case study on 26 11 attack

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The Ordinary Heroes of the Taj

• Rohit Deshpande
• Anjali Raina

How an Indian hotel chain’s organizational culture nurtured employees who were willing to risk their lives to save their guests

Reprint: R1112J

When terrorists attacked the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008, employees of the Taj Mumbai hotel displayed uncommon valor. They placed the safety of guests over their own well-being, thereby risking—and, in some cases, sacrificing—their lives. Deshpandé, of Harvard Business School, and Raina, of the HBS India Research Center in Mumbai, demonstrate that this behavior was not merely a crisis response. It was instead a manifestation of the Taj Group’s deeply rooted customer-centric culture that, the authors argue, other companies can emulate, both in extreme circumstances and during periods of normalcy.

The key ingredients of this Taj-style customer centricity include:

• a values-driven recruitment system that emphasizes integrity and duty over talent and skills;
• training of customer ambassadors who serve the guest first and the company second; and
• a recognition-as-reward system that values well-earned plaudits—from customers, colleagues, and immediate supervisors—over money and advancement.

Each of the three elements has important features and nuances, which the authors explore in detail so that your company can take its cues.

On November 26, 2008, Harish Manwani, chairman, and Nitin Paranjpe, CEO, of Hindustan Unilever hosted a dinner at the Taj Mahal Palace hotel in Mumbai (Taj Mumbai, for short). Unilever’s directors, senior executives, and their spouses were bidding farewell to Patrick Cescau, the CEO, and welcoming Paul Polman, the CEO-elect. About 35 Taj Mumbai employees, led by a 24-year-old banquet manager, Mallika Jagad, were assigned to manage the event in a second-floor banquet room. Around 9:30, as they served the main course, they heard what they thought were fireworks at a nearby wedding. In reality, these were the first gunshots from terrorists who were storming the Taj.

• RD Rohit Deshpande is Sebastian S. Kresge Professor of Marketing at the Harvard Business School.
• AR Anjali Raina is the executive director of the HBS India Research Center in Mumbai.

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A Decade on from the 2008 Mumbai Attack: Reviewing the question of state-sponsorship

On the night of 26 November 2008, ten Kalashnikov-wielding terrorists attacked Mumbai. They stuck simultaneously at five locations, shooting dead 140 Indians and 25 foreign tourists. American and British passport-holders were executed in two luxury hotel complexes. [1] At a Jewish cultural centre, Israeli nationals were tortured before being killed. A fourth location, a café frequented by Western backpackers, was enfiladed with automatic fire. Only at the city’s main railway station, the site of the largest number of deaths, were all the victims Indian. The gunmen seemed at war not just with India, but with the world. [2]

A decade later, the findings of several international police investigations and dozens of analytical studies triggered by the attack have been largely forgotten. [3] This paper seeks to help break this silence by presenting a detailed interpretation of what transpired, with particular focus on an inconvenient reality: the potential role played by state-sponsorship of terrorism. Throughout the discussion that follows, this paper switches between three different analytical views of the Mumbai attack. One perspective, which is most strongly-held in India, holds that it was a state-sponsored covert operation by a Pakistani intelligence agency. A second opinion, more frequently encountered among American and European analysts, takes the more limited view that ‘rogue’ elements within Pakistan’s intelligence service ISI were involved in the attack. Finally, there is the interpretation favoured by Pakistani officials, which holds that the Mumbai attack involved no state-based actors whatsoever.

As is so often the case with matters relating to intelligence agencies, ascertaining exactly what happened and why is a difficult enterprise in which few facts are undisputed. This paper is an extensively-researched interpretation of the Mumbai attacks ten years after their occurrence. It acknowledges that differing perspectives will yield different outlooks on what transpired. With that in mind, its aim is not to provide a ‘definite’ answer on the role and extent of state-sponsorship of the attack. Instead, it seeks to disprove point three and show that state actors did indeed have a hand in the attack.

What happened on ‘26/11’?

Following the Mumbai attack, suspicion swiftly focused on Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a vast jihadist group based in Pakistan. Although notionally banned by the Pakistani government since 2002, LeT held ostentatious fund-raising rallies and operated urban recruitment centres without any official interference. It had pioneered the concept of suicidal mass-casualty assaults in South Asia, reportedly upon the advice of a former Pakistani Army SWAT operator. [4] But, unlike previous LeT assaults on India, those of 26 November 2008 (or ‘26/11’) were different in two respects.

First, the 26/11 attack targeted Western nationals, as well as Indian civilians. This ensured there would be much greater global interest in ascertaining the perpetrators’ true identities than with previous attacks that ‘only’ targeted Indian citizens. Second, during previous raids, LeT gunmen had stormed a single location and fought to the death. Without anyone left to interrogate, the attackers’ country of origin would be difficult to verify. In Mumbai, the gunmen attacked multiple sites simultaneously and sought to manoeuvre in the densely crowded city. However, unfamiliar with the topography, one of the attackers was unable to barricade himself in in time. Local policemen swarmed him while he was on the move, losing one of their colleagues in the process. [5] The arrest of this gunman, whose name was Ajmal Kasab, was a game-changer. For the first time, India captured a participant in a suicidal attack with high interrogation value.

Kasab was immediately questioned by Prashant Marde, an officer of the Mumbai police. [6] The gunman confirmed that there were nine other shooters in the city, and stated that all were Pakistani nationals. Aware of the international ramifications of these revelations, the Indian government permitted the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to interrogate Kasab directly. A team of FBI officials flew in from New York to learn what they could about the attack. [7] Kasab independently confirmed to the FBI what he had told the Indian police: he was a Pakistani citizen and a member of LeT, and the attack was being directed in real-time from the Pakistani port city of Karachi via mobile and internet telephony. This digital trail connecting the gunmen in Mumbai with controllers in Karachi proved crucial.

Simultaneously, Western intelligence officials in Islamabad met with the head of analysis at Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). According to Steve Coll, a double Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist who closely examined Pakistani links with terrorism in his book Directorate S , the ISI official was confronted with intercepts of serving agency operatives directing the gunmen in Mumbai. [8] The official Pakistani response in the following days was a bundle of contradictions. At the diplomatic level, Islamabad promised to cooperate in the post-attack investigation while insisting that any link to Pakistani territory was unproven. However, at the local level, attempts were being made to erase the evidentiary trail leading to Pakistan generally and LeT specifically. [9] Even at the time, this response drew criticism from former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. [10] Nearly ten years later, Sharif observed that Pakistan’s failure to deliver justice for the Mumbai victims had eroded its credibility globally. [11]

This feature-length op-ed is divided into two parts. The first focuses on what Pakistani, American, and Indian investigations into the Mumbai attack discovered about LeT and ISI involvement in the attack. The two levels of involvement – that of LeT as a jihadist group and that of the ISI as an arm of the Pakistani government – are treated separately. The Pakistani investigation focused only on the former, the American focused on both aspects while highlighting the LeT angle, while the Indian investigation concentrated primarily on Pakistani state culpability. Importantly, all three concurred that LeT had carried out the Mumbai attack. The second part of the paper will examine what the Indian and American governments have done since 2008 to secure Pakistani cooperation in shutting down this group. By contrasting Indian and American efforts to cooperate, with the lack of such cooperation from Islamabad, this paper concludes that this is in part due to the US’ ambivalence to pursue LeT.

Data used in this paper has been compiled from American court documents, Western scholarship, and Pakistani and Indian English-language journalism. The Pakistani and Indian sources reflect respective national biases, but they converge on the basic reporting of facts – it is on matters of interpretation that they differ. Pakistani journalists have provided the bulk of information about Islamabad’s historically close ties with Lashkar-e-Taiba. A recent increase in media censorship has limited public discussion on this issue, but Western analysts based outside of the country have continued to pursue this topic. [12] The efforts of the ISI and Pakistani army to shield LeT from international sanctions have been periodically reported on. There has also been focused reporting by American journalists on ISI involvement with terrorism. [13]

LeT and the ‘S’ Wing

In June 2001, the Pakistani current affairs magazine Newsline carried a report in which a wing of the ISI, known as the Security or ‘S’ Wing, was accused of instigating domestic terrorism. The report suggested that during the democratic interlude of 1988-99, when civilian prime ministers ruled the country, the army-officered ISI had used Islamist proxies to discredit them. [14] There has long been suspicion that elements within the agency had engineered a massacre by Sindhi extremists in the city of Hyderabad on 30 September 1988. [15] Around 250 people were gunned down in just 15 minutes, mostly from the minority Muhajir community (descendants of refugees who emigrated from India in 1947). [16] The next day, Muhajirs in Karachi retaliated against innocent Sindhis, fracturing the efforts of civilian politicians to form a united front against the military regime then in power. Throughout the following decade, rumours persisted that the ISI supported breakaway factions within mainstream political parties, providing them with firearms to target each other. [17] These rumours were sometimes endorsed by officials from other security agencies within Pakistan. [18]

There is a similarity between the 1988 Hyderabad massacre in Pakistan, and the attack which took place in Mumbai two decades later. In both cases, roving teams of shooters mowed down civilians in public spaces. In both cases, the perpetrators escaped conviction. The suspected mastermind of the Hyderabad massacre, a Sindhi politician named Qadir Magsi, was acquitted in 2017. [19] The main suspect in the Mumbai case, LeT military chief Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi, was bailed in 2014 after a court case in which prosecutors and at least one judge received death threats. [20]

After 9/11, some international scrutiny had come to be focused on ISI’s alleged support for militant groups. [21] In 2006, aware of mounting suspicion, the agency created a counter-terrorism cell to liaise with Western counterparts. American scholar Stephen Tankel suggests that ‘S’ Wing operated at cross-purposes with this new cell called ISI-CT:

ISI-CT was technically the directorate responsible for counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan. Because it was formed at the behest of the United States and funded with CIA money, however, ICI-CT was perceived within the Pakistani security establishment as an externally sponsored orphan […] In reality, ISI-CT has a limited mandate that clashes with the service’s more powerful External Security Wing (ISI-S), which is responsible for directing intelligence and security operations outside Pakistan, and, in this capacity, manages the militant portfolio. As a result, since its inception, ISI-CT has been constrained and repeatedly undercut by ISI-S. [22]

Some Western analysts have explicitly identified ‘S’ Wing as a sponsor of transnational terrorism. However, due to the fact that the ISI is an intelligence monolith, it also has an internal function, rendering the agency simultaneously responsible for both foreign and domestic operations. [23] This means that it is uniquely positioned to calibrate home-grown militancy within Pakistan, and divert surplus violence towards foreign targets when necessary. Such ‘extraversion’ has been Islamabad’s main policy instrument for preserving domestic security since the early 1990s, as acknowledged by the late Pakistani interior minister, Naseerullah Babar. [24]

International views of the ISI and terrorism

As long as the victims of cross-border terrorism in South Asia were Afghan and Indian nationals, Western governments did not seem to focus on this specific form of terrorism. This changed, however, after the US and its NATO allies invaded Afghanistan. A 2009 New York Times article described ‘S’ Wing’s role in supporting attacks on American troops in the country. The article stated that ‘[t]he support consists of money, military supplies and strategic planning guidance to Taliban commanders.’ [25] This description matches that which the ISI has long been reported to provide Pakistani militants fighting in Kashmir. [26]

ISI, according to the assessments of Anglo-American scholars such as Robert Johnson and David Ignatius, favours offensive covert action at the expense of objective risk-evaluation. [27] The result is an operations-oriented mind-set rather than an analysis-oriented one. Thomas Ricks, a columnist with Foreign Policy , considers this predisposition as a factor that, in his view, has led the ISI to miscalculations, including for example, the Mumbai attacks. [28] Although initially treated with scepticism, a growing number of Western scholars now endorse the Indian claim that 26/11 occurred with some level of ISI foreknowledge. [29] Siegfried Wolf, a German researcher, observes that Islamabad’s denials about supporting terrorists have been undermined by statements emanating from its own officialdom. [30] Shaun Gregory, a British professor specializing on Pakistani security policy, has noted that the ISI’s positive tone with Western intelligence services has camouflaged a ‘do-nothing’ policy on counterterrorism. [31]

The motive and masterminds of Mumbai

It is now time to examine an important revelation that emerged during the post-Mumbai investigations. A Pakistani-American jihadist called David Headley (original name: Daood Gilani) was arrested in October 2009 for planning a Mumbai-style terrorist attack in Denmark. [32] While in US custody, he claimed that he had been an informant of the American Drug Enforcement Agency, tasked to infiltrate the criminal underworld in Pakistan. His travels to the latter country had brought him to the attention of the ISI, which had referred him to Lashkar-e-Taiba. Thereafter, Headley appears to have been tasked as a reconnaissance agent for LeT. He undertook several trips to Mumbai over the course of three years, beginning in 2006 and continuing until after the 26/11 attack. It was due to his reconnaissance videos and photographs that LeT was able to plan and rehearse for a precision-strike. [33]

According to Headley’s testimony in a US court, he had been trained by the ISI in intelligence collection techniques. Of the $29,500 he received from Pakistani sponsors, $28,500 came from a serving ISI officer. [34] This officer, identified as ‘Major Iqbal’ in American court documents, became the first Pakistani intelligence operative to ever be indicted by the US government for terrorism. The remainder of the money came to Headley from a LeT operative called Sajid Majeed (often referred to in international media reports as ‘Sajid Mir’). Majeed was deputy head of LeT’s external operations department and handled jihadists worldwide. By 2008, his name had been linked to terrorist plots in Europe, the US, and Australia. Testimonies from Western jihadists depicted him as a highly influential figure within LeT. [35] Headley stated that the Mumbai operation had been coordinated by Majeed. He also claimed that the ten gunmen who attacked Mumbai had been trained by former members of the Pakistani army special forces, thus corroborating what Pakistani journalistic research had uncovered; LeT was being advised by professional soldiers. [36]

The American government convicted Headley on US soil but refused to extradite him to India. Some officials in New Delhi suspect that Washington has sought to protect its fragile relationship with the ISI, which would be damaged if Headley revealed further details of ISI involvement in 26/11. These same officials suspect that the US intelligence community was aware of Headley’s work for LeT in Mumbai but ‘overlooked’ it in the hope that he could help locate Osama bin Laden. [37] Interestingly, even during the years that it ran him as an agent, LeT had an identical view of Headley, seeing him as an American spy sent to infiltrate al-Qaeda but who could be collaterally used to reconnoitre targets in India. [38]

Eventually, the US did allow Indian investigators to interrogate Headley, who claimed that:

The ISI (...) had no ambiguity in understanding the necessity to strike India. It essentially would serve three purposes. They are (a) controlling further split in the Kashmir-based outfits (b) providing them a sense of achievement and (c) shifting and minimizing the theatre of violence from the domestic soil of Pakistan to India. [39]

Until Headley’s interrogation, Indian investigators had struggled to identify a motive; why would ISI officials support a LeT attack on Mumbai which would deliberately kill foreign tourists and bring international opprobrium down on Islamabad? Headley claimed that in 2007-2008, LeT was facing internal rifts as younger cadres wanted to break away from the group due to its subservience to the ISI. In order to keep LeT united under a pliant leadership, some ‘S’ Wing operatives seem to have arranged for an offensive against India which would earn LeT respect within the Pakistani jihadist community and prevent further defections. The offensive would target third country nationals because doing so would magnify LeT’s achievement. Moreover, because the killing would occur on Indian territory, there would be no obvious link to Pakistan. All that was necessary to de-link Islamabad from the attack was to ensure that the attackers would fight to the death. Controlling the gunmen via telephone was possibly intended to bolster their morale in this regard. Furthermore, many such remotely-guided assaults had been carried-out in Indian-administered Kashmir in the past, without any serious diplomatic consequences for Pakistan. [40]

The unexpected capture of Ajmal Kasab by the Mumbai police during the night of 26 November 2008 robbed the plan of its key asset – deniability. Kasab provided details of the training process that the gunmen had gone through in Pakistan. The next breakthrough was Headley’s arrest 11 months later. Lastly, in May 2012, authorities in Saudi Arabia extradited a man to India who provided even more details of the Mumbai attack. This was Zabiuddin Ansari, an Indian jihadist who had fled to Pakistan in 2006. Although not trusted by LeT with operational details of the Mumbai plan, he was sufficiently close to Sajid Majeed to be given an important task: teaching the ten gunmen common Hindi phrases. The idea was that they would telephone Indian television news channels during the attack and make political statements. Usage of Mumbai-specific slang would, LeT hoped, confuse listeners as to their real nationality and make them appear home-grown. [41]

Ansari also claimed that the weapons and ammunition used in Mumbai had been provided by the ISI. Indeed, he went on to state that ISI officials had been present in the LeT control room in Karachi during the attack. [42] One ISI officer identified by Ansari in this regard was Major Sameer Ali, whom Headley had also named as the ISI official who first referred him to LeT. [43] The convergence of their two accounts – one delivered in American custody and the other in Indian custody – lent credence to the argument that ISI had foreknowledge of the attack.

It should not be forgotten that 26/11 took place at a time of steadily improving Indo-Pakistani relations. [44] Hence, the Indian political leadership felt a sense of betrayal, a feeling that was further sharpened by Islamabad’s attempts to deny that the attackers were Pakistani nationals. It took 42 days before Islamabad admitted that Ajmal Kasab was a Pakistani. By this point, Islamabad had started to lose credibility for denying the obvious, and admitting to Kasab’s nationality was a low-cost way to (re)gain, at least some, political capital with foreign governments. [45]

International pressure and a half-hearted investigation

In December 2008, acting on information provided by Western partners, officials from Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) raided LeT camps. Zabiuddin Ansari later suggested that key plotters, among them Sajid Majeed, escaped arrest upon the advice of ISI officers. [46] The raids did net seven LeT operatives, among them Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi, whose voice was heard on the telephonic intercepts directing the gunmen in Mumbai.

On 3 August 2015, former FIA chief Tariq Khosa, who supervised the Pakistani side of the Mumbai investigation, published an op-ed in Dawn , the country’s largest English newspaper. His article avoided mention of the ISI, Major Sameer Ali, Major Iqbal and Sajid Majeed. But it did state in unambiguous terms that the ten gunmen had been members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, that forensic evidence of their training had been obtained from a camp in Sindh province, that their control room in Karachi had been located, and that the ship which had transported them to Indian waters had been seized by the FIA. For writing this article, Khosa was widely criticized. Perhaps anticipating this, as a professional police officer, Khosa made the following observation:

Pakistan has to deal with the Mumbai mayhem, planned and launched from its soil. This requires facing the truth and admitting mistakes. The entire state security apparatus must ensure that the perpetrators and masterminds of the ghastly terror attacks are brought to justice. The case has lingered on for far too long. Dilatory tactics by the defendants, frequent change of trial judges, and assassination of the case prosecutor as well as retracting from original testimony by some key witnesses have been serious setbacks for the prosecutors. [47]

Pakistan’s FIA had made a determined initial effort to track down the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack, which led to the breakthroughs listed by Khosa. Yet, all major developments in the case were prompted by information shared either by Western security agencies or by India. [48] In January 2009, New Delhi provided a 69-page dossier to Islamabad on the Mumbai attack. The dossier included transcripts of LeT controllers, foremost among them Sajid Majeed, ordering via telephone the execution of Western captives. For good measure, India also shared this dossier with 14 other countries whose citizens had been killed in the attack. [49] Thus, from December 2008 to January 2009, Pakistan was under increasing diplomatic pressure to show progress in its own investigation; this led to the arrests conducted by the FIA.

Once the pressure subsided, however, Islamabad appears to have switched from cooperation to confrontation. Over the course of nine years (2008-17) there were as many changes of judges, delaying the court proceedings interminably. As mentioned by Khosa in the above-cited op-ed, one of the prosecution counsels was assassinated in 2013. [50] A judicial official told journalists that the Pakistani government’s official policy was to not pursue the case against LeT, since the beneficiary of this would be India. [51] In 2018, another counsel was removed, ostensibly for not agreeing to this policy.

Thus, despite constant reminders from New Delhi, as well as sporadic ones from Washington, that action against terrorism was in Pakistan’s own interest, no progress was made. Tellingly, there was no mention of the ISI as far as the Pakistani investigation is concerned. Only much later did senior American officials reveal in their memoirs that ISI chief Ahmed Shuja Pasha had blamed ‘rogue operatives’ for the attack. Pasha had told the Pakistani ambassador to Washington that Mumbai was “our people” but it wasn’t “our operation”. [52] Yet, none of these alleged ‘rogues’ ever faced prosecution in Pakistan.

Attempts at a cover-up?

To understand the importance of the Mumbai attack for Indo-Pakistani relations, it is important to see them in context. By 2008, four years of diplomatic initiatives aimed at normalizing relations between New Delhi and Islamabad had matured. On the night of 26 November, the Pakistani foreign minister was in New Delhi for talks on strengthening security cooperation. [53] The US and UK had been urging both sides to investigate terrorist attacks jointly and efforts were being made to create a security architecture for doing so. [54] Trust between both sides was at its highest since the 1999 Kargil Crisis, almost a decade before. In this context, New Delhi’s priority was to avoid losing the positive momentum that had been built up. Mindful that 26/11 might have been a rogue operation by LeT alone, the Indian government initially responded in a restrained manner. It called upon Islamabad to cooperate, in the interests of both countries, in efforts to bring the perpetrators to justice. [55]

Pakistan responded with a blanket denial that any of its citizens were involved. [56] In the first week of 2009, the Indian government upped the ante, stating that 26/11 could not have occurred without assistance from elements of the Pakistani state. Within days, Islamabad issued a tersely-worded statement acknowledging that Kasab was a Pakistani national. Later, the US discreetly used the Mumbai attack as a source of leverage over Pakistan. Permitting Headley’s interrogation by Indian officials in June 2010 served as a warning to Islamabad that more embarrassments may follow. In 2012, the United States fired another two shots across Pakistan’s bow. That April, it announced a $10 million reward for information which could lead to the conviction, on terrorism charges, of LeT chief Hafiz Saeed. [57] By declaring a reward for information leading to his conviction, the US seemed to be sending a double-edged message: implying that, although it had no concrete evidence of his involvement in 26/11,  it was serious about highlighting his association with terrorism. [58] The second warning shot was less ambiguous. In August 2012, the US Treasury included Sajid Majeed in the Specially Designated Global Terrorists list. However, since he was safely in Pakistan, no action was taken. [59]

A non-existent ban

Some Pakistani civilian commentators have claimed that Islamabad’s actions against LeT are choreographed to match the level of Western interest in the group. [60] They argue that the priority of the Pakistani security establishment is not to target extremists, but rather, to silence those who criticize extremists. [61] Towards this end, the military seeks to actively steer popular discussions on domestic security. In November 2015, media networks were banned from reporting on Lashkar-e-Taiba and its increasingly political activities. The ostensible reason was Islamabad’s compliance with UNSC Resolution 1267. [62] Yet, this justification was strange, since, as of 2015, the Pakistani state had yet to ban LeT, or its front organization Jamaat ud Dawa (JuD). LeT had been designated by the UN Security Council in May 2005 as an al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist entity, and JuD was likewise categorized in December 2008. For nine years after Mumbai, the Pakistani foreign office misleadingly described the twin LeT-JuD organizational infrastructure as ‘banned’. [63]

However, a 2009 investigative report by Herald , Pakistan’s leading current affairs magazine, revealed that JuD had never actually been placed on the government’s ‘proscribed’ list. To oblige the UN, Pakistan’s foreign office announced a symbolic ban on the JuD dated 11 December 2008 – one day after the UN Security Council designated JuD a terrorist organization – but this announcement had no legal force within the country. [64] All that happened was that JuD was placed on a government ‘watch list’ – an internal directive that the group’s activities should be kept under observation. Only in February 2018, when Pakistan faced the threat of being censured by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF – a group of 34 wealthy countries that included several of its aid donors), did Islamabad officially ban JuD. [65]

Yet, despite all the diplomatic pressure that it faced, Islamabad still resorted to apparent subterfuge. It directed police forces to seize JuD properties but did not give permission for them to conduct arrests. These ‘seizures’, however, amounted to dispatching a government bureaucrat to oversee the normal functioning of these locations, but not to closing them. [66] Thus, the Pakistani state did not seem to enforce the official proscription of this group. As of November 2018, according to government officials, JuD was once again no longer a banned organisation, as the restrictions imposed in February had lapsed. [67] In February 2019, following renewed pressure from the FATF, Islamabad once again announced a ban on JuD. Initially, it sought to repeat its earlier tactic of 2008-18 (i.e. officially declaring that the organization been proscribed while in practice merely putting it on a watch list). However, on this occasion, Indian newspapers were quick to point out the discrepancy, potentially embarrassing Pakistan at a time when international attention was focused on JuD. A day after the Indian media reported that JuD was still active in Pakistan, Islamabad added the group to the list of proscribed organizations. [68] At the time of writing, it is unclear if this move is likely to be any more permanent than the ‘ban’ imposed in 2018.

In part, the problem is a structural one. A 2010 study found that a majority of Pakistanis do not believe that jihadi groups based in Pakistan, and that operate in Indian Kashmir, engage in terrorism. In fact, most Pakistanis surveyed simply did not know if these groups, such as LeT, intentionally attack civilians. [69] Relatedly, the study found that, although Pakistanis in general view terrorism to be a problem, and neither support the tactic nor believe it is justified by Islam, they are more willing to accept terrorism against foreigners (incl. Indians and Americans). An inhabitant of Kasab’s village told a journalist in 2010 that the Mumbai gunman had not committed a crime because he had killed citizens of ‘an infidel country like India’. [70] Such views might be more widespread in Pakistani society than Islamabad would like foreign audiences to know. There is also the problem of inadequate information. As observed by Joshua White, a US counterterrorism analyst, many Pakistanis perceive LeT as a charitable organization, in contrast to foreign observers who are more aware of its violent side. [71] Madiha Afzal, a Pakistani scholar based in the United States, points out that knowledge of terrorist organizations tends to be stronger outside the country than within. [72]

Potential linkages between LeT and Al Qaeda

According to British investigative journalists Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy, bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad may have been built on land purchased by Lashkar-e-Taiba. [73] Western intelligence agencies uncovered evidence of this when reviewing paperwork obtained from the building’s architect. Scott-Clark and Levy make another claim in their critically-acclaimed book The Exile , which chronicles bin Laden’s years on the run:

In 2008, according to two former aides to the Lashkar-e-Taiba leader Hafiz Saeed, Osama had travelled to Manshera to attend an extraordinary meeting for the Mumbai operation of November 26, 2008 (which had become known as 26/11). It had been facilitated by Lashkar, overseen by the ISI’s S-Wing and sponsored by Al Qaeda. [74]

Furthermore, documents seized in the US commando raid that killed bin Laden found that Hafiz Saeed had been corresponding with the al-Qaeda chief right up to the latter’s death. [75] Osama himself had taken a keen interest in the arrest and trial of David Headley by American authorities in 2009-2010. It was these findings that led the US to declare a reward for information that would lead to Saeed’s arrest and conviction.

The Indian perspective, post-Mumbai

The need to prove Pakistani linkages to the Mumbai attack at the diplomatic level dominated the Indian policy response, even to the extent of excluding military retaliation. Shivshankar Menon, India’s foreign secretary at the time of 26/11 who later went on to serve as National Security Advisor, offered the following rationale for why India did not go to war:

Let’s consider what might have happened had India attacked Pakistan. Most immediately, the fact of a terrorist attack from Pakistan on India with official involvement on the Pakistan side would have been obscured. Instead, as far as the world was concerned, the incident would have become just another India-Pakistan dispute….Faced with a dispute between two traditional rivals, the world’s default response is to call for peace and to split the blame and credit 50:50 in the name of fairness or even-handedness. This was just what the Pakistan Army wanted. [76]

Menon argues that by not escalating in 2008, India created a policy option to employ legal methods against the attack’s perpetrators. Even so, Pakistan did not reciprocate with cooperation but rather, took as little action against LeT as it could get away with. Menon suggested in 2016 that, with the Mumbai trial stalled in Pakistan, New Delhi had no incentive to hold back in the event of another large-scale attack. [77] His assessment was proven accurate within weeks, when Indian forces raided LeT camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir in retaliation for a jihadist assault on an Indian military base.

Conclusion: Terrorism is not always a stateless phenomenon

This op-ed opened with three hypotheses about the 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai. The first, widely held by Indian analysts both within and outside government, asserts that the attack was part of a long-standing campaign of covert warfare waged by the ISI through ‘non-state’ proxies. Such an argument is grounded in a crucial earlier event in Mumbai’s history. On 12 March 1993, more than 15 years before the 26/11 attack, a series of synchronised bombings ripped through the city, killing 257 people. Police investigators discovered that the bombs had been planted by members of a local drug trafficking gang, whose leaders were Indian crime lords based in Dubai. When New Delhi sought the extradition of the gang leaders, the Dubai authorities pressured them to leave the United Arab Emirates. What happened next remains controversial to this day: Indian government spokesmen insisted that the fugitives found refuge in Karachi, a claim that Pakistani spokesmen denied. Over a year later, one of the fugitives was arrested while travelling through Nepal. After being handed over to Indian police, he stated in a television interview that the remaining masterminds of the 1993 bombings were living in Karachi under the protection of the ISI. Although his statement might have been dismissed as having been made under coercion, it was reinforced through photographic, video- and audio-recorded ‘evidence’. [78]

After the bombings, New Delhi launched a diplomatic offensive to convince the US to declare Pakistan a state sponsor of terror. As part of this effort, India’s external intelligence service provided the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with an unexploded detonator, which had been recovered from a bomb that had failed to go off in Mumbai. The detonator was of American manufacture and its serial number was traced to Pakistani military stocks, which had been built up by the US during the Soviet-Afghan War. The CIA however, argued that the mere fact of the detonator’s origin did not amount to proof of Pakistani state sponsorship of the bombings, given the possibility of low-level pilferage. It further claimed that the incriminating detonator had been ‘accidentally’ destroyed during tests in its laboratory. [79] Decades later, bitter memories of this event linger in the corridors of the Indian security establishment. The 1993 bombings and their unsatisfactory aftermath spawned two precepts in India’s assessment of international terrorism: that Pakistan as a state would, at a minimum, provide shelter to terrorists attacking India, and that even when presented with forensic evidence of Pakistani state agencies’ involvement in a specific incident, the US would prefer to look the other way as long as its own interests were not targeted.

Indian suspicions of Pakistan in relation to Mumbai were, thus, fifteen years in the making when the 26/11 attack occurred. Even so, it must be acknowledged that India and the US have since moved much closer towards cooperating against jihadist groups, especially LeT. Sajid Majeed now features in the FBI’s most wanted list of terrorists for his role in 26/11. The agency, using his better-known name of ‘Sajid Mir’, has noted that he is ‘believed to be residing in Pakistan.’ [80] Likewise, the mastermind of the 1993 Mumbai bombings has been described by the United Nations Security Council’s ISIL and al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee as a resident of Pakistan, notwithstanding Islamabad’s continued denials. [81]

The second hypothesis, favoured by most Western analysts, is that individual ISI officials were complicit in the 2008 attack, along with the leadership of Lashkar-e-Taiba. This line of argumentation stops short of blaming the Pakistani state as a unitary actor. Instead, it sees potential for ‘rogue operatives’ to pursue a private jihadist agenda using state resources. Such a school of thought would explain why serving ISI officers such as Major Iqbal and Major Sameer Ali might have supported the attack, or why personnel from the Pakistani army special forces (either serving, retired or technically on ‘leave’ from active service) might have trained the gunmen who stormed Mumbai. It would also explain overlapping details between the interrogation accounts of Kasab, Headley, and Ansari, despite the fact that all three men played different roles in the attack and were interrogated under different conditions, two of them (Kasab and Headley) as part of a joint Indo-US investigatory effort.

The third hypotheses about the 26/11 attack, that it was the work of a non-state actor alone, is unsupported by the historical record. Pakistan’s failure to pursue the trial of the alleged perpetrators suggests either a complete lack of investigatory capacity or a sign of bad faith. Given that Islamabad took just two months to conclude the trial of a Pakistani citizen who helped the CIA eliminate Osama bin Laden (sentencing him to a lengthy prison term), the balance of probability tilts towards the Pakistani state having adopted a highly selective approach to counterterrorism. [82] On the specific issue of ISI involvement in the 26/11 attack, Pakistan has yet to explain why it opposed the extradition of Zabiuddin Ansari from Saudi Arabia to India, if his later confessional statements to Indian police were completely without merit. [83] Since these statements explicitly placed serving ISI officials in the LeT control room in Karachi, a claim that appears to be corroborated by Steve Coll’s reporting about Western intelligence intercepts made during the attack, it seems that Ansari was revealing more than Pakistan would like the international community to know.

The Mumbai attack of 2008 demonstrated that even after 9/11, terrorists did not necessarily become hostis humani generis (‘enemies of all mankind’). At the very least, Pakistan has proven inconsistent on acting against terrorists based on its territory, a binding obligation according to UNSC 1267. The attack remains an open case, with Pakistani state complicity still-debated, but the role of LeT and individual officers within the ISI is now perceived in most quarters as beyond serious dispute. One policy question remains: what should be the international community’s response to another Mumbai? Given that the US has struggled to find a suitable set of instruments for deterring state-sponsored terrorism against itself in the 1980s by non-nuclear powers, the question assumes greater relevance in a nuclear South Asia. As far as India is concerned, it has shown restraint on more than one occasion, to little avail.

[1] Damien McElroy and Rahul Bedi, “Bombay Attacks: Britons and Americans Targeted,” Telegraph , 27 November 2008, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/3529123/Bombay-attacks-Britons-and-Americans-targeted.html .

[2] For detailed studies of the Mumbai attack and the people involved, see Wilson John, The Caliphate’s Soldiers: The Lashkar-e-Tayyeba’s Long War (New Delhi: Amaryllis, 2011) and Stephen Tankel, Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

[3] Saroj Kumar Rath, Fragile Frontiers: The Secret History of Mumbai Terror Attacks (New Delhi: Routledge, 2014), p. 203.

[4] Saleem Shahzad, Inside Al Qaeda and the Taliban (London: Pluto Press, 2011), p. 82-83.

[5] “Tukaram Omble Ensured Kasab Faced a Fair Trial,” Firstpost , 21 November 2012, https://www.firstpost.com/mumbai/how-tukaram-omble-ensured-kasab-faced-a-fair-trial-529947.html .

[6] [Book excerpt from 26/11 Mumbai Attacked , edited by Harinder Baweja and published by Roli Books in 2009], “The Mumbai Police Control Room Becomes a War Zone,” Rediff.com , 20 March 2009, http://www.rediff.com/news/2009/mar/20sld1-book-extract-of-mumbai-attacked.htm .

[7] [Wire services], “FBI Agents Ordered to India to Investigate Attacks,” Economic Times , 29 November 2008, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/fbi-agents-ordered-to-india-to-investigate-attacks/articleshow/3771991.cms .

[8] Steve Coll, Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2016 (London: Penguin, 2018), p. 343. Coll does not identify which Western agencies were involved in this interaction with the ISI, beyond saying that they were ‘American and allied spy services’

[9] “The Unending Faridkot Mystery,” Dawn , 21 November 2012, https://www.dawn.com/news/765854 and Waqar Hussain, “In Kasab’s Village, Media in Firing Line,” Hindu , 21 November 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/In-Kasab%E2%80%99s-village-media-in-firing-line/article12516812.ece .

[10] [Wire services], “After India, Sharif Slams Zardari, Says Kasab from Pak,” Indian Express , 19 December 2008, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/after-india-sharif-slams-zardari-says-kasab-from-pak/400494/ .

[11] Dawood Rehman, “Nawaz Sharif Invites Public Wrath for ‘Admitting Pakistan’s Hand in Mumbai Attacks’,” Daily Pakistan , 13 May 2018, https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/headline/nawaz-sharif-invites-public-wrath-for-admitting-pakistans-hand-in-mumbai-attacks/ and Mohammad Imran, “‘What Did I Say That Was Wrong?’: Nawaz Responds to Controversy Around Remarks on Mumbai Attacks’,” Dawn , 14 May 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1407622 .

[12] Ben Farmer, “In Targeting the Media, Pakistan's Military Weighs in on Election,” The National , 28 June 2018, https://www.thenational.ae/world/asia/in-targeting-the-media-pakistan-s-military-weighs-in-on-election-1.745201 and Daud Khattak and Frud Bezhan, “‘Everybody Is Scared’: Pakistani Media Fighting -- And Losing -- Battle With 'Extreme' Censorship,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty , 3 June 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/everybody-is-scared-pakistani-media-fighting----and-losing----battle-with-extreme-censorship/29268374.html .

[13] Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, US Officials Say,” New York Times , 1 August 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/01/world/asia/01pstan.html .

[14] Massoud Ansari, “Crime City,” Newsline , June 2001, p. 30.

[15] Syed Jamaluddin, Formation of Republic of Jinnahpur (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2008), p. 41, and Saad Ahmad Khan, “Shattering the Public Private Divide: The Role of Mohajir Women in the Karachi Conflict,” MA Thesis submitted to the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Manitoba (2015) , p. 27.

[16] “Appeals against Dr Magsi, 40 Others in Hyderabad Carnage Case Dismissed,” Dawn , 18 May 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1333773 .

[17] Mazhar Abbas, “A Movement Called MQM,” News on Sunday , 11 March 2018, http://tns.thenews.com.pk/movement-called-mqm/#.Wyknm4VOJaQ .

[18] See Aamer Ahmed Khan, “The End of Jihad,” Herald , December 2001, pp. 20-21 and Azmat Abbas, “Tightening the Noose,” Herald , February 2002, p. 32.

[19] Dr Qadir Magsi Acquitted in 1988 Hyderabad Massacre Case,” Express Tribune , 19 May 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1413232/dr-qadir-magsi-acquitted-1988-hyderabad-massacre-case/ .

[20] “26/11 Case: Pakistan Court Summons Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi,” Firstpost , 6 January 2015, https://www.firstpost.com/world/2611-case-pakistan-court-summons-zaki-ur-rehman-lakhvi-2032525.html and Rezaul H. Lashkar, “Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi: Five Things about The 26/11 Mastermind,” Hindustan Times , 24 June 2015, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/zakiur-rehman-lakhvi-five-things-about-the-26-11-mastermind/story-eIuS1WByRBdM4Q4XCSCs7L.html .

[21] Javid Ahmad, “Pakistan’s Secret War Machine,” National Interest , 7 May 2018, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/pakistans-secret-war-machine-25733 .

[22] Stephen Tankel, “Beyond FATA: Exploring the Punjabi Militant Threat to Pakistan,” Terrorism and Political Violence 28, no. 1 (2016), p. 54.

[23] The ISI has one ‘S’ Wing which is divided into internal and external components. About the activities of the internal security branch, see Idrees Bakhtiar and Zaffar Abbas, “Conspiracies Unlimited,” Herald , August 1994, pp. 34-36.

[24] Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihad, Yes, But Not Revolution: Explaining the Extraversion of Islamist Violence in Saudi Arabia,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 3 (2009), pp. 413-415 and Tariq Ali, “In the Doghouse,” in  On the Abyss: Pakistan After the Coup (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2000), p. 22.

[25] Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Afghan Strikes by Taliban Get Pakistan Help, U.S. Aides Say,” New York Times , 25 March 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/world/asia/26tribal.html .

[26] M. Ilyas Khan, “The Waiting Game,” Herald , July 2003, p. 37.

[27] Robert Johnson, “Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence,” in Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere , eds. Philip H.J Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), p. 135. Ignatius says that the ‘ISI is above all a paramilitary organization. It doesn’t do all that much collection of intelligence. It’s not a very good spy agency, but it’s good at running covert action.’ See his interview with Fareed Zakaria dated 25 December 2011, transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1112/25/fzgps.01.html .

[28] Thomas E. Ricks, “Two New Books on Pakistan’s ISI and its ‘War for National Survival’,” Foreign Policy , 4 October 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/04/two-new-books-on-pakistans-isi-and-its-war-for-national-survival/ .

[29] Hein G. Kiessling, Faith, Unity, Discipline: The ISI of Pakistan (Noida: HarperCollins, 2016), p. 214.

[30] Siegfried O. Wolf, “Pakistan and State-Sponsored Terrorism in South Asia,” in Terrorism Revisited: Islamism, Political Violence and State-Sponsorship, eds. Paulo Casaca and Siegfried O. Wolf, (New York: Springer,2017), p. 109.

[31] Shaun Gregory, “The ISI and the War on Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism , 30:12 (2007), pp. 1020-1030.

[32] Yassin Musharbash, “Investigators Look into Possible Ties to ‘Mickey Mouse Project’,” Der Spiegel , 30 December 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/copenhagen-terror-probe-investigators-look-into-possible-ties-to-mickey-mouse-project-a-737252.html .

[33] Ginger Thompson, “Mumbai Plotter Testifies About Training,” New York Times , 25 May 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/world/asia/26headley.html .

[34] See Indictment against David Headley, filed in US District Court, Northern District of Illinois, July 2010, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1520.pdf  and Government’s Position Paper as to Sentencing Factors, submitted to US District Court, Northern District of Illinois, /sites/default/files/import/publication/terrorcase.pdf .

[35] Sebastian Rotella, “The Man behind Mumbai,” ProPublica , 13 November 2010, https://www.propublica.org/article/the-man-behind-mumbai and Praveen Swami, “Sajid Mir’s War against the World,” Hindu , 30 May 2011, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/Sajid-Mirs-war-against-the-world/article14067909.ece .

[36] S. Hussain Zaidi and Rahul Bhatt, Headley and I (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2012), pp. 79-80.

[37] Sebastian Rotella, “The American Behind India’s 9/11 -- And How U.S. Botched Chances to Stop Him,” ProPublica , 24 January 2013, https://www.propublica.org/article/david-headley-homegrown-terrorist .

[38] Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, The Siege: The Attack on the Taj (New Delhi: Penguin, 2013), p. 58.

[39] [39] Interrogation report of David Coleman Headley , compiled by the National Investigation Agency of India, p. 61, accessed http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1602.pdf , 20 June 2018..

[40] Even after the 2008 attack in Mumbai, cross-border LeT raids in Kashmir continued. However, recognizing that the electronic trail of such raids undermined official Pakistani denials, LeT became more cautious about the digital signature of its operations. See Namrata Biji Ahuja, “Pakistani Terrorists Ditching GPS Sets to Avoid Being Traced by India,” The Week , 28 April 2018, https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2018/04/28/pakistani-terrorists-ditch-gps-traced-india.html .

[41] Sebastian Rotella, “Militant Reaffirms Role of Pakistan in Mumbai Attacks,” Foreign Policy , 9 August 2012, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/09/militant-reaffirms-role-of-pakistan-in-mumbai-attacks/ and Sandeep Unnithan, Shantanu Guha Ray, Kiran Tare, Bhavna Vij-Aurora and Mohammad Waqas, “Jundal's Arrest Exposes Pak’s Agenda of Turning 26/11 into an Indian Conspiracy,” India Today , 7 July 2012, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/20120716-abu-jundal-arrest-kasab-mumbai-terror-attacks-conspiracy-theories-758992-2012-07-07 .

[42] Sanjeev Miglani and John Chalmers, “Insight: Voice of Mumbai Attacks Points Finger at Pakistan,” Reuters , 3 July 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-attacks/insight-voice-of-mumbai-attacks-points-finger-at-pakistan-idUSBRE8611C520120703 and Krishna Kumar, “26/11 Attacks: Chargesheet Names Abu Jundal as Key Conspirator,” India Today , 17 October 2012, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/north/story/26-11-attacks-abu-jundal-key-conspirator-118876-2012-10-17 ..

[43] Sebastian Rotella, “Four Disturbing Questions about the Mumbai Terror Attack,” PBS , 22 February 2013, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/four-disturbing-questions-about-the-mumbai-terror-attack/ .

[44] In his penetrating book on Lashkar-e-Taiba, noted Pakistani journalist Arif Jamal (now living in exile in the United States), described the Mumbai attacks as a ‘second Kargil’. He leaves readers with little doubt that, whatever the intentions of the civilian leadership in Pakistan at the time, the military and its chief were committed to a posture of hostility towards India. Arif Jamal, Call for Transnational Jihad: Lashkar-e-Taiba 1985-2014 (New Delhi: Kautilya Books, 2015), pp. 119-120.

[45] Andrew Buncombe and Omar Waraich, “Mumbai Siege: ‘Kill All the Hostages – Except the two Muslims’,” Independent , 8 January 2009, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/mumbai-siege-kill-all-the-hostages-ndash-except-the-two-muslims-1232074.html .

[46] “ISI Officers Major Samir Ali, Colonel Hamza Directly Involved in 26/11: Abu Jundal,” Economic Times , 6 July 2012, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/isi-officers-major-samir-ali-colonel-hamza-directly-involved-in-26/11-abu-jundal/articleshow/14699915.cms and Abhishek Sharan, “Pak Let Key 26/11 Operative Slip Away after Quizzing Him: Jundal,” Hindustan Times , 27 November 2013, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/pak-let-key-26-11-operative-slip-away-after-quizzing-him-jundal/story-QnV0fNiq2448l03LCb0TNM.html .

[47] Tariq Khosa, “Mumbai Attacks Trial,” Dawn , 3 August 2015, https://www.dawn.com/news/1198061/mumbai-attacks-trial .

[48] In this regard, there are similarities with the hunt for Al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan immediately after 9/11: Pakistani security agencies did indeed follow up on information provided by their Western counterparts, but only when the details were so specific that there simply was no basis on which the local authorities could withhold cooperation. M. Ilyas Khan, “Sleeping with the Enemy,” Herald , June 2002, p. 30.

[49] Somini Sengupta, “Dossier Gives Details of Mumbai Attacks,” New York Times , 6 January 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/world/asia/07india.html and Nirupama Subramanian, “India, U.S. Faced Off on Sharing 26/11 Information with Pakistan,” Hindu , 15 March 2011, http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/India-U.S.-faced-off-on-sharing-2611-information-with-Pakistan/article13675604.ece .

[50] Declan Walsh, Prosecutor in Bhutto’s Death and Mumbai Attacks Is Killed in Pakistan’, New York Times , 3 May 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/04/world/asia/prosecutor-in-bhutto-killing-and-mumbai-attacks-assassinated-in-pakistan.html .

[51] Omer Farooq Khan, “Pakistan sacks 26/11 Prosecutor for not ‘Taking Govt Line’,” Times of India , 30 April 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/pak-sacks-26/11-prosecutor-for-not-taking-govt-line/articleshow/63965624.cms .

[52] Suhasini Haidar, “Our People Planned 26/11: Ex-Chief of ISI,” Hindu , 10 May 2016, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/Our-people-planned-2611-ex-chief-of-ISI/article14311776.ece and “Ex-ISI Men Likely behind 26/11 Attacks, Says Athar,” Dawn , 25 April 2011, https://www.dawn.com/news/623876 .

[53] Owen Bowcott, “Mumbai Attacks Put Pressure on Pakistan Talks,” Guardian , 27 November 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/27/mumbai-terror-attacks-diplomacy .

[54] Amelia Gentleman, “India and Pakistan Say They Will Fight Terrorism Together in Spite of Deadly Train Bombing,” New York Times , 21 February 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/21/world/asia/21cnd-india.html .

[55] [Wire services], “No Reply Received from Pak on Terror Dossier: India’, Indian Express , 10 January 2009, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/no-reply-received-from-pak-on-terror-dossier-india/lite/ .

[56] “From Naved to 26/11: How Pakistan Has Reacted When It’s Been Accused of Terrorism,” Firstpost , 7 August 2015, https://www.firstpost.com/world/from-naved-to-2611-how-pakistan-reacted-when-its-been-accused-of-terrorism-2381694.html .

[57] See US State Department “Rewards for Justice” website, accessed https://rewardsforjustice.net/english/hafiz_saeed.html , 21 June 2018 and Declan Walsh, “US Posts $10 Million Reward for Pakistani Militant,” New York Times , 3 April 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/04/world/asia/us-offers-10-million-reward-for-pakistani-militant.html .

[58] Rob Crilly, “US Admits It Lacks Evidence to Convict $10m Hafiz Saeed,” Telegraph , 5 April 2012, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/9188337/US-admits-it-lacks-evidence-to-convict-10m-Hafiz-Saeed.html .

[59] Press Release: “Treasury Designates Lashkar-E Tayyiba Leadership,” US Department of the Treasury, 30 August 2012, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1694.aspx .

[60] Hussain is cited in Madeeha Anwar and Mubashir Zaidi, “Pakistan's 'Name Game' Gives Terror Groups a Pass,” Voice of America , 10 May 2018, https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-militant-name-game-gives-terror-groups-pass/4388801.html . See Madiha Afzal, “What do Pakistanis Think of Anti-India Terrorist Groups?,” Brookings , 29 March 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/03/29/what-do-pakistanis-think-of-anti-india-terrorist-groups/ .

[61] Umer Ali, “Pakistan’s Censorship Takes a Dangerous Turn,” Diplomat , 7 February 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/pakistans-censorship-takes-a-dangerous-turn/ and Stephen Tankel, “Confronting Pakistan's Support for Terrorism: Don't Designate, Calibrate,” The Washington Quarterly 39, no. 4 (2016), p. 175.

[62] Malik Asad, “Pemra Bans Media Coverage of JuD, FIF,” Dawn , 3 November 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1217122 .

[63] [Wire services], “‘Banned’ Jamaat ud Dawa Thrives in Pakistan’,” Dawn , 10 February 2015, https://www.dawn.com/news/1162698 , [Editorial] “Banned or not?,” Dawn , 24 January 2015, https://www.dawn.com/news/1159032 and Praveen Swami, “Pakistan’s Terror-Finance Time-Bomb,” Indian Express , 2 March 2017, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/pakistans-terror-finance-time-bomb-financian-action-task-force-lashkar-e-toiba-jamat-ul-dawa-haqqani-network-praveen-swami-column-4550095/ .

[64] Umer Farooq, “Sleight of Ban,” Herald , December 2009, pp. 52-53.

[65] Sanaullah Khan, “Pakistan Extends Ban on Terror Groups, Individuals Identified by United Nations,” Dawn , 13 February 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1388987 .

[66] Asif Shahzad and Mubasher Bukhari, ‘Seized, but not ceased: Banned charities pose challenge for Pakistan’, Reuters , 20 February 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-militants-financing/seized-but-not-ceased-banned-charities-pose-challenge-for-pakistan-idUSKCN1G423Q .

[67] [Wire services], “Charities Run by Radical Cleric No Longer Banned by Pakistan,” New York Times , 27 October 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/10/27/world/asia/ap-as-pakistan.html .

[68] “Pakistan Bans Hafiz Saeed-led Jamat-ud-Dawa and Charity Arm FIF, Two Weeks After it Said it Did,” News18, 5 March 2019, https://www.news18.com/news/india/pakistan-finally-bans-hafiz-saeed-led-jud-and-fif-two-weeks-after-it-said-it-did-2057225.html .

[69] [69] Karl Kaltenthaler, William J. Miller, Stephen Ceccoli and Ron Gelleny, “The Sources of Pakistani Attitudes toward Religiously Motivated Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33, no. 9 (2010), p. 823.

[70] “Kasabs [sic] Home Village Slams Mumbai Conviction,” Dawn , 3 May 2010, https://www.dawn.com/news/533766 .

[71] Joshua T. White, “Beyond Moderation: Dynamics of Political Islam in Pakistan,” Contemporary South Asia 20, no. 2 (2012), p. 181.

[72] Madiha Afzal, “Pakistan’s Censorship Model: An Image- and Identity-Obsessed Country,” Brookings, 30 May 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/05/30/pakistans-censorship-model/ .

[73] Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy, The Exile: The Stunning Inside Story of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda in Flight (New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), p. 431.

[74] Ibid., p. 374.

[75] Rob Crilly, “Mumbai Attack ‘Mastermind’ Hafiz Saeed Linked to Osama bin Laden,” Telegraph , 4 April 2012, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/9186009/Mumbai-attack-mastermind-Hafiz-Saeed-linked-to-Osama-bin-Laden.html .

[76] Shivshankar Menon, “Why India Didn’t Attack Pakistan after 26/11 Mumbai Attacks,” LiveMint , 22 November 2016, https://www.livemint.com/Leisure/29lXP57cHDAloqUf2uJOHM/Why-India-didnt-attack-Pakistan-after-2611-Mumbai-attacks.html .

[78] S. Hussain Zaidi, “The Yakub Memon Story: The Man who Helped India Expose Pakistan's Role in 1993 Bombay Blasts,” Scroll.in , 30 July 2015, https://scroll.in/article/744801/the-yakub-memon-story-the-man-who-helped-india-expose-pakistans-role-in-1993-bombay-blasts .

[79] Chidanand Rajghatta, “B Raman, India’s Seasoned Spymaster and Trenchant US Critic, Dies at 77,” Times of India , 17 June 2013, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/B-Raman-Indias-seasoned-spymaster-and-trenchant-US-critic-dies-at-77/articleshow/20628240.cms and B.Raman, “Lessons from the Mumbai Blasts,” Rediff.com , 14 March 2003, https://www.rediff.com/news/2003/mar/14raman.htm .

[80] FBI Most Wanted: Sajid Mir, accessed https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/sajid-mir , 22 May 2019.

[81] [No author named], ‘Six addresses of Dawood Ibrahim in Pakistan get indirect UN confirmation’, The Hindu , 23 August 2016, accessed https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Six-addresses-of-Dawood-Ibrahim-in-Pakistan-get-indirect-UN-confirmation/article14585353.ece , 22 May 2019.

[82] Qaswar Abbas, “Pak Sentences Man Who Helped Track Osama but Takes no Action Against Hafiz Saeed,” India Today , 2 June 2012, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/neighbours/story/20120611-shakeel-afridi-osama-bin-laden-hafiz-saeed-pakistan-758636-2012-06-02 .

[83] Deeptimaan Tiwary, “DNA Test, Voice Sample Convinced Saudi of Jundal’s Nationality,” Times of India, 27 June 2012, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/DNA-test-voice-sample-convinced-Saudi-of-Jundals-nationality/articleshow/14420670.cms .  

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26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack revisited: Lessons learnt and novel disaster model for future

Dhiraj v. sonawane.

1 Department of Orthopaedics, Grant Medical College and Sir J.J. Group of Hospitals, Mumbai, India

Bipul K. Garg

Ajay chandanwale, ambarish a. mathesul.

2 Department of Orthopaedics, Sassoon General Hospital and Byramjee Jeejeebhoy Medical College, Pune, India

Omkar R. Shinde

Shravan singh, associated data.

Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analysed in this study.

Introduction

Terrorism is the unlawful exercise of random and ruthless violence against property or individuals, usually innocent civilians, in order to intimidate governments or societies for political or ideological purposes. Mumbai, the financial capital of India and its busiest metropolitan city, has been a prime target for terrorist attacks. In the last two decades, the number of terrorist attacks in Mumbai have caused over 700 fatalities ( Table 1 ). On 26 November 2008, ten transnational terrorists attacked Mumbai, which included the busiest railway station in peak hour, five-star hotels, a café shop and hospitals. The multiple attacks and control measures lasted for three days, leading to the deaths of over 149 people which included civilians, foreign nationals, security personnel and hospital staff. The attack was a meticulously planned and executed act of terrorism where explosive devices and gunfire were used to cause the maximum number of casualties and lasted for 60 h. This attack was therefore different from previous attacks which were serial blasts in Mumbai in 2006 (Hirshberg, Holcomb & Mattox 2001 ), and in London in 2005 (Aylwin et al. 2006 ; Bhandarwar et al. 2012 ). In the 2011 attack, 66.8% of injured people required surgical interventions, compared to less than 35% in both the Mumbai and London blasts (Deshpande, Mehta & Kshirsagar 2007 ). The Sir J.J. Group of Hospitals (SJJGH) in Mumbai received the maximum number of casualties (271 patients) in a short duration of time. The modes of transport of patients were mainly taxis, handcarts, fire brigade vans, ambulances and private vehicles, assisted by local people. The in-hospital disaster plan was activated immediately, as large numbers of patients were expected.

Number of casualties and mortalities in terror attacks in Mumbai over the last two decades.

Source : South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2001, Terrorist attacks in Mumbai since 1993, Institute for Conflict Management, viewed 05 May 2019, from http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/mumbai_blast.htm#

Sl, serial.

This study describes the pattern of injuries during the attack and the distribution of patients in various hospitals. Two fundamental aims of disaster management are the rapid evacuation of all casualties from a hazardous incident scene, and the reduced mortality of critically injured patients. The purpose of this study was to identify the medical response time to the terrorist attack, identify lacunae in disaster mitigation, suggest organised approaches to save lives and limit disability, and give detailed measures towards better preparedness in dealing with future terror strikes for Indian metropolitan cities.

Materials and methods

Study design.

This is a retrospective study.

Data of all patients presenting at various hospitals, including SJJGH, Bombay Hospital, Cooper Hospital, Gokuldas Tejpal Hospital, KEM Hospital, Nair Hospital and St. George Hospital, who had injuries sustained during the 26/11 terrorist attack, were included in the study.

A retrospective analysis of patients’ data from all of the hospitals mentioned above was carried out. This study was conducted at SJJGH, which serves as the definitive receiving facility. Data were collected by a thorough review of the inpatient and outpatient records. The patients’ data were studied under the following sub-headings: age, sex, diagnosis, prior care received, number and types of procedure, and number of patients triaged at the various hospitals. The data were analysed to learn about medical response interactions and the main outcomes.

Ethical consideration

The study was initiated after approval was received from the J.J. Group of Hospitals and Grant Medical College Research and Ethical Committee.

The majority of patients (271) were managed at the SJJGH, which was 3.5 km/8 minute distance from the disaster site, although other hospitals, such as the St. George Hospital, which was 900 m/2 minutes distance; the GT Hospital, which was 950 m/2 min distance; and the Bombay Hospital, which was 2 km/5 min distance from the incident site, managed 38, 30 and 79 patients respectively. The detail of the number of patients managed and the distance of the hospital from the disaster site are indicated in Table 2 .

Detail of the number of patients managed and the distance of the hospital from the disaster site.

GT Hospital, Gokuldas Tejpal Hospital; KEM Hospital, King Edward Memorial Hospital.

The total number of interventions performed at the Sir J.J. Group of Hospitals was 194. These interventions involved: local exploration in 47 patients, primary closure of contused lacerated wounds in 30 patients, laparotomy in 22 patients, internal fixation in 19 patients, insertion of an intercostal drain in 15 patients, external fixation in 13 patients, foreign body removal in 13 patients, skin grafting in 13 patients, secondary wound closure in 6 patients, amputation in 4 patients, flap in 4 patients, craniotomy in 2 patients, tendon repair in 2 patients, vascular repair in 2 patients, thoracotomy in 1 patient and tracheostomy in 1 patient.

This terror attack has shown that Mumbai lacked pre-hospital care and on-scene triage. Previous attacks have shown a lack of coordination and poor transport facilities in managing disasters. During disasters, local bystanders have played a major role in the transport of casualties. These attacks have challenged the ability of disaster preparedness regarding medical response, security and infrastructure. The attacks have been frequent and have targeted crowded areas of the city with the aim of causing maximum damage. The recent 2011 Mumbai terror attacks were the deadliest terror strike. On retrospective evaluation of the data, some obvious loopholes were evident in handling this terrorist attack. Mumbai lacks the means to manage this disaster in providing emergency medical care especially at a pre-hospital level. This was compounded by a lack of coordination and poor transportation infrastructure. The majority of injured patients were brought to the hospital by local people and passers-by, using handcarts, taxis and private vehicles. Hundreds of patients were received at SJJGH in a short time frame, which overloaded the hospital. Although other trauma centres were kept on standby, they received few patients. Consequently, only one hospital was overloaded by the victims of this terror attack ( Table 2 ).

Roy et al., in their retrospective descriptive study on the Mumbai terror attacks, concluded that there was a need to build a central medical control and strengthen public hospital capacity, and also that a formal emergency medical services (EMS) system and triage is absent in the city of Mumbai ( 2011 ). They found that the distribution of victims was determined by the proximity of the hospital to the blast site and the type of pre-hospital transport, and these occurred without field triage. Pinkert et al. studied the January 2006 Tel Aviv bomb blast in Israel and described it according to the Disastrous incidents systematic analysis through components, interactions and results (DISAST-CIR) methodology (2008). They concluded that in the event of mass casualty, the incident necessitated primary triage, evacuation priority decision- making, and the rapid distribution of casualties between all the adjacent hospitals, which would enable efficient and effective containment of the event.

The average/mean incident-to-arrival time in our study was 21 hours (2 h to 44 h) for major injuries and 14 h (30 min to 39 h) for minor injuries, which was more than the time taken in disaster and terrorism-prone countries like Israel. Also, as per our study and previous reports of the Mumbai terror attacks, there was an unequitable distribution of patients amongst the major public hospitals. Had there been a comprehensive disaster module, involving triage, field teams and transport teams, the number of casualties could have been reduced.

Our proposal

We feel the need for the development of a comprehensive disaster module for the city of Mumbai and for Indian cities overall. The module would function as described in Figure 1 and consist of the formation of a central medical control committee (CMCC): This body would comprise of experts of tertiary medical care centres or experienced personnel who are capable of handling trauma and mass casualties, who would be responsible for handling the response to a terror attack or disaster.

Disaster mitigation protocol.

Functions of the CMCC body would involve:

• An efficient and timely response to a disaster.
• Coordination with the ministry.
• The upgrading of available infrastructure.
• The training of staff and carrying out mock drills.
• Informing the media.

The present infrastructure (existing trauma care centres) and city need to be graded into levels:

• Advanced trauma care centre: Public hospitals with medical colleges within the city limits.
• Basic trauma care centre: Other public trauma care centres within the city limits.

Zones: With disaster sites as the focal point, trauma care centres falling within a particular time/distance from the disaster would be divided into the following categories:

• Less than 5 km/30 min from the disaster site/nearest the advanced trauma care centre.
• Within 5–10 km/30 min – 2 h of the disaster site.
• Greater than 10 km/2 h from the disaster site (by road via available vehicle as per Google Maps).

The CMCC body, with the available infrastructure and workforce comprising hospital authorities would need to direct and coordinate the response with other major trauma centres in the city, which would act according to the pre-planned disaster management protocol. This should ensure the equitable distribution of the casualties and efficient management.

We would like to suggest a disaster mitigation protocol for such future disasters with emphasis on pre-hospital care ( Figure 1 ). In pre-hospital management, the cooperation of local by-standers as well as police, public servants, taxi drivers, bus drivers and their vehicles is imperative. These motivated by-standers, with minimal formal training, would play an active role in a ‘play and run method’ of management of the victims. In our protocol, we divided patients into two broad categories, which are (1) urgent unstable patients with injury to vital organs, spontaneous pneumothorax, internal bleeding, a stab wound in the trunk, burns > 10%, hypovolaemic shock, compound fracture with significant haemorrhage, spine injury, et cetera and (2) stable patients with close fractures, contused lacerated wound, minor injuries, and patients remaining unstable after having been stabilised.

The composition and role of the Central Medical Control Committee

• Field disaster team
• Medics (trauma specialist, physicians, anaesthetist)
• Paramedics (nurses, trainee)
• Hospital staff (ward boys, drivers, etc.)
• Mobile van (dressing material, splints, IV fluids, emergency kit, etc.)

Transport team

• Mobile intensive care unit
• Physician, anaesthetist

Emergency medical services team at hospital

• Triage at entrance by trauma specialist
• Management according to advanced trauma life support protocol
• Team approach consisting of the surgeon, orthopaedician, anaesthesiologist and specialist
• Documentation and communication

Proper planning, a disaster management protocol and preparedness for such disaster can use these resources to their optimum level at the time of a disaster, to enable the timely management of injured patients who can be given treatment based upon severity, haemodynamic instability and the proximity of effective health care for prompt early treatment, without an excessive load being placed on selected hospitals, to reduce critical mortality.

Acknowledgements

Competing interests.

The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Authors’ contributions

All authors contributed equally to this work.

Funding information

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

Data availability statement

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any affiliated agency of the authors.

How to cite this article: Sonawane, D.V., Garg, B.K., Chandanwale, A., Mathesul, AA., Shinde, O.R. & Singh, S., 2020, ‘26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack revisited: Lessons learnt and novel disaster model for future ’, Jàmbá: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies 12(1), a915. https://doi.org/10.4102/jamba.v12i1.915

• Aylwin C.J., König T.C., Brennan N.W., Shirley P.J., Davies G., Walsh M.S. et al., 2006, ‘ Reduction in critical mortality in urban mass casualty incidents: Analysis of triage, surge, and resource use after the London bombings ’, The Lancet 368 ( 9554 ), 2219–2225. 10.1016/S0140-6736(06)69896-6 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bhandarwar A.H., Bakhshi G.D., Tayade M.B., Borisa A.D., Thadeshwar N.R. & Gandhi S.S., 2012, ‘ Surgical response to the 2008 Mumbai terror attack ’, British Journal of Surgery 99 ( 3 ), 368–372. 10.1002/bjs.7738 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Deshpande A.A., Mehta S. & Kshirsagar N.A., 2007, ‘ Hospital management of Mumbai train blast victims ’, The Lancet 369 ( 9562 ), 639–640. 10.1016/S0140-6736(07)60305-5 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hirshberg A., Holcomb J.B. & Mattox K.L., 2001, ‘ Hospital trauma care in multiple-casualty incidents: A critical view ’, Annals of Emergency Medicine 37 ( 6 ), 647–652. 10.1067/mem.2001.115650 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pinkert M., Lehavi O., Goren O.B., Raiter Y., Shamis A., Priel Z. et al., 2008, ‘ Primary triage, evacuation priorities, and rapid primary distribution between adjacent hospitals – Lessons learned from a suicide bomber attack in downtown Tel-Aviv ’, Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 23 ( 4 ), 337–341. 10.1017/s1049023x00005975 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Roy N., Kapil V., Subbarao I. & Ashkenazi I., 2011, ‘ Mass casualty response in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks ’, Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 5 ( 4 ), 273–279. 10.1001/dmp.2011.80 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• South Asia Terrorism Portal , 2001, Terrorist attacks in Mumbai since 1993 , Institute for Conflict Management, viewed 05 May 2019, from http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/mumbai_blast.htm# . [ Google Scholar ]

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Mumbai Post 26/11: An Alternate Perspective

• Edited by: Ram Puniyani & Shabnam Hashmi
• Publisher: SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd
• Publication year: 2010
• Online pub date: June 19, 2012
• Discipline: Politics & International Relations
• Subject: Terrorism , South Asia Studies , South Asian Politics
• DOI: https:// doi. org/10.4135/9788132108030
• Keywords: conspiracies , conspiracy theories , detainees , Iraq , mass murder , September 11 attacks , terrorism Show all Show less
• Print ISBN: 9788132103080
• Online ISBN: 9788132108030
• Buy the book icon link

26/11 shook Mumbai to the core. The attack was brutal and horrific. Nearly 60 people lost their lives at CST, Taj Hotel, and Trident Hotel. Several senior police officers were killed. One of the officers, Hemant Karkare, was investigating the Malegaon blast of 2006, in which personalities like Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur, Lt Col. Prasad Shrikant Purohit, and others who are associated with the RSS ideology of Hindu Rashtra were named. This compilation of articles unravels the full story of the events and raises unanswered queries related to the attack. It also surveys the phenomenon of terrorism and some acts of terror which have not been investigated so far.

Front Matter

• Introduction
• Chapter 1: Terror: The Aftermath
• Chapter 2: As the Fires Die: The Terror of the Aftermath
• Chapter 3: Hotel Taj: Icon of Whose India?
• Chapter 4: Why the United States Got it Wrong
• Chapter 5: Death of a Salesman
• Chapter 6: Counter-terrorism Must not Kill Democracy
• Chapter 7: Responding to Mumbai Terror: Need for Diplomacy and Restraint, not War
• Chapter 8: Mumbai under Siege
• Chapter 9: Handling Queries: Democratic Responses—Antulay Remarks and the Aftermath
• Chapter 10: The Mumbai Terror Attacks: Need for a Thorough Investigation
• Chapter 11: India's Terror Dossier: Further Evidence of Conspiracy
• Chapter 12: Terrorism, Rule of Law and Human Rights
• Chapter 13: Acts of Terror and Terrorizing Act: Unfolding Indian Tragedy
• Chapter 14: Our Politicians are Still not Listening
• Chapter 15: Terrorism: Are Stronger Laws the Answer?
• Chapter 16: Lessons from the Mumbai Attack

Back Matter

• Appendix I: Acts of Terrorism by RSS Combine
• Appendix II: Unraveling Truth: People's Tribunal on Atrocities Committed in the Name of Combating Terrorism
• Select Bibliography
• About the Editors and Contributors

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26/11 Mumbai terror attacks: Here’s what happened at Taj Mahal Hotel, Trident-Oberoi, Nariman House

We look back at how terror unfolded at the taj mahal palace hotel, oberoi-trident, cst, nariman house, cafe leopold, and cama hospital., by: express web desk.

It has been eight years since ten young men stormed into the financial capital of the country with the sole aim of wrecking it to the core — for three consecutive days, the city of Mumbai was wrapped in the grip of terror; eight years since Mumbai was brought down to its knees.

Up until November 2008, terror was associated with the fear that vexed the life of the common man or those unfortunate, inhabiting the disputed borders of the country. For the first time, the bubble of comfort that sheltered the propertied and elite in India was shattered. It was also the first time when foreigners in the country were the target of an attack, transforming a domestic tragedy into one that ended up having significant international ramifications.

But the largest significance of 26/11 lay in the impact that it had on public emotion. Never before had a terrorist attack given rise to public debate of the kind that discussed the role of every element of society in inhibiting terror. From politicians to the country’s security agencies to the media, each failed in its responsibility that eventually claimed the lives of 166 individuals.

Taj Mahal Palace Hotel

The image of the front dome of Taj Mahal Palace hotel encapsulated with a large plume of smoke is one that is etched into the memory of every Mumbaikar. It was not just about the fear of the hundreds trapped inside or the multiple bombings and shootings or the fact that the iconic five-star hotel lay under siege for the longest period of time that made the Taj the face of the 26/11 attacks. Rather, the attack on Taj symbolised something way more powerful. It was a brazen combat against the most affluent and celebrated in the financial capital. It was a brutal strike upon an establishment that symbolised the emergence of an entrepreneurial elite in India.

For more than 60 hours the symbol of opulence in Mumbai lay at the mercy of four heavily armed terrorists.

9:38 pm: Two among the four terrorists, Abdul Rehman Bada and Abu Ali reached the main entrance of the Tower section, having planted a crude RDX bomb in front of the police post nearby. Armed with AK 47s, ammunition and grenades, they made their way to the lobby area, firing on anyone and everyone who caught their sight.

9:43 pm: The other two terrorists, Shoib and Umer, entered through the La-Pat door of the Palace and started shooting down guests in the poolside area. The fact that the terrorists were aware of that the La-Pat door, which is generally closed to public, was open on that particular day for a few corporate meetings and a wedding, was evidence of the intricacy in planning that went behind the attacks.

By the poolside, four foreigners were the first to have been shot down dead by the terrorists along with security guard Ravindra Kumar and his Labrador Retriever.

12:00 am: By midnight Mumbai Police surrounded the Taj. Many of the guests inside the hotel were huddled up by the staff into small rooms by this time.

1:00 am: The central dome of the hotel was bombed and there was a massive fire in the building.

3:00 am: The army and firemen arrived at the location.

4:00 am: The first round of evacuation took place. Two groups were formed by marine commandos. The first group was out safely. The second group was spotted by the terrorists while they were making an exit. Gautam Singh, a tandoor chef at Taj, was one of them. He was shot dead.

November 27 (Thursday)

6:30 am: A team of 200 commandos reached Mumbai from New Delhi and took charge of the rescue operations in Taj and Oberoi. The government gave orders to storm the building. In the succeeding hours, evacuations took place in batches.

10:30 am: Fresh round of gun battle reported from within the building.

4: 30 pm: The terrorists set fire to a room on the fourth floor of the building.

November 28 (Friday)

14: 53- 15:59 pm: Ten grenade explosions reported to have taken place within the premises.

7: 30 pm: Another round of explosions and firing took place.

November 29 (Saturday)

8:00 am: The Indian commandos announced that the Taj had been cleared of all the terrorists.

While the NSG and medical teams sanitised the building after complete evacuation, the fire department was still dousing the last fires in the building. At St, George hospital and JJ hospital body bags kept coming in. The wards were full to their capacity as patients were lying in sheets soaked in blood and tears.

The Oberoi-Trident

The Oberoi-Trident is the other icon of luxury and opulence in Mumbai that came under the deadly saws of the 26/11 attacks. Being much larger than Taj Mahal hotel in terms of spatial capacity, the rescue operation at the Oberoi-Trident was extremely slow. The two hotels being interconnected, consist of 800 rooms between them. An approximate larger number of hostages were under siege here than at the Taj. Further, bureaucratic failures had led to the security forces being able to enter the building only in the evening.

The Oberoi-Trident plays host to a large number of foreign tourists visiting India and it was the case on the night of 26/11. Foreign nationals were reported to be the prime point of target for the terrorists. By the time the siege ended in Oberoi-Trident, 143 hostages were rescued alive and 24 bodies were recovered.

10:10 pm: Gunfire began at the entrance of Trident with the gatekeeper being the first to fall prey. Two gunmen walked into the reception area and opened fire. Hotel staff including bellboys and hotel management trainees lay injured as the two gunmen made their way to the Opium Den bar, the Tiffin and later the Kandahar restaurants.

The two gunmen walked up the mezzanine level to the spa and killed two Thai masseuses, following which they set off a grenade explosion at the lobby level.

November 27 (Thursday) 12:00 am: The Rapid Action Force positioned themselves outside the building. Friends and kin of those trapped inside stood in the bylanes waiting to hear about their loved ones, hoping they would be rescued.

6:00 am: The police stepped back as the NSG takes over operation at the Oberoi.

6: 45 pm: Explosions and gun battles continue throughout the day. A number of NSG and army personnel are reported to be injured. Evacuation of hostages take place in batches. By now a total of 31 people are rescued.

7: 25 pm: A fire is reported to have broken out in the 4th floor.

3: 00 pm: The rescue operation at Oberoi comes to an end and both terrorists are killed. As reported by Ritu Sarin, at the end of the 40 hours of trigger alert at Oberoi, the site resembled a camp ravaged.

Nariman House

This attack was distinctive in nature as it was on the Chabad House (a Jewish community centre) run by Rabbi Gavriel Noach Holtzberg and his wife, Rivka Holtzberg. The House, located in Colaba, was frequented by large number of Jews, particularly Israeli but also from those visiting the country from across the world.

The couple had moved to Mumbai from Brooklyn in 2003 and taken upon themselves the management of the centre that housed an educational centre, a synagogue and a social hall. The place was a meeting point for foreign Jewish backpackers on their way to holiday destinations in the country, and also for the Jews living in the city.

The news of the attack on the Chabad House was quick to have international reverberations across similar Jewish centres across the world in more than 70 countries. Never before had Jews in India been the target of attack for any terrorist group.

November 26 (Wednesday)

9:45 pm: Dinner had just ended and the Rabbi along with his wife, his two year old son, Moshe and six guests were getting ready to go to bed when a gunshot was heard. When one of the gunmen came upstairs, a bomb blew off at the petrol pump near the building. Seconds later, an RDX laden device went off near the base of the Nariman House staircase. The terrorists then charged upstairs with gunshots ringing in the air.

The Rabbi and his wife along with their guests were held hostage in the Chabad House for the next nearly 40 hours. The couple’s son, Moshe and the cook managed to escape twelve hours into the siege. According to witnesses, the boy’s pants were drenched in blood when he emerged.

5:30 pm: A batch of 20 commandos were sent who tried to enter the building from the ground floor. The terrorists had destroyed the lift and the entry point to the Nariman House.

12:00 am: Nine hostages were rescued from the first floor.

7:30: am: Unable to enter the building from the ground floor,  NSG commandos were air dropped onto the terrace of the building from a chopper.

1:00 pm: Firing at intervals and grenade explosions continued through the day.

3: 30 pm: A fifteen-minute shooting spree was followed by an NSG commando hanging a red flag from the window of the fifth floor as a signal to the NSG authorities outside about the final assault.

5:45 pm: An explosion blew up the fourth floor of the building. The eruption was strong enough to expose the top floor staircase.

6:00 pm: One of the NSG guards went to the rooftop and showed a thumbs up sign declaring the operation to be successful.

9:00 pm: NSG chief J K Dutta arrived at the spot and declared the rescue operation at Nariman House to be successfully over. However, the Rabbi, his wife and five of the hostages were found dead. One commando, Joginder Singh was killed while two others were injured.

When the Indian Express entered the building less than 24 hours later, the site resembled much like a global conflict zone. More than 30 grenades had been hurled. Small craters were all over the floor and bullet marks all across the walls. The stench of decomposed bodies was unbearable. The bodies of the two terrorists lay on the fourth floor.

Photographs of hostages released post the operation give evidence of the torture unleashed on them by the terrorists. The Rabbi’s body was found in the second floor with his legs tied up with a belt. His wife’s body lay nearby. The bodies of two Israeli girls lay beside each other with their hands and legs tied up.

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GENEVA, Ill. (WLS) -- The Northern Illinois Food Bank will begin its Summer Food Service Program on the first Monday of June.

The Food Research an Action Center reports one in 11 kids who receive free or reduced-price lunch during the school year, are at risk for summer hunger, the food bank said.

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The program provides free breakfasts, lunches, and snacks to youth programs throughout 13 counties in suburban and rural Northern Illinois.

The meals will be distributed and must be consumed, at designated community sites, including at select park districts, churches, schools, and community centers.

Summer Meal sites run from June 3 to August 16.

Meals on the Move will begin on Monday at four different park sites across Aurora.

The program provides free summer lunches to kids and teens 18 and under.

The sites are open Monday through Friday from 11:00 a.m. to noon or 12:30 p.m. to 1:30 p.m., depending on the site.

All lunches need to be eaten on-site at the park and may not be taken home. There is no cost, no registration, and no ID required.

Weekend lunches for kids will also be available.

Meals on the Move runs through August 9.

To find a location near you for either program, visit www.solvehungertoday.org/child-nutrition-programs.

Or call (800) 359-2163, or text "Food" or "Comida" to 304-304.

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• FOOD & DRINK
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How Trump’s Conviction Could Reshape the Election

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Last week, Donald J. Trump became the first U.S. former president to be convicted of a crime when a jury found that he had falsified business records to conceal a sex scandal.

Nate Cohn, who is the chief political analyst at The Times, Maggie Haberman, a senior political correspondent, and Reid J. Epstein, who also covers politics, discuss how the conviction might shape the remaining months of the presidential race.

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Technical Report: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Viruses

Updated June 5, 2024

This report provides an update to the April 26, 2024, report to include three additional sporadic human cases (1 in Australia and 2 in the United States) and recent activity in wild birds, poultry, and other animals, including the multi-state outbreak in U.S. dairy cattle, and updated information on monitoring for human infections with highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus infections in the United States. CDC continues to believe that the overall risk to human health associated with the ongoing outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses has not changed and remains low to the U.S. general public at this time.

Executive summary

A small number of sporadic human cases of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) have been identified worldwide since 2022, amidst a panzootic of these viruses in wild birds and poultry. Nearly all   human cases reported globally since 2022 were associated with poultry exposures, and no cases of human-to-human transmission of HPAI A(H5N1) virus have been identified. Three human cases of HPAI A(H5N1) virus infection in dairy farm workers were reported during April and May 2024 in the United States and were attributed to exposures to dairy cattle. One previous human case was detected in the United States in 2022 during poultry culling work. In a few cases, the source of exposure to HPAI A(H5N1) virus was unknown. To date, HPAI A(H5N1) viruses currently circulating most commonly in birds and poultry, with spillover to mammals and humans, do not have the ability to efficiently bind to receptors that predominate in the human upper respiratory tract. This is a major reason why the current risk to the public from HPAI A(H5N1) viruses remains low. However, because of the potential for influenza viruses to rapidly evolve and the wide global prevalence of HPAI A(H5N1) viruses in wild birds and poultry outbreaks and following the identification and spread among dairy cattle in the United States, additional sporadic human infections are anticipated. Continued comprehensive surveillance of these viruses in wild birds, poultry, mammals, and people worldwide, and frequent reassessments are critical to determine the public health risk, along with ongoing preparedness efforts.

• CDC is actively working on the domestic outbreak of clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI A(H5N1) viruses in wild birds, with outbreaks in poultry and backyard flocks, and infections of other animals, including dairy cattle. Response activities include conducting surveillance among people with relevant exposures and preparing for the possibility that contemporary HPAI A(H5N1) viruses gain the ability for increased transmissibility to and among people.
• CDC, along with state and local public health partners, continues to monitor people in the United States who have been exposed to infected birds, poultry, dairy cattle, or other animals for 10 days after their last exposure. To date, more than 9,000 people in 52 jurisdictions have been monitored since 2022.
• H5 candidate vaccine viruses (CVVs) produced by CDC are expected to provide good protection against current clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI A(H5N1) viruses detected in birds and mammals, including dairy cattle. These H5 CVVs are available and have been shared with vaccine manufacturers.
• Because influenza viruses are constantly changing, CDC performs ongoing analyses of HPAI A(H5N1) viruses to identify genetic changes that might allow for: spread more easily to and between people, more serious illness in people, reduced susceptibility to antivirals, changes in the sensitivity of diagnostic assays, or reduced neutralization of the virus by vaccine induced antibodies. To date, few genetic changes of public health concern have been identified in HPAI A(H5N1) viruses circulating in wild birds and poultry worldwide and detected in dairy cattle in the United States.
• Currently, HPAI A(H5N1) viruses circulating in birds and U.S. dairy cattle are believed to pose a low risk to the general public in the United States; however, people who have job-related or recreational exposures to infected birds or mammals are at higher risk of infection and should take appropriate precautions outlined in CDC guidance .
• Comprehensive surveillance and readiness efforts are ongoing, and CDC continually takes preparedness measures to be ready in case the risk to people from HPAI A(H5N1) virus or from other novel influenza A viruses changes.

HPAI A(H5N1) viruses in wild birds and poultry

Hpai a(h5n1) virus infections among mammals, human cases of a(h5n1), table 1. global reported a(h5n1) human cases, january 2022 through june 4, 2024, figure 1. epidemic curve of human cases of a(h5n1) by illness onset date, 1997-2024 by country (n=912), monitoring of persons exposed to hpai a(h5n1) viruses in the united states, u.s. influenza surveillance for human infections with novel influenza a viruses, including hpai a(h5n1) virus, cdc and u.s. government preparedness activities, limitations of the report, conclusions, previous h5n1 technical reports.

Since 2005, HPAI A(H5N1) viruses have undergone extensive genetic diversification including the formation of hundreds of genotypes following reassortment with other avian influenza A viruses. Clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI A(H5N1) viruses emerged in 2020 and were introduced into North America in late 2021 [1,2] and spread to Central and South America, resulting in wild bird infections (in terrestrial, seabird, shorebird, and migratory species) and poultry outbreaks in many countries [3-8]. In Fall 2023, the first detections of HPAI A(H5N1) viruses in birds in the Antarctica region were reported [9]. Globally, this 2.3.4.4b clade of HPAI A(H5N1) viruses has become widespread causing record numbers of bird outbreaks in wild, backyard, village, and farm birds.

In the United States,  USDA APHIS monitors for avian influenza A viruses in wild, commercial, and backyard birds. From January 2022 through June 4, 2024, APHIS reported HPAI A(H5)/A(H5N1) virus detections in more than 9,300 wild birds in 50 states or territories and more than 1,140 commercial and backyard flocks affecting more than 96.5 million birds in 48 states.

Sporadic HPAI A(H5N1) virus infections of mammals have been reported since 2003-2004 during HPAI A(H5N1) virus outbreaks in poultry or wild birds [ 10-12 ]. HPAI A(H5) viruses are known to occasionally infect mammals that eat (presumably infected) birds or poultry and mammals that are exposed to environments with a high concentration of virus.

Globally, sporadic HPAI A(H5N1) virus infections and outbreaks in a wide range of mammal species were reported by countries in different regions of the world to the  World Organisation for Animal Health  since January 2022. HPAI A(H5N1) virus infections of mammals have included a polar bear in the United States , farmed mink in  Spain  and  farmed foxes and other mammals in Finland,  harbor and gray seals in the United States,  sea lions in Peru , Argentina , and  Chile , elephant seals in Argentina , baby goats in the United States , alpacas in the United States , and domesticated pets such  as cats in Poland ,  France , South Korea, and the  United States , and dogs in  Italy . During March through June 4, 2024, the United States reported HPAI A(H5N1) virus infections of dairy cows at more than 80 farms in nine states . Spread from dairy farm-to-dairy farm was reported , and routes of transmission are under investigation. In the United States, from May 2022 through June 4, 2024, USDA APHIS reported HPAI A(H5N1) virus detections in wild mammals comprising a wide range of different species in 31 states.

Experimental studies have used the ferret model to assess transmissibility and disease severity of HPAI A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses. One study used a recombinant virus that was based upon a virus isolated from a mink during a mink farm outbreak in Spain in 2022. When ferrets were experimentally infected with the recombinant HPAI A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus, transmission to co-housed susceptible ferrets through direct contact was observed, but transmission through respiratory droplets to separated ferrets was less efficient [ 13 ]. In another study, ferrets experimentally infected with a HPAI A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus isolated from a human case in Chile in 2023 transmitted to susceptible ferrets by direct contact but not through respiratory droplets or fomites [ 14 ]. Importantly, in this study, all experimentally infected ferrets experienced fatal disease [ 14 ].

While HPAI A(H5N1) viruses are currently circulating widely in wild birds and poultry in many geographic regions, relatively few human cases of HPAI A(H5N1) have been reported in recent years [ Figure 1 ]. From January 2022 through June 4, 2024, 29 sporadic human cases of A(H5N1) were reported from nine countries, including 15 cases of severe or critical illness, and seven deaths, six cases of mild illness, and eight asymptomatic cases [ Table 1 ].

One human case of HPAI A(H5N1) was reported in the United States in April 2022 while exposed to poultry . The individual reported fatigue without other symptoms during poultry culling activities at a farm with confirmed HPAI A(H5N1) virus infection of poultry, and a low level of A(H5N1) viral RNA was detected in a single upper respiratory tract specimen. It is possible that detection of A(H5N1) viral RNA resulted from deposition of non-infectious viral material in the upper respiratory tract of the individual and did not represent true infection, similar to the environmental contamination that was attributed to two asymptomatic cases in poultry workers reported in Spain [15]. Transient environmental deposition may also explain the detection of A(H5N1) viral RNA in cases of A(H5N1) reported in asymptomatic poultry workers in the U.K. that were investigated as part of a surveillance study [ 16-18 ].

One human case of A(H5N1) was reported in the United States in April 2024 in an adult dairy farm worker . The individual worked at a farm with sick cows presumed to be infected with HPAI A(H5N1) virus in an area in which cows at other dairy farms were confirmed with HPAI A(H5N1) virus infection in Texas [ 19 ]. The worker only experienced conjunctivitis without any other signs or symptoms of illness. HPAI A(H5N1) virus was detected in conjunctival and nasopharyngeal swab specimens, and sequence data confirmed clade 2.3.4.4b, genotype B3.13 , and close genetic relatedness to viruses detected in other dairy cattle farms in Texas. Oseltamivir was provided for treatment of the individual and for post-exposure prophylaxis of household contacts. Conjunctivitis resolved without other symptoms and household contacts remained well [ 19 ]. No additional human cases related to this case were detected.

One human case of A(H5N1) was reported in the United States in May 2024 in an adult dairy farm worker . The individual worked at a farm with sick cows confirmed to be infected with HPAI A(H5N1) virus in Michigan. The worker only experienced conjunctivitis. HPAI A(H5N1) virus was detected in a conjunctival swab specimen, and sequence data confirmed clade 2.3.4.4b, genotype B3.13, closely related to genotype B3.13 viruses detected in dairy cows were sequenced and shared by USDA. Oseltamivir was offered to the worker and household contacts. No additional human cases related to this case were detected.

One human case of A(H5N1) was reported in the United States in May 2024 in an adult farm worker . The individual worked at a farm with sick cows confirmed to be infected with HPAI A(H5N1) virus in Michigan. The worker experienced upper respiratory symptoms. HPAI A(H5N1) virus was detected in a nasopharyngeal swab specimen, and partial HA and full-length NA sequence data confirmed clade 2.3.4.4b, closely related to viruses detected in dairy cows. Oseltamivir was provided for treatment of the individual and for post-exposure prophylaxis of household contacts. No additional human cases related to this case were detected.

Most human cases of HPAI A(H5N1) reported since January 2022 had recent exposure to sick or dead poultry, and no cases of human-to-human HPAI A(H5N1) virus transmission were identified. Fifteen cases (8 children, 7 adults) had severe or critical illness, and seven (3 children, 4 adults) died. Fourteen cases were associated with clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI A(H5N1) virus in 7 countries, and eleven cases were associated or assumed to be associated with clade 2.3.2.1c HPAI A(H5N1) viruses in Cambodia and Vietnam. Of the 7 cases of clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI A(H5N1) virus infections that were symptomatic (conjunctivitis or respiratory illness), 4 had severe or critical illness (57%) and one of the 4 died (25%). One case of severe illness in a child in Australia in March 2024 with recent travel history to India was associated with clade 2.3.2.1a HPAI A(H5N1) virus. None of the HPAI A(H5N1) virus genetic sequences contained any known markers of reduced susceptibility to currently recommended FDA-approved influenza antiviral medications.

Genetic data have revealed that when some mammals, including humans, are infected with HPAI A(H5N1) virus, the virus may undergo intra-host evolution resulting in genetic changes that allow more efficient replication in the lower respiratory tract or extrapulmonary tissues [20-22]. Some HPAI A(H5N1) viruses that have infected humans in 2023 and 2024 have also shown the same or similar genetic changes as those identified in wild and captive mammals. For example, sequencing of viruses from specimens collected from human cases identified in Cambodia during October and November 2023, in Vietnam in 2024 and in the dairy farm worker in Texas in April 2024 revealed the presence of the polymerase basic protein 2 (PB2) 627K marker, which is often associated with mammalian adaptation during infection [ 23 ]. The HPAI A(H5N1) virus sequenced from the human case in Chile identified in March 2023 had different genetic changes (PB2 591K and 701N) that are also associated with mammalian adaptation [ 24 ]. Sequencing of the HPAI A(H5N1) virus from the first dairy farm worker case in Michigan did not identify the PB2 627K marker but revealed the presence of PB2 M631L, that is known to be associated with viral adaptation to mammalian hosts, and which has been detected in 99% of dairy cow sequences but only sporadically in birds [25]. PB2 M631L has been identified as resulting in enhancement of virus replication and disease severity in mice during studies with avian influenza A(H10N7) viruses [ 26 ]. The remainder of the genome of A/Michigan/90/2024 was closely related to sequences detected in infected dairy cows and strongly suggests cow-to-human transmission.

Although these genetic changes may impact mammalian disease outcome, they have not been associated with enhanced transmissibility of the virus to humans. HPAI A(H5N1) viruses preferentially bind to α2,3-linked sialic acid receptors that are prevalent in the respiratory and intestinal tracts of waterfowl and poultry, and in the human lower respiratory tract but do not currently have the ability to easily infect cells and bind efficiently to α2,6-linked sialic acid receptors that are predominant in the human upper respiratory tract [ 2 ].  The ability to bind efficiently to α2,6-linked sialic acid receptors would be needed to increase the risk of transmission to people [ 27,28 ]. Using recombinantly expressed hemagglutinin, analysis of receptor binding of the HPAI A(H5N1) virus identified in the dairy farm worker from Texas (A/Texas/37/2024) revealed binding only to avian-type α2,3-linked sialic acid receptors.

Since 1997, a total of 912 sporadic human A(H5N1) cases have been reported from 24 countries, caused by different HPAI A(H5N1) virus clades [29,30], with a cumulative case fatality proportion of greater than 50%. Human A(H5N1) cases peaked in 2006 (115 cases, 9 countries) and 2015 (145 cases, 4 countries) primarily due to a large epidemic in Egypt with 136 cases [ Figure 1 ].

Nearly all reported human A(H5N1) cases had poultry exposures, such as to sick or dead poultry or visiting live poultry markets. Rare, limited, and non-sustained instances of human-to-human HPAI A(H5N1) virus transmission likely occurred in a small number of family members following prolonged, close unprotected exposure with a symptomatic case-patient during 2004-2007 in multiple countries [ 31-34 ].

Although few human cases have occurred recently, given widespread infection among poultry and wild birds, people who have job-related or recreational exposures to infected birds or sick or dead mammals are at higher risk of infection.

CDC, in collaboration with state, territorial, and local public health partners, has monitored people exposed to infected birds and poultry, cattle, or other animals beginning with their first exposure and for 10 days after their last exposure, from February 2022 through June 4, 2024:

• Total monitored: more than 9,000 people in 52 jurisdictions.
• Total illnesses reported among monitored persons: nearly 200 people.
• Number positive for influenza A(H5N1) virus: 3 people (1 additional case was detected in a dairy farm worker not being monitored).

Of the nearly 200 monitored people showing symptoms who were tested for novel influenza A and seasonal influenza viruses along with other respiratory viruses, HPAI A(H5N1) virus was detected in specimens from 3 persons. HPAI A(H5N1) virus genetic material was detected at a low level in a respiratory specimen from one person in Colorado who experienced fatigue without any other illness signs or symptoms while participating in poultry culling activities. HPAI A(H5N1) virus was detected in a conjunctival swab specimen from one person in Michigan who experienced conjunctivitis without any other illness signs or symptoms while working with sick dairy cattle confirmed with HPAI A(H5N1) virus infection. HPAI A(H5N1) virus genetic material was detected in a nasopharyngeal swab specimen from one person in Michigan who experienced acute respiratory illness while working with sick dairy cattle confirmed with HPAI A(H5N1) virus infection. HPAI A(H5N1) virus was detected in conjunctival swab and nasopharyngeal swab specimens in one person in Texas who was not being monitored who experienced conjunctivitis without any other illness signs or symptoms while working with sick dairy cattle presumed to be infected with HPAI A(H5N1) virus. [See above section on “ Human cases of A(H5N1) .”]

Human infection with a novel influenza A virus, including HPAI A(H5N1) virus, is a nationally notifiable condition (case definition: Novel Influenza A Virus Infections 2014 Case Definition | CDC)

Influenza testing is widely available in clinical laboratories and health care facilities. Assays in these settings would detect A(H5N1) virus infections as influenza A virus positive, and a subset of assays would be able to also determine that they are not influenza A virus subtypes H1 or H3 that commonly circulate among humans. Specimens from persons possibly exposed to HPAI A(H5N1) virus or that test positive for influenza A virus but negative for A(H1) and A(H3) subtypes should be forwarded to the appropriate state or local public health laboratory for further testing. CDC should be notified immediately in the event that any clinical specimens from suspected cases test positive for a novel influenza A virus or if the testing results of clinical specimens from suspected cases are inconclusive . Currently, CDC recommends testing for HPAI A(H5N1) virus infection in symptomatic persons with relevant exposure history . Human infection with a novel influenza A virus is a nationally notifiable condition, and currently confirmatory testing is being done only at CDC. Very few specimens have been submitted to CDC for H5 testing since January 2022.

• Seasonal influenza virus detection assays that can also detect novel influenza A viruses are used in 128 public health laboratories in all 50 U.S states.
• Specific diagnostic assays to detect A(H5) viruses are available at 99 public health laboratories in all 50 states.

Per long-standing protocols, upon detection of a virus that tests positive for influenza A virus but is negative for human H1 or H3 genes, the public health laboratory will rapidly contact CDC and ship the specimen to CDC.  Specimens that are influenza A virus positive but negative for human H1 or H3 genes may also be tested for H5 by state public health laboratories and are rapidly sent to CDC for a diagnostic result.  An investigation of the case will be initiated, and a case report form will be submitted to CDC through the novel influenza A reporting module.

Global surveillance and rapid response to human infections

CDC’s Influenza Division supports surveillance in live bird markets, backyard farms, and wild birds and/or their environments in Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Guatemala, Kenya, Lao PDR, Peru, Thailand, and Vietnam. Surveillance data highlight the high prevalence and wide range of avian influenza A viruses in birds and help to describe the changing epidemiology of avian influenza A viruses. In 2022, the Influenza Division tracked more than 50 human infections with avian influenza A viruses reported to the WHO from seven countries in four WHO regions. Most recently, CDC Influenza Division field staff assisted in the rapid response investigations of four human A(H5N1) cases in Cambodia during October and November 2023.

CDC systems that monitor national, state, and local level influenza data are being used during the current HPAI A(H5N1) virus situation .

• Influenza virus and illness activity are monitored year-round through a collaborative effort between CDC and many partners, including state, local, and territorial health departments; public health and clinical laboratories; clinics; and emergency departments.
• Human cases of novel influenza A virus infection, which are human infections with non-human influenza A viruses that are different from currently spreading seasonal human influenza A viruses, are nationally notifiable. Every identified case is investigated and reported to CDC.
• CDC is actively looking at multiple influenza indicators during the current situation to monitor for HPAI A(H5N1) viruses, including looking for spread of the virus to, or among people, in jurisdictions where the virus has been identified in people or animals.

Virological assessments

Because influenza viruses have a high error rate during replication and rapidly evolve, CDC continually conducts genetic analyses of viruses to identify changes that may impact virus phenotypes such as antigenicity, antiviral susceptibility, transmissibility, and/or pathogenesis. Genetic analysis also is performed to assess changes that may impact diagnostic test performance.

Diagnostics

Various CDC influenza virus diagnostic real time RT-PCR tests detect typical human (seasonal) viruses or novel influenza A viruses (e.g., H5, H7) that may infect people through zoonotic transmission.  These diagnostic tests are used in all 50 U.S states and globally. Additionally, there are CDC diagnostic tests that specifically detect A(H5) viruses, which are available in public health laboratories in all 50 U.S. states and international laboratories.

Most commercial assays used for human influenza virus testing are likely to detect HPAI A(H5N1) viruses as influenza A viruses because they target conserved proteins.

Candidate vaccine virus development

The development of influenza candidate vaccine viruses (CVVs), coordinated by WHO, remains an essential component of the overall global strategy for influenza pandemic preparedness. A library of H5 candidate vaccine viruses (CVV) has been produced with additional recommendations for development during bi-annual vaccine consultation meetings (See Table and  https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/vaccines/who-recommendations/zoonotic-influenza-viruses-and-candidate-vaccine-viruses ). The  CDC Influenza Risk Assessment Tool  is also used to help  prioritize HPAI A(H5) viruses for development of CVVs .

This report is subject to the following limitations. First, the number of reported human infections with HPAI A(H5N1) viruses is small. Conclusions regarding virus characterization analyses, transmissibility from animals to people, transmissibility among people, and clinical spectrum of illness in people should be interpreted in light of this small number. Second, detailed exposure information was not available for all exposed persons or for those being monitored for illness after exposure to HPAI A(H5N1) virus-infected wild birds, poultry, backyard flocks, and other animals, including dairy cattle in the United States. As of the date of this report, understanding of HPAI A(H5N1) virus infections of cattle is very limited. Thus, we are not able to assess the impact of exposure variables such as duration of exposure, nature of exposure (e.g., direct vs. indirect contact), and use of personal protective equipment on infection risk among persons with confirmed HPAI A(H5N1) virus infection or those being monitored after exposures to any animals confirmed or suspected with HPAI A(H5N1) virus infection.

• To date, CDC analyses of clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI A(H5N1) viruses detected in wild birds, poultry, and sporadically in mammals, including in dairy cattle, since late 2021 indicate that these viruses all have a high degree of genetic identity with each other and no significant mammalian adaptive substitutions, insertions, or deletions have been identified, particularly in the HA gene, which is important for zoonotic and subsequent human-to-human transmission.
• Considering the high prevalence of HPAI A(H5N1) viruses in wild birds and poultry worldwide, spillover into mammals (including carnivores that may feed on infected animals) and additional sporadic zoonotic infections are anticipated among people with exposures to infected sick or dead poultry, wild birds, or other infected animals.
• Clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI A(H5N1) viruses currently circulating in wild birds and poultry worldwide lack the ability to preferentially bind to the types of sialic acid receptors that are predominant in the upper respiratory tract of humans and therefore do not currently have the ability to easily infect or transmit among people.
• Despite extensive worldwide spread of HPAI A(H5N1) viruses in wild birds and poultry in recent years, only a small number of sporadic human infections with clade 2.3.4.4b or clade 2.3.2.1c viruses have been reported since 2022; nearly all cases had recent exposure to poultry and no cases of human-to-human transmission of HPAI A(H5N1) virus have been identified.
• In 2024, 3 sporadic epidemiologically unrelated human infections with clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI A(H5N1) viruses have been detected in U.S. dairy farm workers exposed to cows presumed or confirmed to be infected with HPAI A(H5N1) virus. All 3 workers experienced clinically mild illnesses and recovered fully. For cases with genome sequencing available, no known markers of reduced susceptibility to currently recommended FDA-approved influenza antiviral medications were detected, and no changes to receptor binding tropism were identified that would increase the risk of transmission to and among people. Given the ongoing outbreak of clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI A(H5N1) viruses among dairy cattle in 9 states to date, additional sporadic human infections in exposed dairy farm workers are anticipated.

While CDC’s assessment is that the current overall threat of clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI A(H5N1) viruses to public health is low, the widespread geographic prevalence of infected birds and poultry, with spillover into a wide range of mammal species, and ongoing spread of clade 2.3.4.4b viruses, including among dairy cattle in the United States, raises the potential for more  mammals to be infected that could result in viral evolution or reassortment events which might change the current risk assessment. Similar to human infections with HPAI A(H5N1) viruses since 1997, sporadic clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI A(H5N1) virus infections have resulted in a wide clinical spectrum, ranging from conjunctivitis and acute respiratory illness to severe and critical illness with fatal outcome. Additional sporadic human infections with HPAI A(H5N1) viruses with a wide clinical spectrum (mild to severe and critical illness) resulting from exposure to infected animals are anticipated worldwide. Vigilance and ongoing surveillance of HPAI A(H5N1) viruses circulating in wild birds, poultry, and in mammals and infected persons worldwide is critical to monitor the public health risk and to detect genetic changes (particularly in the HA gene) that would change CDC’s risk assessment.

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• How CDC is monitoring influenza data among people to better understand the current avian influenza A (H5N1) situation | Avian Influenza (Flu)
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• Case Definitions for Investigations of Human Infection with Avian Influenza A Viruses in the United States
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• Interim Guidance on Influenza Antiviral Chemoprophylaxis of Persons Exposed to Birds with Avian Influenza A Viruses Associated with Severe Human Disease or with the Potential to Cause Severe Human Disease
• Interim Guidance on Follow-up of Close Contacts of Persons Infected with Novel Influenza A Viruses and Use of Antiviral Medications for Chemoprophylaxis
• Brief Summary for Clinicians: Evaluating and Managing Patients Exposed to Birds Infected with Avian Influenza A Viruses of Public Health Concern
• Interim Guidance on Testing and Specimen Collection for Patients with Suspected Infection with Novel Influenza A Viruses with the Potential to Cause Severe Disease in Humans
• Interim Guidance for Infection Control Within Healthcare Settings When Caring for Confirmed Cases, Probable Cases, and Cases Under Investigation for Infection with Novel Influenza A Viruses Associated with Severe Disease | Avian Influenza (Flu) (cdc.gov)
• Interim Guidance on the Use of Antiviral Medications for Treatment of Human Infections with Novel Influenza A Viruses Associated with Severe Human Disease
• Technical Report: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Viruses (cdc.gov) – December 29, 2023
• Technical Report: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Viruses (cdc.gov)  – October 27, 2023
• Technical Report: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Viruses (cdc.gov)  – October 5, 2023
• Technical Report: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Viruses (cdc.gov)  – July 7, 2023
• Addendum:  Human Infection with highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus in Chile (cdc.gov)  – April 17, 2023
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• Reported Human Infections with Avian Influenza A Viruses
• Past Examples of Probable Limited, Non-Sustained, Person-to-Person Spread of Avian Influenza A Viruses
• Highlights in the History of Avian Influenza (Bird Flu) Timeline – 2020-2024
• Information for People Exposed to Birds Infected with Avian Influenza Viruses
• Prevention and Antiviral Treatment of Bird Flu Viruses in People
• Recommendations for Worker Protection and Use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to Reduce Exposure to Novel Influenza A Viruses Associated with Severe Disease in Humans
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• Public Health Monitoring Plan for USDA/APHIS Responders to Detections of Avian Influenza Virus in Poultry  [353 KB, 18 pages]

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