malaria incidence by 2010. The program said Africa needed $1.9 billion a year to slow the disease, but by 2002 donors had only come up with $200 million a year. By 2004 the infection rate had risen 12 percent. Experts say donors rarely followed through with pledges and some programs were subject to political considerations, such as what kinds of insecticides to use, whether to buy cheap generic drugs or how much poor people should pay for mosquito nets.

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Why Project-Based Work Fails — and How to Get It Right

If your team is prioritizing project-based work, this episode is for you.

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Companies of every size across the world are basing more of their work around projects than at any time in the past. But research shows that nearly two-thirds of those efforts fail.

Antonio Nieto-Rodriguez , who has studied projects and project management for decades, argues that at least some of the blame for these failures lies with executives who misunderstand the fundamentals of projects and fail to dedicate enough of their time to those they sponsor.

In this episode, Nieto-Rodriguez explains how to get better outcomes from project-based work. He also discusses how to frame projects, structure organizations around them, and avoid common pitfalls.

Key episode topics include: strategy, project management, operations strategy, organizational change.

HBR On Strategy curates the best case studies and conversations with the world’s top business and management experts, to help you unlock new ways of doing business. New episodes every week.

Listen to the full HBR IdeaCast episode: The Future of Work Is Projects—So You’ve Got to Get Them Right (2021)
Find more episodes of HBR IdeaCast
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HANNAH BATES: Welcome to HBR On Strategy, case studies and conversations with the world’s top business and management experts, hand-selected to help you unlock new ways of doing business.

Companies of every size, in every industry across the world are basing more of their work around projects than any time in the past. But research shows that nearly two-thirds of those efforts fail.

Antonio Nieto-Rodriguez, who has studied projects and project management for decades, argues that at least some of the blame for these failures lies with executives – who misunderstand the fundamentals of projects and fail to dedicate enough of their time to the projects they sponsor.

In this episode, you’ll learn how to get better outcomes from project-based work. You’ll also learn how to frame projects, structure organizations around them, and avoid key pitfalls.

If your team is taking on project-based work or if you’re leading a new project, this episode is for you. It originally aired on HBR IdeaCast in November 2021. Here it is.

ALISON BEARD: Welcome to the HBR IdeaCast from Harvard Business Review. I’m Alison Beard. If the 20th century was all about operational efficiency in businesses, the 21st century is all about organizational change. And how do new initiatives, products and services, strategies or business models advance? Through project work. It’s what our guest today calls the project economy, and it’s estimated to generate $20 trillion in economic activity and employ 88 million people in project management related roles by 2027.

That’s across every industry and size of company in every part of the world, and yet research indicates that only 35% of projects are successful. At this increasingly critical business function, most of us are doing a pretty terrible job, so how do we get better at it going forward? Antonio Nieto-Rodriguez is the former chairman of the Project Management Institute, founder of Projects & Co. and the author of the HBR Project Management Handbook. He’s here to talk about emerging best practices for companies and the people in them. Antonio, welcome.

ANTONIO NIETO-RODRIGUEZ: Thank you, Alison. It’s a pleasure to be here.

ALISON BEARD: Project management seems like a clear idea, but how do you define it and think about it in a way that might be different than what people assume?

ANTONIO NIETO-RODRIGUEZ: Well, I think one of the challenges with project management that I face personally in my career is that as soon as you talk project management, senior executives and people who are not experts in project management, they think, “Oh, this is something very technical, very tactical. It’s nothing for me,” so I’ve been facing that kind of discontent or disinterest in project management for 25 years. So, for me, I want to move out from that project management term and move it up into projects, and we all do projects. And for me, the definition is anything that has to deal with change, that’s projects. You can manage them through project management, Agile methods, design thinking, product management. But I want to really, I think we need to elevate and say, “Well, all what goes around change, that’s projects,” and we need to manage them.

ALISON BEARD: And how has project work changed over the past few decades?

ANTONIO NIETO-RODRIGUEZ: Well, project work has changed in two big areas. One is on a macro level. I’ve been doing research, and of course we all talk about the Marshall Plan after the Second War and all the projects that came from U.S. funding to develop Europe, reconstruct Europe, that was about $13 billion. Then we talk about the financial crisis in 2008 and ’09, we were talking about $3 trillion of projects. And now after the pandemic, we’re talking about $15, $20 trillion of projects. I think the world will never see as many projects as what we’re going to see in the next decade. We need to reconstruct countries, healthcare systems, economies, so that’s from a macro perspective.

From a micro perspective, from the way work is organized in companies, in businesses, it has evolved significantly in the sense that so far, operations have been prime in most of the organizations over the past 80 years. That’s what I say, the world driven by efficiency, where most of the activities were around doing things cheaper, faster, more automated, more volumes. Companies have been organized for that. That’s why you have hierarchies, that’s where cultures like command and control have been in place and so on, but since a few years when artificial intelligence and robots are taking over a big chunk of operations, the type of work is shifted to project based. So, I think the biggest, biggest disruption that happens in the world of projects is what we’re experiencing now. A radical shift from operations to project based work.

ALISON BEARD: And that’s because projects are about sort of discovering the new innovating, and the pace of change is such in every industry now that every company needs to learn how to do this well?

ANTONIO NIETO-RODRIGUEZ: Absolutely, and one of the challenges I have to admit, Alison, I’m a big of course, expert in project, a big advocate of project management, but our performance, like you mentioned in introduction, has been poor or appalling. I think project management has not delivered the expected results. We need to find better ways to addressing the change. The future 10 years ago maybe was five years from now, right? So, you would have a project that would last for three years expecting to get some benefits maybe in three, four years, a digital transformation, a new M&A activity, a new business unit, but today, the future is so fast.

So, your future is tomorrow, right? So, that means the acceleration of project based work has to go faster. Let me give you a quick example. Here in Brussels, they were setting, establishing a hospital from scratch, Greenfield, start of the construction in 2016, completion of the hospital in 2020. So, four years of construction, state of the art, but to my surprise, the hospital was open in 2018 before it was co completed. So, I think there’s no company in the world can wait four years to get any benefits from the projects. The future is now, and we need to address that. That’s why you see exploding the number of projects in organizations. I come across companies where they have more projects than people.

ALISON BEARD: And I do want to get to how to do it better, but first, that failure rate is so high. What are some of the most common challenges or problems that projects run into? Why are we getting it so wrong right now?

ANTONIO NIETO-RODRIGUEZ: Let me highlight just three. First, I think senior leaders, they don’t have the competencies to be effective sponsorship. Over the years …

ALISON BEARD: They’re not going to like hearing that.

ANTONIO NIETO-RODRIGUEZ: I’m sure. I’m sure, but I’m sorry. I always am hundred percent honest on both on my thinking, but I think sponsors have not realized the role is crucial in sponsoring projects. It’s not about how many projects you sponsor, that has been the kind of, “I sponsor 20 projects. I’m the most important person in this company.” Well, now it’s about less is more, and it has been proven. When you are an executive, the CEO, the VP, and you dedicate time to your project, time means not just one hour per month, but a half a day per week. If this is the future of your business, I don’t understand why senior leaders don’t dedicate so much time. They’re all driven by operations and day to day urgency so very few leaders make the space. And second, they don’t understand the fundamentals of projects.

Most of the executives come from a path marketing, finance, operation strategy, and it requires for them to understand that projects are different. That you work in projects in a matrix, that is not so much the hierarchical approach, but this team working and collaboration. So, it’s hard to give you a number, Alison, but I would say 30% to and 40% of the success of the project is if the senior leaders is engaged and understands and drives the project. Alison, the second point, I realized that in the area of change in projects, we are always running with all methods. It happened in the past with IT projects, I started implementing big ERP systems, we were trying to apply some very traditional project management.

It didn’t work. Then Agile came and said, “Well, now we are going to use Agile for every project,” and that, we see today with digital transformations, AI implementations, that doesn’t work. The failure keeps there. The third reason, so I think the role of the project manager, the project management profession has not taken ownership of the results. It has been very focused on process, very focused on documentation. It did make a lot of sense in the sixties, in the fifties where you would do a lot of public sector projects where you want to document everything, but I think the reason that the third reason for me is that project management didn’t evolve to embrace the new reality. And second, project managers have been more a deliver type of role.

In project management, we always said, “Well, who’s accountable for delivering the projects? Who’s accountable for delivering the benefits?” Right? Well, it’s the sponsor. We project managers were responsible of delivering the project on time, on budget, on scope, and that has been the cradle for project management for the last 40 years. And we’ve missed to focus on the outcomes. We’ve missed to focus on the benefits. We’ve missed to take accountability of the results. It’s easy to make a project charter, but what companies are looking for is delivering value, either financial, either social, either sustainability. So, I’m asking my community of project managers to step up, to take ownership, to say, “No, it’s not just the plan. It’s not just delivery on time. What matters actually even more is delivering the benefits, whatever they are, and faster, please.”

ALISON BEARD: So, for an organization that does have existing operations that need to be managed, but then also wants to pursue change and innovation through project work, how does that company change its structure or culture to be able to do both well?

ANTONIO NIETO-RODRIGUEZ: Yeah. Well, great question, Alison. I’ve seen so many companies struggling because I’m not saying, “Let’s forget about what you’re doing right today. Let’s forget about that organization that you’ve built so successful for that world driven by efficiency with hierarchies, with yearly plans, with deep expertise, deep technical expertise,” but how can we address change? And change that’s going very fast and our products are just lasting less and less. In the past, we last five years, now five weeks or maybe five months. So, how can we mix that? And it’s a struggle. You cannot say, “Let’s forget my hierarchy and let’s move everything into flat teams and Agile structures and project basing.” That doesn’t work, so I think in the challenge for the leaders, the senior leaders, the executives, is finding that balance. And I always say you need to experiment.

You cannot just go and say, “Well, half of the organization is working without job descriptions. They’re all working project based.” I think my approach, my suggestion is, what are your top five projects? What are the five most important projects that your organization has to deliver? Extract those projects from your daily operations. Extract them. They should not be done by people working in operations. They should have a different structure. They should have a different culture. Put them aside, put them independent. They are own entities, and of course, strong sponsorship. Executives, you need to spend time on them. By extracting for those five top projects already, and moving out to that from that hierarchical structure, that operational activities, that you can see already, quite a lot of acceleration in the way you deliver projects.

ALISON BEARD: Often though, it seems as if particularly project leaders do have operational responsibilities as well, and then sort of, they’re expected to tack the project on top of that. So, how are companies that you work with navigating that balance? Are they giving the executives that time to take away for the project work?

ANTONIO NIETO-RODRIGUEZ: Great, great question. This is really the core. One of the core problems I always raise when I do workshops with senior leaders is, how come you cannot extract people from your day to day job and put them in a project? It’s one of the biggest challenges that I see. Even companies which have 10,000 people, they are not able to free up 50 people to carry out the project. The best projects I’ve seen in a research, one of them, of course the iPhone, the first one which I research very much in detail, at that time, they were able to take the day to day people, the senior leader, the best people of Apple at that time and extract them for two years and a half to develop.

And people who were in the operations side said, “Well, I love to join this project, but who’s going to do my day to day activities?” And we were saying, “Don’t bother. Anybody can do your day to day activity. You have a deputy when you’re gone,” said, “We’ll put those people. We’ll promote them. We’ll create more talent, but you, you are the best person in these companies. How come you’re not working in the most strategic project in the future of your work?” Right? It doesn’t make sense, but companies struggle so much and there’s nothing worse that you can do, Alison, than have half time people working in your projects. I work one hour per week, then I work two days per week, then it’s a mess. It’s not how you deliver great projects. At least try to get the best people around.

ALISON BEARD: I think that makes sense when you sort of have a clear idea of what the future’s going to look like, and you know exactly which five projects are the most important, but isn’t the issue in many cases that organizations sort of have 30 projects on the go, and aren’t really sure what’s going to pan out, and they can’t take all of those people away from their day to day activities? So, how do companies prioritize?

ANTONIO NIETO-RODRIGUEZ: I’m sure everybody that’s listening this, they can’t relate to that point. Companies have way too many projects. I think that if there’s a core skill for leaders in current times, is focused and prioritization. Knowing what is the big path, and unfortunately, it’s just very hard to see when you see more projects than employees. And like you’re saying, how can they do their day to day job plus three, four time projects? That’s where people get overwhelmed. I am sure that the big reset is linked to this, so many projects plus day to day activities. It’s just stressing everybody out, and I think that when you work with companies where the priorities are clear, where people know, these are our top three, their top five, and we know where we’re going, this is the focus, that’s where I think executives need to work on. On really making the tough decisions.

ALISON BEARD: What are some best practices for putting project teams together?

ANTONIO NIETO-RODRIGUEZ: Well, Alison, the formula for engagement is super simple. The most engaged people in a project, you know which one is it? Volunteers. Let me put you an example. Maybe in HBR, you are launching a new project. Why don’t you ask who wants to join?

ALISON BEARD: Makes sense. It’s so simple, but it makes so much sense.

ANTONIO NIETO-RODRIGUEZ: It’s so simple, because there’s different things that happen here. First, if nobody wants to volunteer in that project, that project is terrible. Don’t start it. Don’t start it because it’s just, people are going to be forced to do it, so ask for volunteers. Nobody shows up, don’t start it. You don’t need a business case of three months hiring consultants to make you, “Yes, this is …” If nobody jumps on it, terrible. Don’t even start it. It’s just a five minutes test and you save three months of work. Second, if the project talks about business case, very few people get excited, yeah? Who wants to work in a project that delivers 10% return on investment? Yes, nobody. Right? 15%, nobody. Who wants to work in a project which is going to make a more sustainable world? Who’s going to work in a project who’s going to increase the customer experience and make customers more happy, and deliver better value to a customer?

Who wants to work in a project who’s going to create our employees or make our employees more happy, and make us a top company? Lots of people. So, we have been, when we were talking about some of the issues, I think project manage has been focused on talking about things that don’t matter to most of the stakeholders, like a business case. Business case is super important. It’s the return investment, for sure, but that’s not what engages people. The purpose engages people. When you have volunteers, they will dream about your projects. They will do whatever they can to make it happen, and it can be because of the purpose, it can be because they like to work with you, they see a big opportunity to learn. Of course, as a project leader, you need to balance that. But as simple as that, Alison, “Who wants to volunteer?”

ALISON BEARD: How does the rise of project driven work relate to the gig economy? Is your sense that companies are hiring contractors and freelancers to get a lot of this done? Is it a balance or are they trying to handle most of it in-house?

ANTONIO NIETO-RODRIGUEZ: I think when we started to hear about the gig economy, I think yes, one of the reasons was, “Let’s hire external resources to work in our projects because we are so rigid internally, like I cannot free, from my 10,000 people, I cannot free 10 of them because they’re so busy in day to day operations plus other projects,” so it started like that. What I see now is that companies are finally taking the step of shifting resources to more project based work. Again, when I use the word project, I include Agile teams, self directed, so very flat project driven teams. So, that’s happening to the point that I talk about it is that companies are canceling job descriptions. We all had job descriptions like, Alison, most of the people listening, probably they had a job description, which tried to describe like, where do you fit in this box? Right? And just do those activities in this box, in that operational field.

That’s your box. If you do it right in two, three years, you just go up in the structure. But many large companies and small companies are realizing that people don’t work in boxes anymore, and job descriptions are not needed anymore. It’s a thing from that world driven by efficiency that together with the chief operating officer in this role, so I think they will not last very long. So, I think the project driven world is now being and embraced by organization where companies like Alibaba or other major players are really embracing this type of work where yeah, they’re looking for people who can have an idea, who can develop the idea, who can implement the project, and who can run the idea of the product or the business and generate value for the companies. This is what I call end-to-end players or strategy implementation professionals. We want this type of end-to-end players who can work transversely in organizations.

ALISON BEARD: Are there lessons from your project management world that might be helpful for people doing more traditional ongoing work?

ANTONIO NIETO-RODRIGUEZ: I think project managers have been a bit not very proud about their work. They’ve been seeing like, “Okay, you are not very modern. Agile teams are better, or innovation people,” so I think as a project manager, you need to believe on what you’re doing. Second, I think we need to take more ownership. I’ve been working 25 years in this space and managing large transformation M&A, and I always was waiting for the sponsor. I know the sponsor was very important for my projects, but I was kind of waiting and hoping that the sponsor will learn and follow training on how to do it or make some time for my projects. And I’ve learned the lesson is that the first thing I do in my projects is I go to the sponsor and talk frankly with the sponsor.

“Listen, are you ready to put time on this project? It’s very important. I need you, and I’m happy to coach you. I’m happy to tell you how projects work and what do we need to focus on, but I need your time, and I need a couple of hours per month. Let’s say an hour every two weeks. I need to talk to you. I need decisions from you.” So, I’m very much proactive because I know that role is very important and these people are really busy. One of the biggest lesson learned was being proactive with my project. The second maybe is I talk to many project managers and we are very technical to the point of sometimes difficult to understand, slash boring, right? Who wants to talk to a project manager? Come on. Do you have something more interesting? No, but that’s …

ALISON BEARD: You’re more interesting than I imagine, than my sort of vision of what the project manager is.

ANTONIO NIETO-RODRIGUEZ: You see? Because I don’t talk about project management, I don’t talk about Gantt charts, I don’t think that’s my kitchen. That’s what I do when I need to think about making a plan, but you are interested on the bigger picture. You are interested on how my ideas will contribute to our needs as an organization, so I do this exercise with project managers, “Tell your partner what you do without mentioning the words projects and project management,” and they say, “Oh, I’m struggling. What do I do?” And then they start talking about the value they bring, and that’s what people want to hear.

You covered this topic broadly in HBR, but talking, adapting, understanding the language of your stakeholders, using it. That’s how you get their engagement. That’s how you get their attention. That’s how they appreciate your value, and that’s the second big learning. When I did that, things changed for me. Senior leaders wanted to talk to me. When I forced them to prioritize in key projects, they were saying, “Antonio, we want another meeting with you,” was the CEO of the bank, because I force them. I force them to create value. I force them to have strategic dialogue, so I would say if you’re listening, you’re working in this space, move on into that space. Move on on the value creation, on your stakeholder, and things will change very fast.

ALISON BEARD: Well, Antonio, I learned a ton today. Thanks so much for coming on the show.

ANTONIO NIETO-RODRIGUEZ: A pleasure.

HANNAH BATES: That was project management expert Antonio Nieto-Rodriguez in conversation with Alison Beard on the HBR IdeaCast. He’s the author of the Harvard Business Review Project Management Handbook.

We’ll be back next Wednesday with another hand-picked conversation about business strategy from Harvard Business Review. If you found this episode helpful, share it with your friends and colleagues, and follow our show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. While you’re there, be sure to leave us a review. And when you’re ready for more podcasts, articles, case studies, books, and videos with the world’s top business and management experts, find it all at HBR.org.

This episode was produced by Mary Dooe, Anne Saini, and me, Hannah Bates. Ian Fox is our editor. And special thanks to Rob Eckhardt, Adam Buchholz, Maureen Hoch, Nicole Smith, Erica Truxler, Ramsey Khabbaz, Anne Bartholomew, and you – our listener. See you next week.

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WHY MANY PROJECTS IN AFRICA FAIL TO COMPLETE

2017, IPMP Journal of Management & Science

The focus of this paper is the exploration of why many projects in Africa failed to complete. That is to investigate the causes that lead to the failure of deliverables obtained after the successful completion of projects. Business leaders and experts have proclaimed that project management is a strategic imperative. Project management provides people with a powerful set of tools that improves their ability to plan, implement, and manage activities to accomplish specific organizational objectives. But project management is more than just a set of tools; it is a results-oriented management style that places a premium on building collaborative relationships among a diverse cast of characters. Exciting opportunities await people skilled in project management. The project approach has long been the style of doing business in the construction industry, U.S. Department of Defense contracts, and Hollywood as well as big consulting firms. Now project management has spread to all avenues of work. Today, project teams carry out everything from port expansions to hospital restructuring to upgrading information systems. They are creating next generation, fuel efficient vehicles, developing sustainable sources of energy, and exploring the farthest reaches of outer space. The impact of project management is most profound in the electronics industry, where the new folk heroes are young professionals whose Herculean efforts lead to the constant flow of new hardware and software products. Project management is not limited to the private sector. Project management is also a vehicle for doing good deeds and solving social problems. Endeavors such as providing emergency aid to the Gulf Coast devastated by hurricane Katrina, devising a strategy for reducing crime and drug abuse within a city, or organizing a community effort to renovate a public playground would and do benefit from the application of modern project management skills and techniques. Perhaps the best indicator of demand for project management can be seen in the rapid expansion of the Project Management Institute (PMI), a professional organization for project managers. Project Management Profession has grown from 93,000 in 2002 to more than 270,000 currently. See the PMI Snapshot from Practice for information regarding professional certification in project management. It’s nearly impossible to pick up a newspaper or business periodical and not find something about projects. This is no surprise! Approximately $2.5 trillion (about 25 percent of the African gross national product) are spent on projects each year in the African Countries alone. Other countries are increasingly spending more on projects. Millions of people around the world consider project management the major task in their profession. Project management is not without problems. The Standish Group has tracked the management of information technology (IT) projects since 1994. This firm’s periodic landmark reports summarize the continued need for improved project management. For over a decade the Standish Reports of management of IT projects showed improvements. In 1994 approximately 16 percent of IT projects were completed on time, on budget; in 2004 the success rate moved up to 29 percent. Failed projects also declined from 31 percent in 1994 to 18 percent in 2004. However, the CHAOS Summary 2009 report shows a small decrease in the numbers. This survey report shows only 32 percent of IT projects were delivered on time and within budget. However, 44 percent were “challenged,” which means they were late, over budget, and/or missed meeting performance requirements. In addition, 24 percent failed, were cancelled, or never used. Jim Crear, Standish Group CIO, notes this is the highest failure rate in over a decade. The need for elevating performance continues to challenge the project management profession. The waste on failed projects and cost overruns is estimated in the neighborhood of over $150 billion! Most of the people who excel at managing projects never have the title of project manager. They include accountants, lawyers, administrators, scientists, contractors, public health officials, teachers, and community advocates whose success depends upon being able to lead and manage project work. For them project management is not a title but a critical job requirement. It is hard to think of a profession or a career path that would not benefit from being good at managing projects. Not only is project management critical to most careers, the skill set is transferable across most businesses and professions. At its core, project management fundamentals are universal. The same project management methodology that is used to develop a new product can be adapted to create new services, organize events, refurbish aging operations, and so forth. In a world where it is estimated that each person is likely to experience three to four career changes, managing projects is a talent worthy of development. The significance of project management can also be seen in the classroom. Twenty years ago major universities offered one or two classes in project management, primarily for engineers. Today, most universities offer multiple sections of project management classes, with the core group of engineers being supplemented by business students majoring in marketing, management information systems (MIS), and finance, as well as students from other disciplines such as oceanography, health sciences, computer sciences, and liberal arts. These students are finding that their exposure to project management is providing them with distinct advantages when it comes time to look for jobs. More and more employers are looking for graduates with project management skills. The logical starting point for developing these skills is understanding the uniqueness of a project and of project managers.

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Although International Development Projects (IDPs) have become and will remain an important instrument of activating and achieving development in developing countries, they are plagued with failure. They are failing at an astonishing rate, despite their management. This study investigates why IDPs fail. From real world failed operations, it identifies that IDPs are highly susceptible to failure as they are beset with numerous challenges right from the outset. It also identifies 16 causes of failure of such projects. Findings will benefit project professionals, especially IDP professionals, development-oriented organizations and the IDP body of knowledge. It also provides a basis to generate new research on IDPs and failure.

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South Africa now a compelling world investment story, upbeat Orion highlights

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19th June 2024 By: Martin Creamer Creamer Media Editor

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JOHANNESBURG (miningweekly.com) – “The sun is finally shining on us,” an upbeat Orion Minerals CEO Errol Smart enthused during an Australia/South Africa webinar on Wednesday, when he outlined how South Africa has become one of the world’s most compelling short-term investment stories.

Predicting that this country's investment narrative would super heat over the next couple of weeks, he pointed out how strongly this was advancing Orion’s Prieska copper project, where trial mining has been under way for some time, as well as Orion's high-grade Okiep copper project, which is following closely behind.

“Copper is a very strong thematic in the macroeconomics around the world,” Smart highlighted during the webinar covered by Mining Weekly . (Also watch attached Creamer Media video.)

Orion’s Prieska copper and zinc project already has mining under way, with, once again, Okiep not far behind.

Both have bankable feasibility studies (BFSs) at a time when the rand has strengthened, interest rates are likely to moderate, and there is a semblance of medium-to-long-term certainty in the outlook amid one of the main pillars embraced by the new government being the promotion of economic growth and stability.

The Northern Cape, which hosts Orion brownfield and greenfield base metals projects, has historically produced more that 2.5-million tons of copper.

Already on site at Prieska are 160 people with ore being elevated to surface daily.

The Johannesburg- and Sydney-listed Orion is looking to having plants in place and production commencing at the end of 2025. Seventy-five per cent of Orion's equity trading happens on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), and only 25% on the ASX.

Production is expected to commence 12 to 18 months after project funding has been completed amid completion of the BFSs being imminent.

“By August it’ll all be handed over to the independent experts,” said Smart.

The Minerals Corporation is acting as the independent debt financier for the BFS and discussion is under way with equity financiers and prospective offtake-related financiers.

Existing resources and reserves will be the basis on which mining gets under way and existing feasibility studies indicate the potential to produce 50 000 t/y of copper equivalent for 17 to 18 years.

In parallel, a period of resource and reserve growth will ensue to take output beyond the 50 000 t/y mark.

STRONG SOUTH AFRICAN FOLLOWING

Dual-listed Orion’s fully fungible shares can be bought on one exchange and sold on the other.

The R1.3-billion, or A$110-million, market capitalisation company has roughly six-billion shares on issue, 44% of them in trading accounts on the JSE and 56% on the ASX, with South Africans holding 43% of the shares of the company, Europeans 33%, and Australians 23%. Europeans have opted to hold the shares on the ASX.

“With that said, the South Africans understand the South African environment better and trade actively. We've got a massive retail following in South Africa, with more than 30 000 South African shareholders as retail shareholders, which is not the price determinant."

With reference to South Africa’s new government, Smart said: “In these days, we'll likely have 90% of the trading happening on the JSE.”

Orion’s largest shareholder with 17.9% is Tembo Capital, a European fund that is managed out of London.

The second biggest shareholder with 12.6% of the shares is the Delphi Group, which is a German fund.

South African mining company Clover Alloys, which is primarily involved in chrome mining, holds 8.8%, and Thomas Borman , formerly of BHP Billiton, 5.4%.

The Orion chairperson is Denis Waddell , who lives in Perth, and Boksburg-born Smart is based in South Africa.

Orion does not have professional and operating staff who must be flown in and out of South Africa.

Director Godfrey Gomwe is the former CEO of Anglo Coal and most recently the CEO of MC Mining, which has been taken over on the ASX.

Director Anthony Lennox is the former MD of Rio Tinto’s Palabora copper mine, which is South Africa's largest operating copper mine, while director Patience Mpofu is resident in Sydney.

Director Mark Palmer , who represents Tembo, is based in London.

“Yesterday, we saw JP Morgan coming out, and moving us from underweight to overweight,” Smart enthused.

This has been done against the background of Prieska’s mining infrastructure including a ready-made shaft that descends to a depth of 1 100 m.

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Date: February 2015. Cost: R2 billion ZAR (approximately $130 million) Synopsis: Sixty buses purchased at a cost of R100 million (ZAR) in 2009 have turned to a failed project. They were purchased as part of a programme to refresh municipal bus service in Port Elizabeth, South Africa.
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et al., 2021). Similarly et al. (2021), indicate that most projects fail to achieve their expected objectives due to certain internal factors entirely neglected in their evaluation of cost performance in South African project industries. The findings argued that cost overruns affect project progress.
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over budget. Failure rates of the projects seem to be in excess of 50%. The NEPAD project in South Africa, Jatropha project in Tanzania, and ICT projects in South Africa are just some of the examples of projects mentioned in the study. Projects in Africa fail not only because of mismanagement but also because of the sheer
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ENGLISH SUMMARY : The thesis presents a case study of lessons learned from failed products and services in a South African bank. The inspiration for the case study comes from social psychological research by the Institute of Brilliant Failures (Iske, 2018) that focuses on the archetypical reasons for failure and how valuable lesson can be learned from those failures.
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2012 •. Lavagnon A . Ika. This article discusses international development (ID) projects and project management problems within ID in Africa and suggests they may fall into one or more of four main traps: the one-size-fits-all technical trap, the accountability-for-results trap, the lack-of-project-management-capacity trap, and the cultural trap.
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Examples of Failed Projects in South Africa

No full-text available

10 failed projects and the lessons learned

Why should we analyse projects that failed?

10 projects that failed:

Lesson learned:

2. Crystal Pepsi

3. Ford Edsel

4. Computerised DMV

5. J.C. Penney’s 2011 rebrand

6. Airbus A380

7. Montreal’s Highway 15 overpass

8. Knight Capital

9. Target’s failed entry into Canada

10. Afghan forest camo pattern

Common warning signs of a failing project

Lack of interest

Poor communication

Lack of transparency

Scope and budget creep

Poor management oversight

How ILX can help train project managers

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